Turkish participation is key, but at what cost and at whose expense?
Tuesday, February 13, 2007
KurdishMedia.com - By Prof. Dlawer Ala’Aldeen
All is not going well in Iraq or Middle East. Time and patience are running out on President George W. Bush, and he is running out of patience with Iran and Iranian proxies in Iraq. Defeat is “not an option”, but going for broke is. Mr Bush knows that Iraq is beyond salvage and its civil war is beyond reversal by US. If so, why ask for more money, more troops and more sacrifice. The answer is, Iran.
Sending more US troops to Baghdad, targeting pro-Iranian Jaysh Al-Mahdi and hunting down Iranian agents, all add up to one thing: a pre-war preparation aimed at securing the capital (against a coup d’état) before attacking Iran.
Having effectively gift-wrapped Iraq for Iran, Mr Bush allowed the lead member of “axis of evil” to control the state and streets of Iraq. Thanks to Iran’s cunning and expertly executed plans, the Bush doctrine and the neocons’ democratisation crusade in the Middle East, are virtually dead. Potentially, this could mark the beginning of the end of an empire.
Old strategies and new
Mr Bush’s old strategy for securing Iraq relied heavily on the growth of Iraqi Army and police, patriotism of Iraqi politicians and competence of a democratically elected Government in Baghdad. Not surprisingly, he harvested disappointment on all accounts. His new, largely military, strategy relies on the presence of a 154,000 strong US troops, and the cooperation of Mr Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, to turn the US fortunes. Mr Bush is up for another big disappointment, if securing Iraq is indeed the object as he claims.
Military options have been tried at exhaustion in Iraq, and failed. In 2005, for example, over 160,000 US soldiers failed to secure Iraq against a handful of Sunni Arab terrorists. That was before the “civil war”. This time, an even smaller US troop is asked to achieve miracles against the combined Sunni and Shiite extremists who are engaged in unprecedented sectarian killings.
As for Maliki to deliver on promises, and go against his power-base, is paradoxical and would constitute yet another miracle. Muqtada Sadr’s popular militia (Jeysh Al-Mahdi) is over 60,000 strong, represented in the Iraqi Parliament by 32 MPs, has 6 ministers in the Government, and has infiltrated the suppressive state machinery. Without Muqtada, Maliki would not be or remain a Prime Minister. Furthermore, Mailiki commands no control over his cabinet and the state army, police or intelligence. The self-interested Ministers show no loyalty to the Government, or the country for that matter. In short, there is no Government in Iraq and there never will be, and forcing one into existence will lead to even greater disappointment. And Mr Bush should know this better.
Drawing the plan of attack
Iran has been in Mr Bush's bad books for some time, long before its inauguration as a member of the "axis of evil" in 2002. Israel promoted Iran from an “unfriendly” to a “hostile” country in 2005, particularly after the anti-Semitic rhetoric of President Ahmadinajad, who denied the holocaust and threatened to wipe out Israel from the map. This, now, is a matter of life and death for Israel.
In early 2005, Ariel Sharon and Mr Bush finalised a “plan of attack” on Iran, but neither were ready. That year, the Iraqis were busy formulating, and voting for, a democratic constitution. In 2006, they were left to form their first legitimate, democratically elected, Government. Over-optimistically, Bush hoped that elections will enhance Iraqi Shiite politicians’ independence from Iran, ignoring the fact that almost all the leading Iraqi politicians, including the Sunnis, had for decades sought refuge in Iran (and/or Syria) and were politically, financially and militarily aided by the Iranian establishment. Expectedly, the reverse of Mr Bush’s anticipations occurred, and Iranian interventions guaranteed the exponential escalation of the civil war. Indeed, by 2007, all was lost in Iraq.
In 2005, Israel was not ready either. Iranian fire was physically too close to Israel. Hezbollah of Lebanon and Hamas of Palestine are considered Iran’s proxies and would have been capable of inflicting fatal blows to Israel. They had to be neutralised first, directly or indirectly. And so they were. Israel waged an all out war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, while Hamas has been kept busy struggling for survival.
The plan in action
Along with his overall Iraq strategy, President Bush announced on January 10th that he had ordered another aircraft carrier battle group into the Persian Gulf, thereby stirring pro-war sentiments in the US. His, and Israeli, war of words against Iran have become increasingly hostile and specific. A steady pre-war propaganda blitz is now increasingly palpable and, a joint US-Israeli anti-Iranian lobby is on the offensive.
Reports suggest that US Special Forces, helped by exiles, are already engaged in operations in Iran’s Khuzestan for data collection and liaison with internal opposition. US attack aircrafts have been sent to Turkey and other countries on Iran's borders. US troops, warships and Patriot anti-missile missile batteries are spread all over the Arab side of the Persian Gulf coast. Thus, by the time the second Mediterranean-based aircraft carrier joins the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the President would be ready for an all out attack. Meanwhile, he is on the look out for a misstep by Iran to trigger, albeit prematurely, a full blown war.
The attack on Iran is likely to be entirely air based, but not limited to a short, sharp surgical strike. Instead, Bush will launch a profound campaign of shock and awe, not dissimilar to that of Iraq, designed to paralyse Iran beyond self-defence. Using aircrafts, missiles and powerful bunker-busting ordnance, Iran’s atomic, military, Air Force, navy, telecommunication and major economic (except oil) infrastructure will be targeted. Any thing less, would be inadequate and may leave Iran injured but capable of reprisal.
According to intelligence sources, the US would let the Israelis take a lead role in attacking Iran's nuclear facilities (as an act of pre-emptive self defence), followed by US intervention. This will defuse Democrat’s opposition and bypass the niceties of Congressional and United Nations endorsement of the war. Once the US forces are committed to a new conflict, the Democrats will find it politically impossible to interfere or oppose it while boiling hot.
The aftermath
A sustained bombing campaign in Iran will humiliate President Ahmadinajad and the religious leadership, and may lead the public to rise up against both the US and Iranian rulers. It will not lead to a total collapse of the Government, as the neoconservatives would hope. Iranian Islamic fundamentalism has thrived on poverty, war and crisis. That said, the regime is not invulnerable. Its popular support, economic power and former inner cohesion have been severely weakened by corruption, wars, internal divisions and economic hardship. Imam Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, has publicly criticized the President's statements about Iran's nuclear program and his government's failure to stop inflation in Iran. Other leading politicians are adding to the pressure on Ahmadinajad, who recently opened the door for non-aligned visitors to inspect his nuclear installations.
An attack on Iran will inflame the Near, Middle and Far East, as well as Muslims and anti-war non-Muslims every where. The world will be polarised, and violent expressions of anger would be expected. Bush will dismiss war critics as pro-terrorist. Pro-Iranian Shiites or alienated Arab and Sunni extremists will go violent in the immediate aftermath, but this would be expected, catered for by friendly Governments and will not bother the US. The worst that can happen to the US is to have its soldiers in Iraq targeted. This, however, is the least of Mr Bush’s worries. Bigger war concerns that he has catered for in his current strategy will include: 1) protecting Baghdad’s Green zone where his Embassy and Iraqi Government reside, for which he has dedicated an extra 20,000 US soldiers; 2) protecting Israel and Gulf Arab countries, for whom he has provided anti-missile batteries; 3) Iran’s use of weapons of mass destruction, which he would try to prevent by threatening Iran with worse; 4) avoiding a world economic crisis arising from the transient blockage of the Persian Gulf, which will be unavoidable but bearable. There will be many more colossal consequences of a war of this magnitude, the predictions on which is outside the scope of this article.
Coalition of the willing
Based on previous experience and current global approval rate, Mr Bush is unlikely to seek or secure world wide support for his action. However, the cooperation of key strategic countries, such as those surrounding Iran, would be required. He will need to offer plenty of carrots (and sticks) to Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Afghani and Pakistani Governments and war lords. Intriguingly, these multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries have complex internal security problems, and divergent priorities that are in conflict with one other and with those of USA. These add to the enormity of the task, and require aggressive but sophisticated diplomatic skills.
Turks, Kurds and the US dilemma
Turkey’s collaboration is key to the success of any US-Israeli attack on the geographically wide-spread Iranian targets. Turkish leaders will play tough, making the most of this round and try to make up for their 2003 own goal, when they denied the US military access into Northern Iraq. This time they will offer support and access to land and air. In return they expect US collaboration to exterminate Turkey’s Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). Further, they would go as far as denying the Iraqi Kurds a constitutional right to govern their oil-rich city of Kirkuk.
For the US, it would be a mistake to alienate the Kurds, America’s most powerful and strategic allies inside Iraq, or offer them as scapegoats to Turkey. Regionally, the Kurds are surrounded by hostile neighbours, and have lived under constant Turkish, Iranian and pre-2003 Iraqi threats. Aware of their limitations, and having previously paid heavy prices for other people’s wars, the Kurds are being extra careful and would rather stay out of major regional conflicts.
High profile US and Israeli political and intelligence coordinators have been active in Turkey, bringing back memory of the shameless collaboration between the CIA, Mussed and their Turkish counterpart for kidnapping Abdulla Ocalan, the PKK leader who is now in a Turkish jail. Gen. Joseph W. Ralston of US has been conveying Turkish messages pressures to Masud and Nechirvan Barzani, President and Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan, respectively. Their negotiations remain a secret but, predictably, centre round Turkish intentions to bombard Qandil, the stronghold of PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan. Worse still, Ralston might be brokering a deal for the Turks to invade Iraqi Kurdistan to go after the PKK fighters. However, agreeing a deal that would guarantee a win-lose outcome in favour of the Kurd’s arch enemy, would cost the Kurdish leaders dearly. Their cooperation with a hostile neighbour, who has done little to win the Kurd’s trust and good will, would be suicidal.
Senior British diplomats are also lobbying in Kurdistan, among officials and politicians. Their efforts focus on convincing (and adding pressure on) the Kurds for a long delay in implementing the 140th clause of the Iraqi constitution. The clause relates to holding a referendum on future of Kirkuk, which Turkey fears will strengthen the hand of the Kurds and may lead to their ultimate independence. It is only too obvious that the UK Government is secretly engaged lobbying, and brokering deals, on behalf of Turkey at the expense of the Kurds. Interestingly, none of the lobbyists have offered any credible win-win alternatives. Kirkuk is now the core, and symbol, of the Kurdish struggle in Iraq. No Kurdish leader would brave such an irresponsible compromise and expect to survive politically, or get away with it.
Handling PKK
The PKK represents a hugely popular movement in Northern (Turkey’s) Kurdistan. Turkey’s century-long state terror, and 24 year-long systematic anti-PKK military campaign, have done little to weaken the resolve of the 20 million Northern Kurds in their fight for basic human rights. An air strike on a handful of fighters on an isolated Iraqi mountain would be a total waste of exercise, fuel further hatred and complicate future Kurdish-Turkish-US relations. By alignment with Turkey, the US will loose moral high ground and the Kurd’s goodwill. The PKK, on the other hand, will win sympathy, support and refuge. It is highly likely that the well-connected PKK Peshmarga fighters would suffer minimal damage as a result of air or ground attack on Qandil. They would disseminate amongst the 6 million Iraqi Kurds, who would happily accommodate them (encouraged by their leaders or not).
The US, British and Israel lobbyists should be aiming at win-win situations. Ideally, the US should help the elected Turkish politicians to break free from the unaccountable and dictatorial Army Generals. The two have diverging agenda. The former is trusted with delivering on election pledges, including democracy, prosperity, EU membership and a political solution to the Kurdish issue. The Army, on the other hand, is a state-within-state, thrives on corruption, extremism, violence and wars. Unaided, the Turkish politicians are incapable of confronting Army Generals, who approach the Kurdish issue purely from a security point of view. For as long as this remains so, Turkey will suffer on-going political, economic and security instability.
Kurdish choices
The de facto state of Iraqi Kurdistan is now a reality and the Kurds believe they can contribute to bringing peace, stability and prosperity to the region. They have access to natural wealth and are willing to spend their fortune (billions) on building a modern and civilised country. Turkey is in a unique position to take advantage of these aspirations. Turkish private firms have demonstrated their strong desire to foster such mutually rewarding bridges. Unlike their Government, they have communicated directly to the Kurdish leaders.
Turkey’s on-going animosity, and further aggressive actions, will inevitably force the Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Government, into seeking alternatives. Syria, a desperate neighbour, would be an obvious one. A commercial super-highway, linking Kurdistan to the Mediterranean via Syria would be a secure and cost-effective short-cut. It will bring Syria out of its isolation and into economic prosperity.
Finally
Last week, Turkey’s foreign Minister Abdullah Gul sought Washington's support to “curb PKK activity” and to “thwart Iraqi Kurdistan's ambitions” to regain Kirkuk. The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has urged her Turkish counterpart not to take military action against PKK in Iraq, and the US official line on Kirkuk is that it is a matter for the Iraqis to deal with, internally, as per the adopted constitution. Whereas the British lobbing efforts against the Kurd’s strategic interests is alarming.
To what extent the Turkish, Kurdish and US agenda are reconcilable, and whether the US can find win-win scenarios for all, is not obvious. To what extent public statements and secret commitments mirror each other, is also unknown. Will the Kurdish leaders succumb to pressure, trust the US verbal reassurances on Kirkuk, and trust that they will not be betrayed again, only time will tell. Can the US afford to lose their best allies in Iraq, and thereby lose the entire war? I would say not.
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts
Tuesday, 13 February 2007
Wednesday, 27 December 2006
لهدهست دانی دۆستهكان له دهستد دانی جهنگه
كورد و راپۆڕتى بهيكهر- هاملتن
لهدهست دانی دۆستهكان له دهستد دانی جهنگه
نووسينی: پرۆفيسۆر دلاوهر عهبدولعهزيز عهلائهددين
وهرگێڕانی له ئينگليزيهوه: دكتۆر ئامانج عهبدوڵلا سهعيد
دووهم/ڕاگرتنى يهكلايى كردنهوهى چارهنووسى ناوچه به عهرهبكراوهكان، له كاتێك دا ئهم مهسهلهيه له دهستوردا چهسپێنراوه، ئهمهش خۆى له خۆى داخيانهتێكى يهكجار گهورهيه دهرههق به كوردهكانى عيراق.
سێههم/چڕكردنهوهى دهستهلاَت له حكومهتى ناوهندى ( بهغدا) دا ، ئهم ڕاسپاردهيهش پرۆسهى دروستكردنى بڕيارى سياسى دهخاته بهر دهم مهترسى تاك ڕهوى و دروست بوونى حكومهتێكى سێنترالى دكتاتۆرى.
چوارهم/بهيكهر و هاملَتۆن دهستى ڕێز دهنێنه سهر توندڕهوهكان و دهيانكهنه بهشێكى گرنگ له جيهازى دهولَهت.
پێنجهم/ به ئاشكرا دهكهونه ڕازى كردن و لاواندنهوهى گروپه تێرۆريستهكان و وولاته ئيقليميه پالَپشتهكانيان.
كاتێك (كۆلن پاولَ) له پۆستى وهزيرى دهرهوهى وويلايهتهيهكگرتووهكانى ئهمهريكادا بوو، ههميشه سهرنجى سهرۆكى بهرهو ئهو ڕاستييه ڕادهكێشا كه پێويسته ئهمهريكا يان ڕژێم نهروخێنێ، يان ئهگهر رووخاندى دهبێت تاسهر ئۆبالَى دهرهنجامهكانى له ئهستۆ بگرێت. بهر له هێرشى عيراق، پاولَ به سهرۆكى ووت عيراق وهك مهخزهنى شوشه فرۆشييه- ههرچيت لێ شكاند دهبێت بيكڕيت. ئهم جۆره بيركردنهوهيه تهواو جياوازه لهوهى بهيكهر كه دهيهوێت لێدا و ڕابكات ( لێده و ههرێ).
ئهمهيان دووباره بوونهوهى مێژووه له جهنگى كهنداوى دووهم دا، كهلهسهردهمى بۆش ى باوك دا رووى دا بهمهبهستى دهركردنى هێزهكانى عيراق له كوهيت. ئهم جۆره لێكدانهوه سيياسييه ههلاَنه بوونه مايهى نيگهران كردنى عيراقييهكان و سهنجامهكهشى بهوه شكايهوه كه شيعهكان ئاماده نهبوون هاوكارى و بهخێرهاتنى ئهمهريكا بكهن له جهنگى ئازاد كردنى عيراق دا.
سهرۆك بوش و هێزهكانى ئهمهريكا له ئێستادا باجى ههلَه كۆنهكانى بهيكهر و كيسنجهر دهدهن، ئهم دوو پيره سياسى ييه ههردهم سهداميان لا قبولَتر بووه و ههميشه ئۆپۆزسيۆنى دژه سهداميان به چاوى سوكايهتى سهير كردووه.
خهلَكى ههرێمى كوردستان به شێوازێكى ئارهزوومهندانه پشتيوانى تهواوى ههولَهكانى ئهمهريكابوون له سهرخستنى پرۆسهى ئازادى و گۆڕينى ڕژێمى بهغدا. ههرچهنده ئهم ههلَوێستهى كوردهكان به گران له سهريان دهكهوێت ( لهبهر بارو دۆخى دژه ئهمهريكايى ڕۆژههلاَتى ناوهڕاست ) بهلاَم سهربارى ئهوهش هێشتا به گولَباران پێشوازيان له هێزهكانى ئهمهريكا كرد.
كهچى لهبرى ستايش و پێزانينى ئهم ههلَوێسته، گروپى بهيكهر هاملتن له نوسراوهكهيان دا زۆر به بێمنهتى كوردهكان پهراوێز دهخهن و دهيانكهنه قوربانى گروپه تێرۆريست و توندڕهوهكان و دهولَهته پشتيوانهكانيان. بێگومان گهر ئهم لهنگييه له تێڕوانينى ئهمهريكى دا ڕاست نهكرێتهوه ئهوا دۆسته ڕاستهقينهكهى خۆيان له ناوچهكه لهدهست دهدهن.
ئهوان له ڕاپۆرتهكهيان دا ڕۆلَى كاريگهرى سهركرده كوردهكان له پرۆسهى سياسى عيراق دا فهرامۆش دهكهن. ناوى بارزانى و تالَهبانى تهنها له قالَبى ئاماژه كردن بۆ ناكۆكى و ململانێكانى ئێستاو ڕابردوويان دێنن. لێرهدا دهردهكهوێت كه گروپى بهيكهر هاملتۆن زانياريان زۆر كهمه دهربارهى ڕۆلَى ئهم سهركرده ديارانهى كورد له پرۆسهى سياسى عيراق و پتهوكردنى دام و دهزگاكانى حكومهت و ئاشت بوونهوهى نيشتيمانى و بهرقهراركردنى ئاشتى له نێوان لايهنه بهشهرهاتووهكانى عيراق (شيعه و سونه). ئهوان پێ دهچێت له ياديان چووبێت ئهو دوو سهركرده كورده كۆنترۆلَى دهولَهمهندترين و ستراتيجى ترين ههرێمى عيراق دهكهن وحوكمى زياتر له پێنج ملێون هاولاَتى دهكهن، ئهو هاولاَتيانهى بيرهوهرى كاره خيانهتكارييهكانى پێشووى ئهمهريكايان زۆر باش له ياده. .
كهس گومانى نييه له نيازو ههولَ و تهقهلاى سهركرده كوردهكان بۆ پشتيوانى له يهكپارچهيى خاكى( عيراق). لێبڕاوانه، خهباتيان بۆ چهسپاندنى دهستور و سهقامگيركردنى حكومهتى ئێستاى بهغدا كردووه، بهو هيوايهى بتوانن له سايهى عيراقى ئازاد و ديموكراتيى دهستورى دا مافهكانى خۆيان بچهسپێنن.
ئيلتيزامى سهركرده كوردهكان بۆ مانهوهيان له چوارچێوهى عيراق دا تا ئهو كاته بڕدهكات كه عيراق له چوارچێوهى دهستورێكى ديمكراسى دا پرۆسهى سياسى ئاراسته دهكات، ئهگهر نا چيتر ئاماده نابن هاوكارى هێزه ئهمهريكييهكان بكهن بۆ سهقامگيرى و يهكپارچهيى خاكى عيراق.
لهلايكى ترهوه ڕاسپاردهكانى بهيكهرو هاملتن سهبارهت بهكهركوك ديسان ناههقييهكى گهورهيه دهرههق به خهباتى كوردهكان. ئهوهتا ڕاپۆرتهكه پێشنيازى دواخستنى پرۆسهى ڕيفراندۆمى يهكلايى كردنهوهى كهركوك دهكات، كه بڕياره به پێى دهستور له كۆتايى 2007 دا ئهنجام بدرێت. ڕهنگه ئهم پێشنيازه ههندێك له عيراقييهكان و وولاَتانى دراوسێ ڕازى بكات، بهلاَم كوردهكان ههرگيز ڕازى نابن مادهى 140ى دهستور بخرێته بهر دهم ئهگهر و ئاستهنگ و پاساوى جۆراوجۆرهوه.
ئهم ڕاپۆرته، نهيارهكانى سهرك بوش ى سهرفراز كردووه و بۆته مايهى نيگهرانى دۆسته ههره نزيكهكانى. ئيتر ئهجێنداى موحافيزكاره نوێيهكان له ڕۆژههلاَتى ناوهڕاست دا ڕوو له شكستتى يه. هۆكارهكهشى له لايهكهوه دهگهڕێتهوه بۆ زهبرى توندڕهو و تێرۆريستهكان و وولاَته پشتيوانهكانيان، و له لايهكى تريشهوه بۆ دوودلَى و ڕاڕايى و متمانه لهدهست دانى ئهمهريكييهكان.
Tuesday, 26 December 2006
چاوپێكهوتن لهگهڵ ڕێبازی ئازادی
پرۆفيسۆر دلاوهر عهبدولعهزيز عهلائهددين بۆ ڕێبازی ئازادی
سهبارهت به ڕاپۆرتی بهيكهر هاميلتۆن
ڕێبازی ئازادی ژماره 452 - ڕۆژی 26/12/2006 لاپهڕه 5
*به بۆچوونی تۆ گرنگی ئه ڕاپۆڕته چيه و مه ترسيهكانی لهسهر كورد كامانهيه؟
*لةخالَى (30)دا كةركوك بة بةرميليَك بارود ناو دةبات و داوادةكات جيَبةجيَكردنى ثرؤسةى ئاسايى كردنةوة دوابكةيَت ئةمة تا ضةند واقيعة و لةطةلَ دةستورو ماددةى (140) دةطونجيَت كورد لةمبارةيةوة ضى بكات؟
لهو خاڵهدا، ڕاستگوتراوه كه كهركوك لهسهر تهقينهوهيه، و له كاتی تهقينهوهش، وهزعی عيراق ئالۆزتر دهبێت و سهرئێشهيهكی زياتر بۆ ئهمريكا دروست دهبێت. لهخاڵهكهدا، ئيشارهتيش بهوه كراوه كه وهعدهی ريفهراندۆم له دهستوردا چهسپاوه، بهڵام داوادهكات كه به پێچهوانهی دهستوور، ئهو كاره دوابخرێ (واته نهكرێ)، تاوهكو چارهيهكی جياوازی بۆ دهدۆزرێتهوه به ڕاوێژكاری نێودهوڵهتيهوه (واته بهبهشداری توركيا و ووڵاته دراوسێكانی عيراقهوه). ئهنجامی ئهوجۆره چارهيهش ديارهو پێويست به چاوهرێ ناكات.
*لةماددةى (32)دا باسى مافى ثيَكهاتةو ئةتنيك و كةمينةكانى عيراق و تةنانةت ذنانيش دةكات كةضى باسى كورد ناكات ئةم خالَة بةئاشكرا كة دذايةتى كورد نيية؟
نهخێر ئهوه له دژايهتی كورد نيه. گروپی بهيكهر-هاميلتن دژايهتی كورديان نهكردوه، بهڵام بايهخيان به كورد و رۆڵی سياسی كورديی نهداوه، چونكه ئهو جۆره حيسابهی بۆ ناكهن كه ئێمه دهمانهوێ. بۆ نموونه، بهيكهر كابرايهكی ئهمريكی پرۆ عهرهبه و بهلايهوه كورد له نهخشهی سياسيدا ياريكهرنيه، و بهڵكو ئێسكيشی سووك نيه.
*لةخالَى (25-26)دا داواى دانوستان و طفتوطؤ دةكات تةنانةت لةطةلَ بةعسيةكانيش ئةمة ثةيوةست نيية بةشكستى ئةمريكاوة كة ئةم راثؤرتة دةيةويَت شكستةكانى بؤ راستبكاتةوة. ضؤن لايةنةسياسيةكان بة هاتنةوةى بةعسيةكان رازى دةبن؟
ئهو جۆره پێشنيازه، بۆ گفتوگۆ لهگهڵ توندڕهو و دوژمنه عهقائيديهكانی ئهمريكا، پهيوهسته به شكستی لهشكر و سياسهتی ئهمريكا له عيراقدا. ڕاپۆرتهكه بهمهبهستی ڕاستكردنهوهی ئهو شكستانه نوسراوه. ئهگهر ئيدارهی سهرۆك بوش بيهوێ تهبهننای ئهو پێشنيازه بكات، ئهوا دهتوانێ لهسهر حكومهتی ماليكی و لايهنه سياسيهكانی تری فهرز بكات. ئهگهر بهپێی ڕاپۆرتهكهبێ، دهبێ ئهمريكا لهمهودوا وهك داگيركهر ههڵسوكهوت بكات نهوهك ڕزگاركهر.
*راثؤرتةكة ئةوةندةى بةرذةوةندييةكانى ولآتانى ناوضةكة و ئيَران و سورياى لةبةرضاو طرتوة، ئةوةندة بةرذةوةندى عيراقيةكان و كوردى لةبةرضاو نةطرتوة دةبىَ كوردو عيراقيةكان ضى بكةن بؤ وةلآمدانةوةى ئةم راثؤرتة؟
تاكو ئێستا لايهنه كورديهكان و عيراقيهكانی تر خيتابيان يهك نهبووه، بۆيهش ههڵوێستی يهكگرتوويان نابێ. ههندێ له عيراقيهكان سوودمهندن به ڕاپۆرتهكه و بهرژهوهنديهكانيان بهستراونهتهوه به ووڵاتهكانی دراوسێ، بۆيهش پێشوازی لهو ڕاپۆرته دهكهن. ئهوهی گرنكه ئهوهيه كه ئايا كورد دهبێ چی بكات؟ كورد دهبێ به بهرنامه، لهناوهوه و دهرهوهی عيراق بهكاری لۆبی وا ههڵبستی كه فشارێكی نائاسايی بخاته سهر ئيدارهی سهرۆك بوش و نهيهلی كورد ئيهمال بكات. بهتهلهفۆنێك و وهفدێكی سهرۆك بوش نابێ سهركردهكانمان دڵنيا ببنهوهو دووباره لێی پالدهنهوه، دهبێ بهردهوام بن له فشاركردن و بگره ههراسانكردنی سياسهتمهدار و جهنهڕالهكانی ئهمريكی. نهيهلن سهرۆك بوش بهدڵنياييهوه لێ بخهوی و وابزانی كهوا سهركردهكانی كوردی ههموو له گيرفاندايه.
*ئيَران و سوريا دوو دوذمنى سةرسةختى ئةمريكان لةعيراقدا لةكاتيَكدا ضةندين كيَشةى تريش لة نيَوانياندا هةية كةضى راثؤرتةكة دةيةويَت رؤلَ بدات بةو دوو دةولَةتة، فاكتةرى ئةم طرنطيدانة ضيية، ثيَتواية رؤلَى ئيَران و سوريا لةمةودوا ثؤزةتيظانة بيَت؟
ئارامی له عيراقدا له بهرژهوهندی دراوسێكانيشه. بهڵام ئهجێندا و ئهولهيهتی دراوسێكانمان جياوازه له هی ئێمه. ئهولهويهتی ئيێستای سوريا و ئێران ئهوهيه كه بهرنامهی ئهمريكی له عيراقدا شكست بهێنێ، تاوهكو پهل نههاوێ بۆناو سنووريان، وهيان بۆ بڵاو كردنهوهی ديموكراسيهت لهناوچهكه. بهگوێرهی بهيكهر-هاميلتن، دهتوانرێت ڕۆلی پۆزهتيڤی ئێران و سوريا بكڕدرێ – واته شتێك بهرامبهر شتێك. بهڵام به گوێرهی ئيدارهی سهرۆك بوش، ئهو جۆرده دهست پانكردنهوه له ئێران و سوريا، جۆرێكه له دۆڕانی ياری سياسی كه له مهودای درێژدا زهرهری بۆ ئهمريكا ههيه. ههروهها، سهرۆك بوش نايهوێ ئارامی عيراق له ڕژێمی ئێران بكڕێ بهرامبهر به چاوپۆشين له بهرنامهی چهكی ئهتۆمیهكهی.
*سةركردايةتى كورد هةميشة بانطةشةى هاوثةيمانى و دؤستايةتى ئةمريكا دةكات، بةلآم دةركةوت كورد لةهاوكيَشة سياسيةكاندا شويَنيَكى نيية، ئايا كورد هةلَةكانى كامةية و ديبلؤماسيةتى ضؤن بةريَتة ثيَش؟
ئهوه پرسيارێكی ئاڵۆزه و پێويستی به وهڵامی ههمهلايهنهيه. سهركردهی كورد دهبێ لهمهودوا سيقهی به خۆی و به ميللهتهكهی زياتر بێ. كورد خاوهنی خاك و سامان و ميللهت و قهزيهيه. سهركردهی كورد دهبێ پشت ئهستووربێ بهوانه. تهنيا ڕێگهش ئهوهيه كه بڕوايی و ڕێزلێكگرتن له نێوان سهركردهكان و ميللهت زياتر بێت. بهداخهوه، سهركردهی كورد و ميللهتهكهی لێك دابڕاون و سيقهی نێوانيان ڕوولهكزيه و گهندهڵی حكومهت و موئهسسهسهكانی ڕوولهزياديه. ئهوهندهی كه ميللهت بۆ سياسيهكانی كردوه، سياسيهكان بۆ ميللهتيان نهكردوه، نموونهش زۆرن، ههرله سهردهمی شاخهوه بگره بۆ شهڕی براكوژی و تاوهكو شهری دهستور و ديموكراسی. لهمهودوا ميللهت چاوهڕێی بهديهێنانی وهعدهكانه. چاوهڕێی سارێژكردنهوهی برينهكانه، وه چاوهڕێی چارهسهری گهندهڵی و دامهزراندنی ديموكراسيهته كه تا ئێستا ههنگاوی ڕاستهقينه و مهزنی بۆ نههاويشتراوه له ناوههرێمی كوردستاندا.
لهسهر شانۆی نێودهوڵهتيشدا، لۆبی كوردی زۆر لهدوايه و كلاسيكيه و بێ سهروبهره. ههر حيزبهی بهتهنيايه و تهنيا بۆ پاراستنی بهرژهوهندی تاكهحيزبهكی كاردهكات. ڕاسته زۆربهی جار بهرژهوهندی حيزبی و كوردی تێكهڵدهبێتهوه، و بۆيهش ههردووك بهيهك حيساب سوودمهند دهبن. بهڵام ململانێی حيزبهكان تهوژم و تهركيزی لۆبيكردنهكهی لاواز كردوه. جار ههبوه كه نوێنهری دوو حيزبی كوردی چاويان به ههمان لێپرسراو و سيسهتمهداری بيانی كهوتوه و به دوو ڕوانگهی جياوازهوه (يان قسهوقسهرۆچكی دژ بهيهكهوه) ههوڵی ڕاكێشانی ئهوكهسهيان داوه. تهنانهت له ههندێ بواردا، ههر حيزبهی پهيوهندیه تابيهتهكانی خۆی به سياسی و ڕۆژنامهنووسه بيانيهكان به نهێنی دههێليتهوه، وه بهشداری حيزبه كورديهكانی پێناكات.
جگه لهوانهش، زۆربهی كاری حيزبهكان لهدهرهوهی ووڵاتدا بريتيه له كاری حيزبايهتی له نێو كۆمهڵگای كوردهواری و بهزمانی كوردی. ههرلايهنهی خهريكی كاری كۆمهڵايهتیه، بۆ نموونه ڕێكخستنی ئاههنگی نهورۆز و كۆڕی ڕۆشنبيري. پێويسته ئهو كارانه بۆ بۆ سهنتهره ڕۆشنبيريهكان لێبگهڕێن و تهركيزی حيزبايهتیان بۆ ڕاكێشانی ڕای گشتی ووڵاتهكه بۆ كورد ڕا بكێشن. دهبێ كاری لۆبی كردن به بهرنامهبێ و به تهنسيق بێ و به پێشڕهوی نوێنهرايهتی حكومهتی كوردستان بێت و به بهشداری ههموو حيزبهكانی گۆڕهپان. ههروهها دهبێ شێوازی لۆبيكردن به عهقليهت و عيلمی نوێ و تهوژمی بهردهوام بێ.
*راطةياندنى سةربةخؤيى يان ريفراندؤميَك بؤ سةربةخؤيى ريَطا ضارةية بؤ وةلآمدانةوةى راثؤرتةكة؟
نهخێر، ئهو جۆره وهڵامدانهوه له جێگهی خۆی نيه. له زروفی ئيمرۆدا، ڕاگهياندنی سهربهخۆيی كارێكی خۆكوژيه، و جارێ كاتی نههاتوه. بهرلهوهی بهو جۆره ڕاگهياندنه ههڵسين، دهبێ بزانين ئايا ئيدارهی سهرۆك بوش بهتهمای چيه و ئايا ريفهراندۆمی كهركوك و باقی بهندهكانی دهستوور جێبهجێ دهكرێ يان نا. ههرچی ريفهراندۆمه، ئهوه به شێوهی نارهسمی و زۆر به سهركهوتوويی ئهنجامدراوه، و ئهنجامدانی ريفهراندۆمێكی ترمان پێويست نيه. واته زهرهری نيه و سووديشی نيه چونكه هيچ پهيامێكی تر نابهخشێ. ئهمريكاش دهزانێ خواستی زۆرينهی كورد چيه و ههركاتێكيش ئهوجۆره ريفهراندۆمه به رهسمی بكرێ، ئهنجامهكهی مسۆگهره.
Tuesday, 19 December 2006
The Kurds and the ISG: losing friends, losing the war
The implementation of the Baker report would be a betrayal of Iraq's Kurds and a defeat for the United States itself, says Dlawer Ala'Aldeen.
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
After nine long months and endless speculation, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) published its report with recommendations for a change of course in Iraq on 6 December 2006. The report contains many solid, often objective, conclusions. However, it also consists of numerous ill-conceived assertions and recommendations in direct conflict with President George W Bush's mission for "liberating" Iraq, and with America's fundamental values for constitutional democracy. If adopted, the report will constitute an alarming reversal in Iraq policy, whereby the United State risks losing the goodwill of its local allies and, ultimately, the war on terror.
In a retrograde step, the ISG unapologetically makes five potentially damaging recommendations:
- suspension and/or gross manipulation of the democratically adopted constitution
- inhibition of the constitutionally agreed referendum on the fate of the arabised city of Kirkuk, representing yet another major betrayal of the Kurds
- centralisation of power in Baghdad, in a return to dictatorial central government
- rewarding extremists by their integration into the Iraqi state machinery
- reaching out to appease terrorists and their sponsoring countries.
The lesson of history
After extensive research, the ISG was expected to provide visionary solutions to help establish peace and democracy in Iraq, and justify a programmed and timely withdrawal of American troops. Instead, the group - chaired by former secretary of state James A Baker and former congressman Lee H Hamilton - provides a 20th-century-style Realpolitik that is typical of the era of Henry A Kissinger (and indeed of James Baker himself).
A solution to historic and political quagmires requires long-term commitment and shared ownership and responsibility. Colin Powell, when he was secretary of state, allegedly advised the president to follow the "Pottery Barn rule" in Iraq policy and "own it" if he breaks it. In stark contrast, Baker urges a quick-fix-and-run outcome.
Much against Bush's mission of "liberation", the ISG report is written with an occupying colonialist language and mentality. As a result, it reflects weakness in the superpower's confidence in handling its enemies, opting for deals-on-wheels with eyes fixed on America's short-term interests. This same chronic failure created the strong sense of betrayal among Iraqis in the past (e.g., in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war, conducted during the presidency of Bush's father, George HW Bush, to drive Iraq forces from Kuwait). The culmination of that sense of betrayal was the Shi‘a refusal to cooperate during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Bush and the US forces are currently harvesting the Baker-Kissinger seeds of the 1970s-1990s period. Saddam Hussein, despite his record, remained the two elder statesmen's favourite, and Saddam's opposition was considered not worthy of negotiations, even during the 1991 war, when the US was in need of the Iraqi people's support.
The people of the Kurdistan region willingly offered their unreserved support to the US efforts for a regime change in Baghdad and gave the liberating army a floral welcome. In the context of the anti-American climate in the middle east, this proved costly for the Kurds. Instead of a big reward, the Kurds are being alienated by the ISG and offered as scapegoats to the extremists, terrorists and their sponsoring countries. This grave miscalculation, if followed through, will inflict a double wound on the Americans: they will fail to win the support of their arch-enemies while losing that of the Kurds, their only genuine allies in Iraq.
The ISG report makes minimal reference to the Kurdish political parties, and where it does, it is in defining the two rival leaders, Jalal Talabani and Masood Barzani. The two are only mentioned with reference to their mutual distrust, past infighting and ongoing rivalry. They are not in any way acknowledged for their highly influential roles in brokering peace between the belligerent Sunni and Shi‘a factions, and for their vital role in keeping the government intact. The two leaders also control the richest and most strategic fifth of Iraq's territory, and govern over five million people who have vivid memories of past betrayals by the United States and Britain.A defeat for America
The Kurdish political leaders' support and unreserved commitment to a unified Iraq is unquestioned. The Kurds willingly supported the new constitution and current government in Baghdad, in the hope that their aspirations and prosperity will be realised within a democratic Iraq. The Kurds' enthusiasm to remain within Iraq goes as far as Iraq being constitutionally democratic. Thereafter, they will find no justification for supporting the US efforts to keep Iraq stable and united.
The ISG's recommendation on Kirkuk is alarming to the Kurds. It asks for postponement of the planned 2007 referendum (as per the constitution) and finding "another" solution acceptable to all Iraqis (and neighbouring countries). But there will be no solution acceptable to the Kurds that does not implement Article 140 of the constitution; no other option will keep Iraq intact.
To state the obvious, it is most unlikely that the US will be able to contain violence in Iraq without the help of Iraqis. This can only be accomplished by implementing the constitution, allowing local authorities within each province (federal unit) to fortify their boundaries and take control of their security and administration. Therefore, in reality, Bush has little option but to support the federalisation of Iraq to secure a lasting peace and conduct a programmed withdrawal of the US troops.
Whether or not the ISG report influences Bush's strategic decisions in the region, it is clear that opponents of the president received the report with satisfaction, while America's closest allies in Iraq were gravely concerned by it. The neo-conservative agenda in the middle east is now facing defeat, thanks both to the extremists, terrorists and their sponsors and to US hesitation and lack of confidence.
The ISG report seems destined to reward violence and appease US enemies at the expense of the Kurds. In the era of war on terror, the US will continue to need the Kurds as much as the Kurds need the US. Abandoning the Kurds again will add them to the list of the angry and will guarantee America's total defeat in Iraq, with dire consequences for the superpower's long-term future.
Wednesday, 13 December 2006
كهمتهرخهمی بهيكهرو هاميلتن، وهيان هی سهركردهی كورد
بهرلهسهری ساڵ، سياسهتی ئهمريكا دهگۆڕێ و كهركوكمان لهدهست دهچێ- ئهگهر پێڕانهگهين
پرۆفيسۆر دلاوهر عهبدولعهزيز عهلائهدين
هاوڵاتی - ژماره 304 ی ڕۆژی 13/12/2006 لاپهڕه 14
سهرۆكی ههرێم فهرمووی "به هیچ شێوهیهك ئێمه پابهندی ئهو راپۆرته نین". مهبهست لێره راپۆرتهكهی گروپی (بهيكهر-هاميلتن)ه كه بۆ گۆرينی ڕێرهوی سياسهتی ئيدارهی ئهمريكی نوسراوه. راپۆرتهكه كاسه ژههرێك بوو، سهرۆك بوش به ناچاری و به نادڵی قوتيدا. ئهگهر"ئيمه" پابهندی نهبين، ئايا بهرنامهی بهديلمان چيه و چی دهكهين؟
له ١٤٢ لاپهرهدا، گروپی بهيكهر-هاميلتن راستهوخۆ پهنجهيان خستۆته سهر برينهكانی بوش و بهبێ موجامهلهكردن كهموكوري و شكسته مهزنهكانی ئيدارهكهيان له عيراق ورۆژههلاتی ناوهراست دياريكردوه. له ٧۹ بهنددا پێشنيازی پاشهكشه و گۆرانكاريان بۆ كردوه. راسته، مهرج نيه سهرۆك بوش و ئيدارهكهی پابهندی راپۆرتهكه بن، بهلام له واقيعدا ئيختياری تریان له بهردهمدا نيه چونكه پابهندن به پاراستنی بهرژهوهندی وولاتهكهیان. لهدوای پهلهروحه، سهرۆك بوش ناچار دهكرێ كه به پێی ئهو راپۆرته ههنگاو بنێ، دهنا به كۆنگرێس و سهنات و ميديا و پياماقولانی پارتهكهی، دونيای لهبهردهم تاريك دهكرێ. بۆيهش، سهرۆك بوش به بێ شهك رێرهو و سياسهتی راپۆرتهكه دهگرێته بهر، لهوهشدا، ئيمهی كورد دهبێ زۆر به ئاگا بين له بيركردنهوه و جموجۆل و ههنگاوی سياسی.
راپۆرتهكه بهمهبهستی پاراستنی بهرژهوهندی بهرزی ئهمريكا و ڕزگار كردنی لهشكرهكهی نوسراوه، به سهرپهرشتی دوو پيره سهركردهی سهدهی رابووردوو و ڕاوێژكاريی پيرهسياسی وهك كيسينجهر، وه دوور له سۆز و وهفا و گفت و بهڵێن. بيرۆكهكانيان له ڕوانگهيهكی سياسهتبازی نێودهولهتی وادا ههلقوليوه كه تێياندا كورد تهنيا چاودێره -له پهنجهرهيهكی بچوكهوه- نهوهك ياريكهر. بۆيهش زوبانی نووسينهكهيان بيرهوهری سالانی حهفتاو ههشتاكانی پێوهلكاوه، ئهو زهمانی كه كورد ههر قوربانی بووه نهوهك براوه. لهراپۆرتی بهيكهر-هاميلتندا، براوهكان زياترن له دۆڕاوهكان. تهواوی دراوسێ و دوژمنهكانمان له براوهكانن، بهتايبهتی ئێران و سوريا، ئهوجا توركيا و سعوديه و ئوردون. براوهی ناو عيراقيش بريتين له عهرهبی سوننهو شيعه، به توندرهوهكانی وهك موقتهدای سهدرهوه. دۆڕاوهكانيش تهنيا دوو لايهنن، ئيدارهی سهرۆك بوش و ميللهتی كورد، بهلام ئيدارهی تاقه زلهێز توانای بهرگهگرتنی دۆڕانی كاتيی ههيه، به پيچهوانهی ميللهتێكی بندهسته.
پوختهی بهنده مهترسيدارهكان
رۆلی كورد له راپۆرتهكهدا
ئيمرۆ ناوچهكهمان ئاگری تێبهربووه و قانونهكانی سهردهمی شهری سارد سهراوبن بوونه. سهردهم هی شهری دژبه تێرۆره، بۆيهش رۆلی كهمه نهتهوهكانی وهك كورد زهق بوه. سياسهتی دهرهوهيی ئهمريكاش لهبهرد نهقش نهكراوه، بهڵكو ههموورۆژێك له گۆراندايه. بهرامبهر ئهمريكا، ئهوكهسهی كه خاوهن قهزيهيه و دهنگی بهرزدهكاتهوه خۆی دهكاته دڕكێكی موزعيج (بێ ئهوهی ببێته دوژمن)، زياتری دهست دهكهوێ له كهسێك كه خۆی دهكاته گوڵێك، يان پياوچاكێكی بێدهنگ. ههلبهت بهيكهر خۆشحال دهبێ ئهگهر كورد (دۆسته مسۆگهرهكهی) بهبێدهنگی بهكهم ڕازی ببێ. بهيكهر ههروهك برێمهر، ديسانهوه دهيهوێ ئيدارهی ئهمريكی زياتر خهريكی ڕازيكردنی دوژمنهكان بێ، لهسهر حيسابی دۆسته لاوازهكانی.
لاوازيی لۆبی كوردی له ئهمريكا
مال و حالێكی بێ سهروبهر
سهرهرای جموجۆلی و چالاكی خودی سهرۆكی ههرێم و سهرۆك كۆمار، ئيمرۆ دهبوايه كاريگهری سهركردهی كورد له ئاستی ناوچهيي و نێو دهولهتیدا زۆر زياتر بوايه لهوهی ههيه. بهلام كورد له كۆنهوه تا ئيستا خاوهنی موبادهره نهبوه له كاری چارهنوسسازی له سهر شانۆی نێودهولهتی. تهنيا پيشهی كاردانهوه بوه بۆ كاری دهوروبهر. تهنانهت سهركهوتنه ميژووييهكانی ئهو دووسێ ساڵهی رابووردووشيان رهنگدانهوهی ئهو فرسهتانه بوه كه رۆژگار (ڕزگاركردنی عيراق و سهرلێشێواوی عهرهبی عيراق) هێنانيه پێشهوه. هۆی ئهو بێ موبادهرهيهی كورديش دهگهرێتهوه سهر ئهوهی كه سهركردهی كورد بای ئهوهنده سيقهی به خۆوی و بزوتنهوهكهی نهبوه، تا لهوێوه پهلبهاوێ و موراوهغهی سياسی بكات له بهرامبهرهێزهكانی دراوسێ و زلهێزهكاندا. هۆيهكی تری گرنگيش دهگهرێتهوه بۆ ناتهبايی ريزهكانی كورد و خهريكبوونی سهركردهكان به ململانێی خۆخۆری.
خۆ ململانێی ناوهخۆيی ريزهكانی ناوهوهی يهكێتی، تهواو رێكخراوهكهی له موعادهلهكه دهرهێناوه. مهكتهبی سياسی و ئهندامانی سهركردايهتی و مهڵبهندهكانی يهكێتی تاكو ئهودواييه تهركيزیان ههرلهسهر پرۆسهی چاكسازی و ململانێی تهكهتولات بوو. لهكاتی ئاساييشدا، تهنيا كهنالی لۆبیكهری يهكێتی نيشتيمانی بريتيه له سهرهك كۆمار و يهكدوو وهزيری بهغدا. ئهوانهيش دهستبهستراون بههۆی مهنسهبه عيراقيهكانيانهوه. له ناو حكومهتی ههرێميشدا هيچ كام له وهزيره سهربهيهكێتيهكان (به جێگری سهرۆكوهزيرانيشهوه) كاری لۆبيان پێ نهسپێردراوه.
ههلبهت، ئهوه تهنيا يهك نموونهيه، له دهيان جاری تر كه پێشنيازی وورد و گرنگم ناردوه بۆ ههمان سهركرده ولێپرسراوان، و بهههمان شێوهش له بێ وهلامياندا كۆلم داوه، ئهگهرچی لهههندێ لهو جارانه زانيومه كه گوێرايهلی نامهكانم بوونه و به جيدديان وهرگرتوه، بهلام بهبێ ئهوهی وهڵام و پێزانينم بدهنهوه. بۆ نموونه له بهغدا له مانگی مايسی سالی ٢٠٠۳ دا، لهسهردهمی (جهنهڕال جهی گارنهر)ی سهرۆكی (ئۆرها)دا، نامهيهكی درێژم ئاراستهی بهرێز مام جهلال كرد، كه تێيدا نيگهرانی خۆم دهرخست له ههولهكانی، كه ئهوكاته بهرێزی دهيويست بكرێته سهرۆكوهزيرانی حكومهتی موئهققهت (ئهو پرۆژهيهی كه برێمهرنهيهێشت بقهومێ). له نامهكهمدا به چاكم نهزانی كه سهرۆكی پارتی وهيان يهكێتی ببێته سهرۆكی حكومهتێكی كارتۆنی بندهست كه لهبهرچاوی دونيادا وهك بووكهشووشهی زلهێزێك دێته بهرچاو، و بهوهش زهرهر به بزووتنهوهی كورد دهكهوێ. كورد ئهوكاته خاوهنی دهسهلات و حكومهتی سهربهخۆ بوو، پێويستی به شهرهشهق و سهرئێشهی حكومهتی بهغدا نهبوو. نهشدهكرا كه سهركردهيهكی وهك مام جهلال بهبێ ميكانيزمێكی شهرعی ببێته واجيههی زلهێزی داگيركهر و مهسئوليهتی شهری ئيرهاب و نيزامی بهعس و باقی فهوزهويهكانی عيراق بگرێته ئهستۆ. من ئهو نامهيهم به دهست دايه سكرتێری مام جهلال و داوای وهلام و پێزانينم لێ كرد. دوايی دوو رۆژ له ئهندامانی مهكتهبی سياسيهوه زانيمهوه كه ههرئهو رۆژه مام جهلال نامهكهمی خوێندبويهوه و ئێواره كۆپی دابووه ئهندامانی مهكتهب سياسی و لهرۆژی دواتر به چڕی باسی لهسهر كرابوو. مام جـهلال پشتگيری خۆی دهربریبوو له بيرورايهكانم و بهقسهشی كردبووم و دواتر برياری دابوو ههولی سهركوهزيرايهتی واز لێبهينێ. ههتا ئيمرۆشی لهگهلدابێ سوپاس و پيزانينی خۆی بۆم نهنارد.
ئهسلی مهقسهد و پلانی كار
بهكورديهكهی، ئيمرۆ كاتی لۆبی دووربهدووری نيه، بهلكو رۆژی لۆبی قورسه به ئامادهبوونی خودی سهركردهكان. رۆژی برياردانه و رۆژی ستاندنی مافی رهومانه. مێژوو لێمان نابورێ ئهكهر سهد له سهدی ووزهو توانامان نهرهخسێنين بۆ پاراستنی بهرژهوهندی بهرزی كورد و دهستكهوته مێژووييهكانمان و گهراندنهوهی كهركوك و ناوچه داگيركراوهكانی تر و وهدهستهێنانی گشت ئاواتمان
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