Thursday, 3 June 2004

Iraq in the balance
openDemocracy 3 - 6 - 2004

Iraqis are engaged in an intense national debate about the way they will now govern themselves. In this period of uncertainty, expectation and continued insurgency, six Iraqis discussed how they should shape their country’s future, its relationships with occupiers and neighbours, in mid–May, before the new government was formed.

This text is based on a roundtable discussion in the London office of openDemocracy on 17 May 2004, with Anthony Barnett and Caspar Henderson.

The six Iraqi roundtable participants are:

  • Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, Professor of Clinical Microbiology, University Hospital, Nottingham, England – and founder of the Kurdish Scientific and Medical Association

  • Hayder al–Fekaiki, founder of the non–governmental organisation Iraq Volunteer, an IT consultant and director of Iraqisport

  • Yousif al–Khoei, director of the Al–Khoei Foundation, London

  • Maysoon Pachachi, director of Oxymoron Films and a founder of Act Together: Women against Sanctions and War on Iraq

  • Ahmed Shames, chair of Iraqi Prospect Organisation

  • Sami Zubaida, Emeritus Professor of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, London
  • openDemocracy: The voices of most people outside the rich metropolitan centres of power are seldom heard in international discussions on topics of vital global concern. But people in the majority world should have a say – not only via formulaic mechanisms like opinion polling, but as equal and active partners, both with each other and with those in the centres of power in the west.

    oday, we in the world outside Iraq seldom if ever hear Iraqis debate among themselves over the future of their country. In facilitating this process in a modest way at openDemocracy, a key principle – in the Iraqi context as elsewhere – is willingness to listen to another’s point of view.

    The Iraq dialogue hosted by openDemocracy is, then, part of a wider attempt to ensure that decisions about national and global governance always include the voices and experiences of those most affected.

    It is particularly important to emphasise this in relation to Iraq, because Iraq is so often seen through the lens of American and (more broadly) western experience; whereas, from the standpoint of Iraq, America and the outside world – including the country’s neighbours and region – is part of Iraqi reality. How will Iraqis “manage” this reality, as well as addressing their country’s severe internal problems of governance and development, in the weeks and months ahead? What are the different views on these crucial questions?

    To start, please could each of you in turn briefly outline your background, what you thought about the United States–led invasion and whether your views have now changed?

    Where I’m coming from

    Dlawer Ala’Aldeen: I am Kurdish. I was brought up in Irbil, studied medicine in Baghdad, worked in Mosul and Irbil before arriving in Britain in 1984. I am a clinician and a university professor. As a human right activist I have worked with Iraqi opposition groups on defending victims of chemical weapons, of the Anfal mass killings in Kurdistan and in the marsh areas of southern Iraq. I am a founder of the Kurdish Scientific and Medical Association. I lobbied extensively in the United Kingdom and persuaded Margaret Thatcher to intervene with the British and US governments to create a safe haven for the Kurds after the 1991 uprising. Since then I have worked to help Iraqi universities in Iraq. Immediately after the fall of Saddam in April 2003 I went to Baghdad for five weeks to help with medical emergencies.

    My view of last year’s war was shaped by the experiences of the past – in particular the Kurdish safe haven, which has been successful by and large, despite Kurdish infighting. I thought that because of the Iraqi people’s hunger for freedom, democracy and quality of life, the insurgencies and the few groups that are stirring problems would be very quickly controlled. This is where we all were wrong. Primarily the fault was with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) leaders who got carried away with their initial military success, ignored advice and as a consequence made strategic mistakes.

    I’ve had plenty of opportunities to see both Iraqi politicians and CPA officials close up. So I have been able to observe closely the mentality behind the original plans and how things have changed. But irrespective of whether we Iraqis were pro-war or anti–war, the regime change became a reality for us to accommodate. The American administration had made a strategic decision to remove Saddam and establish new and permanent influence in the region. This was not subject to alteration by Iraqis. The day–to–day policies and tactics, however, were evolving with time.

    Ahmed Shames: I was born in Baghdad in Iraq in 1975, left in 1996 and came to Britain. In early 2002 I co–founded the Iraqi Prospect Organisation (IPO), of which I am chairman. IPO is a group of young Iraqi men and women in exile which worked to promote the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime, and then the establishment of true democracy after regime change. We were in favour of military action to topple Saddam’s regime, because we saw it as the only possible way to end the dictatorship in Iraq. But we are not in favour of American occupation.

    We moved into Baghdad in August 2003 where our main headquarters are now. And now we are working to promote both the establishment of a proportional democracy in Iraq and the involvement of young men and women in Iraqi politics. We do policy research. We are creating policy options for the future Iraq. We published a report about the Iraqi constitution, and one on different electoral systems and what is the best for Iraq.

    Regarding the present situation, I feel that an Iraqi government could have been established much earlier, even that elections could have been held much earlier. We don’t regret anything, but now we are working to promote that Iraqis should actually be in charge of Iraq.

    On my last trip to Iraq, two months ago, I met a lot of young people. Six or seven months previously they didn’t know much about democracy, now they have founded their own organisation calling for democracy, and are trying to educate others about it. My experience is limited but my impression is very much that the Iraqi people are ready to accept democracy, and that the people behind the violence are a very loud but also a very small minority. This leaves me guardedly optimistic.

    Hayder al–Fekaiki: I was born in Iraq and moved to the UK in 1979. I am an IT consultant by occupation and I represent a charity, Iraqi Volunteer, of which I’m a trustee. The charity’s aim is to engage Iraqis – abroad and inside the country – in political debate and in rebuilding Iraq. We also encourage Iraqis to look long and hard at Iraqi history and to take a sober view of the challenges that lie ahead. Iraqis must do this for themselves, rather than continue to leave the initiative in the hands of others.

    I was born into a highly political family so I didn’t have any choice but to be politically “aware”! My starting point is that most debate – both before and after the war on Iraq and at all levels – has largely excluded the Iraqi voices. This is a shared issue, and resolving it requires a shared solution.

    I think that war and occupation in all its forms is abhorrent, and unilateral regime change is a very dangerous precedent. But this does not negate the suffering of the Iraqi people under the Saddam regime and it does not negate the need to change oppressive regimes by force. Iraq is a shared international responsibility and its rescue is the duty of the international community in the form of the United Nations or another multilateral body. I believe that the international community bears the responsibility for regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein and must find effective mechanisms in preventing or changing such regimes.

    openDemocracy: Has your view changed in the last year and a half?

    Hayder al–Fekaiki: No. I think what we’ve seen since April 2003 is reasonably expected given the circumstances of war and occupation and the decades of violent regimes, socio–economic turmoil and chronic state of war that Iraqis had to endure. It is true that improvement is taking longer than expected, or had been hoped. But I think it’s unreasonable to expect life to change for the better any quicker, considering what Iraq has been through.

    Sami Zubaida: I was born in Iraq, finished secondary school there, and then came to England, where I have lived most of my life. I am from a Jewish family, so difficulties even before Saddam were high. I was last in Baghdad over forty years ago.

    Nevertheless, I have kept up with, and written about Iraqi culture and politics and the suffering of the Iraqi people. I have been active as a scholar of Iraq and the Middle East, but not active in politics. I was in favour of the recent US–led war because, despite all the problems, it was the only way I could see in which that nightmare regime could be ended.

    I’ve changed my view a great deal. The American blunders – whether due to mere incompetence or a malicious mindset, especially in the last few weeks – have made me think again. We’ve caught a glimpse of an ugly American attitude towards Iraqis, not the naively benevolent view one had earlier.

    As for the future, I don’t see anything good happening. Iraq needs and a majority wants a legitimate political process. But the only forces on the ground which seem to be successful are those trying to prevent a political process – from which they will not benefit. So I don’t see any prospect for a democratic and peaceful Iraq, at least not for a long time.

    Maysoon Pachachi: I am an Iraqi filmmaker. I’ve lived in Britain for something like thirty–five years. I went back to Iraq about two months ago. I’ve always been interested in the lived experience of people, rather than the machinations of formal politics; my political involvement is at a grassroots level.

    I made a film about Iraqi women in exile, shown on Channel 4 in Britain, and helped start a group of Iraqi and non–Iraqi women here in Britain, about four years ago, to campaign against the sanctions on Iraq which we felt were not harming the regime but the people and destroying the society. We also campaigned against the recent war.

    Now I am making a documentary film about this moment in history, and helping to set up an independent film and television college in Baghdad to train young people in the basics of filmmaking so that they can actually make their own films.

    What’s happening now is shocking to me, but not that surprising. Obviously, there’s a great sense of relief that Saddam is no longer there, but I always felt that a war and an occupation would be disastrous. But that’s the reality and we have to deal with it somehow.

    Yousif al–Khoei: I was born in Iraq, studied secondary school in Baghdad and Najaf, and moved to England in 1976. In 1991 I joined the al–Khoei Foundation, founded by my grandfather. The foundation is an international Islamic charity and, amongst other humanitarian activities, we document human rights abuses, especially in the south, and I helped make the famous documentary Saddam’s Killing Fields in the early 1990s. I’ve been twice to Iraq since the end of the 2003 war.

    Much of the suffering of the Iraqi people has been a result of the misguided policies of western powers. They actively helped Saddam in the 1980s and in 1991 they allowed him to crush the uprising. So I feel the west had a moral duty to the Iraqi people to remove the regime, and I couldn’t see any other prospect for doing this other than military action from outside.

    Have I changed my views? I agree that it could and should have been done better. The Americans don’t seem to have a coordinated policy. Recent events especially have not furthered the cause of democracy in the region.

    America in an Iraqi lens

    openDemocracy: Can the Americans open the way to democracy in Iraq?

    Dlawer Ala’Aldeen: I have no illusions about why the Americans fought this war. Saddam and the other dictators in the greater Middle East, who were supported by both superpowers at different times, are products of the cold war, and the way the superpowers organised their security. That cold war is over. Now terrorism is enemy number one – to trade, to stability and to American influence. In the new era, people like Saddam are in the way or even add to the risks of terrorism, therefore they must go or adapt.

    The Americans are in this new game for the long term and are determined to protect their interest in the region without relying on unstable dictators. They will not request permission from Iraqis, regional powers, Europeans or the United Nations. They have concluded that establishing some form of democracy and permanent American presence across the Middle East is the most secure way of fighting terrorism. They began the process with Iraq, with the hope that this will have a domino effect in the region. This means we have to think of the future of Iraq in this context as well as in the light of the regional complexity that the Americans have for so long underestimated.

    Hayder al–Fekaiki: Yes, I agree with Dlawer, I think the Americans know exactly what they want. They certainly went into war with their eyes wide open. Iraq is a very big first step into a far–reaching mission that goes beyond Iraq.

    Sami Zubaida: The Americans are in Iraq to stay, whether we like it or not. They want to establish military bases and to maintain Iraq in their sphere of influence. But as for the political system in Iraq, how they proceed becomes ever less certain the more violent and chaotic things become. I’m beginning to wonder whether, quite soon, the US will turn to a “son of Saddam”: a strong man and an authoritarian regime to control the country on its behalf.

    There are other factors to take into account. Kurdish autonomy has been a success story for far. What influence will this have on the future of Iraq? Obviously the Kurdish enclave is not ideal, but it does have, at least to a degree, representative government with some democracy, pluralism and human rights – although with many violations as well. Unfortunately, it’s pretty clear that this cannot be expanded to the rest of Iraq.

    One thing that non–Kurdish Iraqis – the Arabs – seem so far to agree on is that they don’t want Kurdish autonomy. But there’s nothing they can do. Only the Americans can force the Kurds back into subservience to a central Iraqi authority. If the Americans were to leave Iraq, all sorts of violent forces could be released around the Kurdish question.

    openDemocracy: Ahmed, do you agree? You’re trying to create a political process for peaceful democratic development.

    Ahmed Shames: We will only get a “son of Saddam” if or when the Americans declare defeat in Iraq and, so far at least, I can’t see this happening. We Iraqis are lucky to have the world’s superpower on our side to try to build a genuine democracy, but because it’s the world’s superpower it comes with all the arrogance and the over–confidence attached to it.

    I do think there is still a good prospect for democracy in Iraq. It will not happen tomorrow. It will not happen next year. But we can see the steps that are needed and that the acceptance also exists. What we need to do now is empower the majority that is still almost silent. The majority of Iraqis do not want to see violence. They do not want take the rights of others. They would rather live in a united, democratic Iraq.

    Let me give you an example. We were on the phone yesterday to my wife’s family in Najaf. The great majority of people there are against Muqtada al–Sadr and his crew. These are the people that we need to empower in Iraq. This is why I think grassroots work is very important. We need to look at long–term plans. Unfortunately we have the American elections in November 2004 and short–term achievements are becoming more important than the long–term creation of a democratic infrastructure.

    Maysoon Pachachi: I agree with some of what you’re saying. In March, I attended some women’s meetings in Baghdad. These were broad–based with people of different political persuasions and backgrounds. Everyone talked about how the complete collapse of the state infrastructure and the disastrous security situation had created a kind of paralysis in the society. The lack of security affects women in particular, but political empowerment is very difficult to achieve for anyone in these circumstances.

    People were very aware that any real change in the political culture would take a long time. At the moment, for many Iraqis “democracy” is just a slogan, an abstraction – we don’t know what it really means in practice: that government derives its authority from the people. Bottom to top and not the other way round. And we also have long–established habits of fear and corruption inside our psyches, which we want to get rid of. It will be a gradual step–by–step process and it will take time, especially in the teeth of this catastrophic violence and occupation.

    The Americans may try to bring in the “son of Saddam”, but I’m not sure they will succeed. The violence of the so–called “resistance” to the occupation doesn’t seem to have any political, social or economic programme behind it. There is a chance, though, that in time a proper political resistance – peaceful and effective – will take shape. It will all take time. I wouldn’t say I was optimistic, but I’m not without hope.

    An Iraqi political settlement?

    openDemocracy: Is federation the answer for Iraq?

    Hayder al–Fekaiki: Yes, I think that’s the best way forward. I really don’t understand objections to the Kurds having autonomy. After all, it was the republic of Iraq which granted autonomy to Iraqi Kurds in March 1970 . In my view, the Kurds are no different to the Palestinians with respect to having their own distinct land, language, history and heritage.

    The question of federalism is one aspect of a wider issue, while the core question remains as to the overall maturity of the political debate and process within Iraq. Whether you’re resisting occupation, or whether you are pro–federalism or pro–democracy, I believe that as Iraqis we have some way to go before we are able to effectively debate and build our political future.

    Iraqis have long over–simplified the debate. Throughout my years of living within the opposition, our principal thesis remained: “if only we can get rid of Saddam, everything will be back to normal”. Well it isn’t, and we now can see that all too clearly. It’s not just about Saddam. It’s about the history of a people. People who have almost become addicted to violence. Look at what bloody struggle the Kurds had to go through before they managed to put together something which had some semblance of democracy. Iraqis as a whole will have to go through that. And it’s going to take some time before we get through it and out of it.

    Yousif al–Khoei: I too am pessimistic for the short term but optimistic for the longer term. Iraq has huge internal problems – ethnic and sectarian divides, tribalism. It shares typical “third world” problems of lack of education and underdevelopment, like many comparable countries. This is all compounded by the fear of the regional powers, which do not want to see a success in Iraq, because it directly affects them. It is simply not possible to solve all our problems, which go back many generations, in one go.

    But my own prediction was that there would be more sectarian problems than there actually have been. In practice the various leaderships have been surprisingly sensible and alert to the problems of division.

    I think it will take some time to resolve the Kurdish problem. In my view, most Kurds would like to have not just autonomy but complete independence, but they shy away from saying this because of destabilising effects if would have in the region from which they might suffer the most.

    Putting the Kurds aside for the moment, I think that the SunniShi’a divide goes right to the heart of many of the problems in Iraq. As a minority that has been in power for generations, the Sunni are having a hard time adjusting to their reduced status. But I think they will get used to it. There are signs that Shi’a and Sunni are talking, or at least beginning to talk, to each other.

    Perhaps we need a peace and reconciliation process in Iraq as soon as possible.

    As for the “little groups” of armed resistance as I call them, they are banking on the ignorance and the feelings of the uneducated masses. Some are even issuing supposedly religious edicts which permit people to steal so long as they pay them a percentage of the money. This is simply not sustainable. The forces of extremism will get nowhere unless they are financed by regional powers.

    People haven’t had the opportunity to vote yet, but they have amazing ways of expressing themselves and showing their collective will in wise and constructive ways. Take just one example. Just after Saddam’s fall a number of Sunni mosques built by the regime were taken over by the Shi’a. One might expect this to lead to conflict, even civil war. But immediately the religious leaders, who are not supposed to be too democratic, realised the danger and issued edicts to evict them and give the mosques back to the Sunni. I think that shows political maturity within Iraq. And don’t forget Iraq has a very big middle class, more than any other country in the region except perhaps Iran and Egypt.

    openDemocracy: Yahia Said, whom we interviewed by phone between London and Baghdad a month ago is more optimistic than, for example, Sami is. He says there is a process of rebuilding and reconstruction – vibrant newspapers, building and restoration whether it’s health or electricity – that is largely unreported in the west. At the same time, he stresses, there is intense disenchantment with the Americans and with the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).

    Dlawer Ala’Aldeen: I think we all agree on that. Things will get worse before they get better. Democracy will take generations. It starts with the family, then the local community, and then the whole of Iraq. We haven’t even seen the beginning. It will take decades.

    There are many dimensions to this complex challenge, including US policies and tactics, the regional power politics and Iraq’s internal balance of power. The Americans handled the current situation with no clear vision. But their involvement in the Iraqi internal process will be critical because without their dedication and determination, properly applied, there will be no democracy in Iraq, just disintegration.

    Iraq – the sacred entity that was drawn about eighty years ago – was an artificial creation. And as far as I can see most American and British strategists seem to think that the only natural way of ruling Iraq is to have a very strong central government presiding over everybody irrespective of local cultural, political, linguistic or historical differences. Now, we really shouldn’t be influenced by the history of the last century where Iraq was ruled by a small nationalist minority at the expense of the rest of the Iraqis. We have to think again what is the best way forward.

    It is noteworthy that in the past decade, and important in the last year, two contrasting political domains have evolved. The Kurdish region has been ruled by two strong organisations which are essentially governing large territories. By contrast in the rest of Iraq (especially in the Sunni areas), no unifying leaders, leading organisations or popular movements have emerged to represent wide sections of the population. In a new and democratic Iraq, no single party is ever likely to fill the pan–Iraqi vacuum; therefore, it is virtually impossible (at least in the near future) to envisage the re–establishment of a strong central government that will enjoy a popular mandate.

    The existing Kurdish entity does not offer any kind of model. The Kurds enjoy effective independence, peace and even relative prosperity for now, but we all know that this is an anomalous situation that cannot last . As an independent state, Iraqi Kurdistan would be weak and isolated. For example, without the Arab dimension and the unity of Iraqi voice, the Kurds couldn’t have stopped a Turkish intervention or invasion – the ultimate Kurdish nightmare scenario.

    Many Iraqi Arabs think that the first thing to tackle before reshaping Iraqi is to demolish the current Kurdish entity. In fact this should be the last thing to touch, particularly in view of the current security situation. It’s the state of the rest of Iraq and their lack of security, prosperity and political representation that remain cause for concern and should be resolved first. This will make it easier for the Kurds to reciprocate. Finally, the Iraqis need to agree amongst themselves a format that is more natural and works better for the long term. It is then, that the coalition forces, especially the Americans, who will continue to play a major role here, will be happy to sign up to an Iraqi tailor–made outcome.

    Ahmed Shames: Iraq’s history is one dictatorship after the other. That means that it’s essential to decentralise power. But the debate about federalism in Iraq is immature. A lot of people in Iraq simply do not understand what federalism is. They think it means dividing up the country. So the negative ideas about federalism we see now from political movements inside the country is not because they don’t like federalism, it’s because they don’t understand it.

    The lack of political sophistication goes even deeper. If you ask most people about the IGC, they’ll be quick to say “we don’t like it”. But if you ask them who they would prefer they cannot offer coherent alternatives. The same applies to Americans. Recent opinion polls show that 57% of Iraqis wanted the Americans out. But when you ask them, “if the Americans go out, who runs the country?” They don’t have answers.

    Sami Zubaida: Democracy is not just ideological conviction, but institutions and procedures. There are few democrats in Middle East countries, but democracy, of sorts, can be instituted nevertheless, as we see in the case of Turkey. There, the different parties have not been particularly democratic, and the country has been notorious for human rights violations. Yet, the fact that there is a genuine democratic process with a plurality of players and elections which change governments, induces the parties to play the game and follow procedure in order to compete for constituencies of support.

    This has been especially the case with the Islamic party holding the current majority: no particular democratic credentials in terms of history or ideology, but emerging now as a champion of democracy. We see the opposite in Egypt, where repressive government and faux democracy sharpens the authoritarian tendencies of most players. The lesson for Iraq is that political education in democracy, while desirable, will not achieve results without the institution of the democratic game. It is instructive to remember that in Turkey this institution started with the cold war and the country’s insertion into Nato and the “free world”, and is maturing with the prospect of European Union membership.

    Yousif al–Khoei: We have to recognise that for many people in the region “democracy” has a bad name. They sometimes see it as cultural invasion in the name of democracy, the opposite of their own self–determination. And we have to recognise that the track record of America and the Europeans in the region has been to support the countries which are the most anti–democratic, in order to have access to oil. The masses of the Muslim and Arab people just do not trust the west in terms of its good intentions about democracy.

    openDemocracy: Are you saying that the Americans should leave Iraq because if they did, then the majority could find a democratic way forward?

    Yousif al–Khoei: No, I am saying that Americans should not try to impose a Washington–style or Westminster–style democracy on the region. I think their presence is crucial for stability in the short–term. But I think in the long–term that there is enough within Iraq’s own institutions to create a good basis for a future democratic system. For example, civil society within the marginalised Shi’a majority was developed to quite a sophisticated level despite totalitarian control by the Ba’athist state. This can be seen by the religious traditions of Najaf which encouraged sustainable existence and was probably a crucial factor in Saddam Hussein’s hijacking of religious symbols to legitimise his own hold on power. The Americans ought to have a clear strategy, which includes an exit strategy that is good for Iraq.

    Hayder al–Fekaiki: It is early days to talk about democracy in Iraq in any shape or form. What we need before all of this is a viable political infrastructure to fill the void.

    Iraqis still expect to be “given” democracy as they expect to be given electricity, water and security. This attitude comes from a culture of religious, tribal and political autocracy which culminated in the form of a demagogue who left Iraqis nearly devoid of their conscious–self. Now they have to come round to the idea of free will.

    The role of regional powers and the UN

    openDemocracy: What about the neighbouring countries. Can they play a role in helping to build democracy in Iraq?

    Sami Zubaida: The suggestion that neighbouring Arab states should send in peacekeeping forces is naïve in the extreme. They are transparently interested parties. They will be perceived by most Iraqis as partisan Arab nationalists, which, in Iraq, is associated with political Sunnism and the Ba’ath.

    Ahmed Shames: My impression is that the vast bulk of the violence in Iraq is being perpetrated on behalf of the regional countries. There’s less violence in Iraqi Kurdistan because it has a well–established government and a security system that prevents people from sending weapons and fighters and jihadis across the borders. Elsewhere the Americans have done a miserable job protecting Iraq’s borders. You can smuggle tons of weapons and fighters across them. This was the case when I went there. The borders were incredibly poor and the Americans didn’t seem to care much.

    Yousif al–Khoei: Yes, there is potential for the country to be divided under the influence of the regional powers. Sometimes it can seem as if they are the occupiers, not America. Some senior religious figures have asked me why, if the Americans are serious, are they allowing these open borders?

    Ahmed Shames: A lot of people in Iraq think the Americans are doing this deliberately, that they are trying to attract terrorists into Iraq so they can sort them inside Iraq rather than trying to fight them on the streets of Europe and North America. This is an understanding inside Iraq. It may be right. It may be wrong. One thing is sure: the Americans have not done enough to protect the borders.

    Maysoon Pachachi: Yes, there are a million conspiracy theories in Iraq. Every time there’s a suicide bombing people ask, who did it? Was it the Americans, the Iranians, Mossad? You name it, nobody really knows. The people that I have spoken with always – especially when large numbers of Iraqis are killed – say “a suicide bombing? Impossible. This is not an Iraqi habit. If we had been prepared to blow ourselves up we would have done it and got rid of Saddam a long time ago”

    openDemocracy: Do you agree that to achieve a democratic structure, and fair elections, there has to be an outside force?

    Maysoon Pachachi: Yes. But I think the alternatives are not just the Americans being there, or nominally withdrawing leaving behind their “son of Saddam”. Instead, why not introduce an effective international presence, drawing on countries and people who were opposed to the war?

    This may seem hopelessly optimistic, but it’s my wish. I still hope that it is possible, against all the odds, to put the democratic “game” in place, establish an electoral law, do the census, form political parties and have credible, solid elections, that are not open to question – under the umbrella, at first, of some sort of international protection.

    Ahmed Shames: It will have to be a force that’s seen as unbiased, a force that does not belong to any entity within Iraq.

    Maysoon Pachachi: Not an occupation force.

    openDemocracy: Can the United Nations deliver this?

    Ahmed Shames: I think the Coalition Provisional Authority made a mistake in choosing Lakhdar Brahimi as representative for the United Nations in Iraq. Many Iraqis active in politics feel this way.

    People say he’s an Arab nationalist, and Arab nationalism is just one of the political movements inside Iraq. He does not have a good track record for establishing democracy . He has been accused of bias against the Shi’a in his first report.

    Sami Zubaida: Whatever government gets chosen many people will be unhappy with it. Whoever is brought in, others will say saying “they are not representative”. There’s a deeply entrenched problem in the ministries, which is likely to carry over into the new government. Essentially, the ministries have become instruments of patronage for various special interest groups.

    Yousif al–Khoei: I agree that there are major problems, in that everybody, every party is trying to grab as much power as they can in the short space of time they know they are in this or that ministry. In a way this is to be expected. People have suffered a lot, they have not seen power before. In western terms, they are abusing it. But I think that’s a process that will not last because the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people have picked this up, recognised it as a problem and it’s not going to come again and again.

    Sami Zubaida: But this is not democracy. It is populism.

    Yousif al–Khoei: I don’t agree. It offers a basis for something much more positive, and we can see the influence of this on an emerging political culture. I’m talking about areas outside sophisticated, urban Baghdad. In these areas, I have heard Marxists say that Islamists must have a say, and I have heard Islamists say we should listen to secularists. This is why I’m a bit more optimistic. People want to reach agreement.

    Maysoon Pachachi: The idea that the IGC will be dissolved is certainly good news because people despair of it. There is an incredible amount of patronage, corruption and opportunism. If the new government has new people, technocrats who at least have some experience in running ministries, that could be a good thing.

    A dual challenge

    openDemocracy: Is it a good idea to hold elections at the end of the year?

    Ahmed Shames: The fundamental law says that there will be elections before February 2005 . That seems to be a bit optimistic, but if we don’t have elections sometime next year the country will collapse. I was in favour of a technocratic government at the beginning, a year ago. Now after all the recent problems, I think a technocratic government, without a political personality, will be seen by Iraqis as a puppet. We need a genuine Iraqi political leadership.

    Hayder al–Fekaiki: We’re in a situation where violence has the upper hand. I don’t think this will change with the choice of Iyad Allawi to lead the caretaker government. The security situation has to be sorted out first, before we start talking about meaningful elections.

    Dlawer Ala’Aldeen: This discussion clearly reflects the fact that there is concern that elections may not be held. So there needs to be an international effort to make sure they are held. Elections will legitimise the new government and leave no excuse for the Americans not to hand over proper power. And it will be an example of how things can work, that even in Islamic countries you can have free elections and build the institutions for democracy. The conclusion of this meeting, I would suggest, is not that we should worry about the handover from the IGC but that we should be campaigning to gather global support to make sure that the Americans, as well as the new interim government, will work for free, fair and robust elections that will mean we can have a credible elected government.

    Ahmed Shames: Yes, this is the kind of international interference that we want in Iraq. We want people who are not Iraqis to push for democracy in Iraq. This requires a belief in the necessity for success in Iraq for world peace. I’m afraid, unfortunately this belief does not exist amongst many westerners. They see Iraq as a foreign country that is very far away and they don’t really need to bother themselves with. But people need to believe that success in Iraq is success for the Middle East and for world security.

    I want interference in Iraq if it means pushing for democracy and for elections to happen and human rights. We want that, when an Iraqi prisoner is mistreated by an Iraqi, the whole world talks about it and condemns it. We don’t want the outrage to end when the Americans leave, and when Iraqis are doing their own torture.

    Sami Zubaida: Yes I agree with this, we need to see elections take place. We must not allow the “technocratic” administration that the United Nations helps instal become a means whereby Iraq can be blamed for failing to hold elections that America may not want.

    Yousif al–Khoei: Yes. One problem is that there is a mass anti–globalisation, anti–American movement which doesn’t fully understand the complexities of Iraq. It’s highly ideological and has little credibility with the Iraqi people. The torture videos of Saddam’s interrogators did not generate the same reaction around the world or amongst these humanitarian protestors even though they are a hundred times worse than the torture committed by the Americans, bad as that is.

    Maysoon Pachachi: Another important thing the international community should push for is a timetable for an American withdrawal . The government that is elected must have the absolute right to demand that their territory is vacated, including American bases.

    Ahmed Shames: That has to be up to the Iraqi sovereign government.

    Maysoon Pachachi: What I am saying is yes, elections, but not just elections. It’s elections and the end of an occupation.

    Hayder al–Fekaiki: I think elections would be a great first step and its success is dependent on the active role of the international community, both the people who marched against the war and those who decided on the war. Everyone must follow their words with deeds. Elections would be great and marvellous start.

    Dlawer Ala’Aldeen: I agree with Maysoon. But let us remember that “American occupation” is different from “American presence” or “influence”. Let us be realistic and ask for the achievable. We should ask for the end of occupation on Iraqi terms, however, the American presence and influence will remain outside anyone’s control. Yet after elections a sovereign Iraqi government can deal with these issues more confidently and would be expected to agree mutually beneficial arrangements with the Americans. Therefore, it is the elections that we should all focus on.



    Thursday, 22 January 2004

    كركوك داخل أنبوب اختبار

    كركوك داخل أنبوب اختبار

    دلاور عبد العزيز علاء الدين

    22 January 2004 ‌ الشرق الاوسط


    يمر العراق، حالياً بمنعطف سياسي تاريخي لم يشهده منذ قرن، وربما ستحدد أحداث عام 2004 معالم الهيكل السياسي العراقي للقرن القادم وربما لما بعده.

    في أوائل القرن الماضي، تمكن الملك فيصل الأول واعوانه من اقناع المستعمرين البريطانيين بضم منطقة كردستان الجنوبية ـ ذات الأغلبية السنية ـ الى وادي الرافدين ـ ذي الأغلبية الشيعية ـ حتى يتمكن من ترجيح كفة السنة العرب في الدولة العراقية حديثة التكوين. أما قادة الكرد وشيعة العراق، فقد وقفوا مكتوفي الايدي، انذاك واخفقوا في ممارسة دورهم، واللعب حسب قوانين الساعة، وراهنوا على أوراق خاسرة. هذا ما سمح لسنة العراق بالانفراد بالسلطة على مر العقود وحتى سقوط نظام صدام.

    وفي اوائل القرن الحالي تغيرت قوانين اللعبة: «قلبت حرب امريكا على الارهاب الموازين رأساً على عقب. وبعد انهيار نظام صدام، بات الكرد وشيعة العراق أكثر اللاعبين بروزاً ، وبدوا وكأنهم يكسبون الجولة ـ في حين لعب سنة العراق اوراقاً خاسرة منذ رحيل صدام عن الساحة حيث باتوا بلا راع، ولم يظهر بينهم بديل مقبول. ويحاول بعض رجال الدين الذين تربوا في ظل النظام السابق الأخذ بزمام القيادة تحت شعارات غير واضحة تظهرهم غير قادرين على الالمام بقوانين اللعبة الجديدة.

    أما رجال الدين الشيعة، خصوصا الذين تشردوا منهم خلال فترة حكم صدام وتراكمت لديهم الخبرة، فتصرفوا بحكمة، وظهروا كرجال دولة وقادة تعلموا من اخطاء الماضي ومن التجربة الايرانية الفاشلة، وتجلى ذلك في تكاتفهم مع العلمانيين، مسجلين سبقاً ميدانياً في رسم التحالفات واضحوا في وضع من يحدد الاجندة السياسية في البلاد.

    أما قادة الكرد، الذين بدوا في الماضي كمن لا يستفيد من تجاربه المأساوية فظهروا فجأة متفقين كقوة واحدة، وكانوا سباقين للتنبؤ بالمتغيرات، وتمكنوا من اقناع الحلفاء بأنهم عراقيون وحدويون، وان وجود كيانهم الاداري لا يشكل خطراً على وحدة البلد، أو أمن المنطقة أو مصالح الغرب اجمالاً. هذا خلاف ما كان يخطط له صدام، الذي استخدم هذا الخطر الوهمي كحجة لكسب الدعم الغربي والشرقي لنظامه. وكثيراً ما كنت اتساءل فيما اذا كانت الادارتان الامريكية والبريطانية غافلتين عن هذه الحقيقة، ومما زاد قناعتي في هذا الشك هو استمرار الادارتين في دعم صدام حتى في ايام حلبجة واثناء عملية «الانفال» التي راح ضحيتها مئات الآلاف من المدنيين الاكراد. وزاد من قناعتي أكثر حين سنحت لي الفرصة بسؤال ماركريت تاتشر، رئيسة الوزراء البريطانية السابقة، في نيسان 1991، حين التقيتها على رأس وفد كردي طالباً منها التدخل لدى جورج بوش (الأب) وجون ميجر (رئيس الوزراء البريطاني حينها) لانقاذ مليوني كردي محاصر على الحدود الايرانية والتركية، بعد فشل الانتفاضة الشعبية في العراق. حاولت تطمينها بأن ما اطلبه هو انساني بحت ولا ابعاد سياسية له. سألتني تاتشر عن حقيقة نوايا ومطالب الساسة الأكراد. وقلت لها بأن الأكراد واقعيون في مطالبهم، ولولا قساوة الأنظمة المركزية، لكان واضحاً للعيان بأن «ولاء الكردي للعراق لا يختلف عن ولاء الاسكتلندي لبريطانيا». ضحكت ثاتشر لهذه المقارنة، وقالت «لم أفكر بمثل هذه المقارنة وهذا شيء جيد». أما انا فكنت مندهشا لفكرتها الناقصة عن الكرد والشيعة في العراق. ولحسن حظنا فقد اقتنعت ثاتشر، وبادرت على الفور بالاتصال بجورج بوش الذي كان يقضي عطلة عيد الفصح في ممارسة هوايته في صيد السمك، في حين كان جون ميجر منشغلاً بمشاهدة مباريات فريقه المفضل «تشلسي». وأدى تدخل ثاتشر إلى انشاء المنطقة الآمنة في شمال العراق، واعادة الكرد الى ديارهم واقامة البرلمان المنتخب والحكومة الكردية الأولى في العراق في 1992. والسؤال هنا: هل من الممكن لقادة الكرد ان يبرهنوا ما كنا ادعيناه امام ثاتشر والذي كان يخفيه صدام؟

    وهل يمكن للكرد ان يقيموا اقليماً كردياً ديمقراطياً يقتدى به، من حيث تعايش الاقليات بسلام في سائر العراق والمنطقة؟ وهل يمكن للكرد ان يقودوا ما يمكن ان يؤدي الى ان يصبح العراق ديمقراطياً فيدرالياً مؤسساتياً للمستقبل؟

    في آيار/ مايو 2003 كنت بصحبة هوشيار زيباري (وزير الخارجية العراقي الحالي) في فندق قصر السندباد في بغداد حيث كنا نسترجع ذكريات ايام حلبجة والأيام التي قضيناها سوية في التظاهر أمام السفارة العراقية واللوبي في ممرات المؤسسات الديمقراطية البريطانية لفضح نظام صدام. حينها قال لي زيباري: «من كان يصدق ان تتغير الاحداث بهذه السرعة، وان نتلاقى في بغداد على انقاض الدكتاتور الذي كان لا يقهر». فطرحت عليه تساؤلاتي متمنياً ان يكون الزعماء الكرد اهلاً لثقة كل العراقيين.

    وعبرت عن قلقي من امكانية الحزبين الكرديين (الحزب الديمقراطي الكردستاني بزعامة البرازاني والاتحاد الوطني الكردستاني بزعامة الطالباني) على تحقيق التعاون في كردستان وفي بغداد. كان زيباري متفائلاً، لكنه تفهم قلقي النابع من التاريخ الحديث. فالتعايش الديمقراطي في التجربة الكردية لم يدم إلا سنتين ونيفاً (1992 ـ 1994) حتى اشتد التناحر العدائي بينهما وصار فريسة سهلة لصدام ودول الجوار. وما لبث ان اندلع الاقتتال الاخوي ليضع التجربة الديمقراطية على حافة الفشل. كانت نتيجة القتال ان راح آلاف الأكراد ضحايا وتشرد مئات الألوف، وعانت الاقليات الكردستانية بدورها من جراء ذلك. وفي النهاية انقسم الاقليم الكردستاني الى شطرين، وانفرد كل حزب بإدارة احد الشطرين الى ان اعتذر الزعيمان الكرديان علناً أمام البرلمان الكردي في اربيل في العام المنصرم.
    تأسيساً على ما سبق، تقف التجربة الكردية الآن أمام منعطفات حاسمة، يقع في مقدمها توحيد الادارتين وقيام مجتمع ديمقراطي فدرالي، بالرغم من قناعتي، حتى وقت قريب بعدم تفضيل هذا التوحيد خوفاً على اعادة كرة المناصفة والتناحر الداخلي في ساحة اللعب مجدداً. لكن آن الاوان لتأسيس نظام تعددي في الاقليم الفدرالي حتى يرى العالم بأن الديمقراطية ليست مخلوقاً غريباً مفروضاً على العراقيين أو المجتمع الاسلامي. وان وحدة الادارتين الكرديتين تصب في مصلحة العراق العليا، وعلى مجلس الحكم ان يطالب بها. فوحدة الخطاب الكردي كانت كافية لابعاد شبح تدخل الجيش التركي في العراق ككل ووحدة الاكراد ستبعد شبح الحرب الاهلية في كركوك والمدن الاخرى ذات التعقيدات الديموغرافية. وبوسعي القول ان كركوك الآن تشكل انبوب الاختبار الديمقراطي. ان تهيئة المناخ الديمقراطي في هذه المدينة كفيل بكسب غالبية المجتمعات فيها، وهذا يستدعي ايجاد آليات ومؤسسات تضمن الحقوق الثقافية والقومية للتركمان والعرب والمسيحيين فيها. وهي افضل ضمان لاسكات المتطرفين بينهم، ولمنع التدخل الاجنبي، عندئذ يرى التركماني بأن العيش تحت مظلة الادارة الفدرالية الكردية حالة طبيعية ومفضلة وليس العكس.

    لذلك على الكرد ترتيب البيت الكردستاني بالغ التعقيد. وان يقدموا الأمثلة كما يتمنونها للآخرين حتى يستحقوا قيادة قطار الديمقراطية في العراق كله.

    Saturday, 1 November 2003

    Surviving Saddam


    BMJ 2003;327:s173 (29 November), doi:10.1136/bmj.327.7426.s173

    Published in BMJ Careers at bmjcareers.com
    Also in
    studentBMJ 2003;11:393-436 November ISSN 0966-6494

    career focus

    PROFILE

    Surviving Saddam

    Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, professor of clinical microbiology at Nottingham University, thinks that doctors are better placed than politicians to help make the world a better place. Rusheng Chew speaks to a man whose commitment to human rights is the main priority in his personal and professional life

    To all extents, Dlawer (Del) Ala'Aldeen looks like your typical academic: unassuming, keen on his research, and with a string of letters after his name. However, there is more than meets the eye to this 42 year old professor of clinical microbiology at Nottingham University, as I was soon to find out.

    Del is an Iraqi Kurd. To many of us, this may not mean much. However, to him, it is the reason for many of the major choices he has had to make. To put this in its proper context, until not so long ago the (now deposed) president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was engaged in "systematic genocide of the Kurdish people, as well as wanton denials of human rights in Iraq," as Del puts it.

    Compulsory military service was a fact of life for Iraqi youth. Back in 1983, this meant only two choices for the newly graduated doctor from the University of Al-Mustansiryia: "Either I joined the army, in which case I would have had to fight against my own people, or I left." Del chose the latter—but it wasn't all that easy to leave, naturally. He tells me that he had to leave Iraq through the mountains on the Kurdish-Iranian border using smugglers' routes—without his family. Once out of Iraq, he made his way to the United Kingdom, where the rest of his family who made it out gradually joined him.

    I ask him why he chose medicine. "Medicine? It was something that I always knew I wanted to do—it is top of the professions as far as humanitarian reasons are concerned." And what about microbiology then? With a smile, Del replies: "I was drawn to microbiology by fate." He goes on to explain: "I wanted to go back to Iraq, especially Kurdistan, and help rebuild it once Saddam was overthrown—who would have known he would be in power for so long? So initially I wanted to specialise in infectious diseases, as over 70% of patients in Iraq suffer from some form of infection. But the academic side of things was being grossly neglected, and I figured that there was a greater impact to be made if I did academic clinical microbiology instead." Additionally, Del is much more interested in teaching and research than clinical work, and he felt that microbiology offered something with a bias towards the former while not neglecting the latter.

    But as committed as Del is to microbiology, in which he trained in the United Kingdom, he is even more passionate about his work for the Kurdish cause, especially where human rights and chemical and biological weapons are concerned. This is hardly surprising, given that Del has had experience of discrimination against Kurds in Iraq and that his parents and siblings were survivors of attacks with mustard gas and other chemical agents. To this end, he was the founding secretary in 1988 (and chairman from 1992 to 2002) of the British based Kurdish Scientific and Medical Association (KSMA), an organisation that, among others, aims to "enhance medical and scientific cooperation between Kurdistan and the UK." Its activities include seminars and lectures, and it is instrumental in getting academics in the United Kingdom to act as external examiners for the three medical schools in Iraqi Kurdistan. The KSMA also solicits donations of books and equipment. "The Kurds always had the potential—it was just not developed under Saddam," he tells me. Del has no regrets at being involved in fighting for the Kurds, even though it was dangerous going against the Saddam regime. He says pointedly: "I have no regrets about fighting Saddam Hussein or tyrants like him."
    I have no regrets about fighting Saddam Hussein or tyrants like him

    The KSMA has been effective in promoting the causes Del is concerned with. For example, realising the power of the media, he has given media interviews and has publicly lobbied parliament and 10 Downing Street on the Kurdish issue, as well as that of chemical and biological weapons. In 1991, during the Gulf war, Del met the former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher to ask for her help in pushing for British support for the Kurds. This resulted in £20m ($33m, €28m) of aid for them and the creation of a safe haven, which lasted till the 2003 war. Del is modest about his achievements, however. To my suggestion that he is a hero to the Kurds, he replies: "I did my part, and everyone else did theirs; it was this that brought about success."

    Del is also involved in work outside the KSMA. He was appointed to the British working party on chemical and biological weapons, which works towards disarmament. In June 2003 ("two weeks after the toppling of Saddam's statue") he went back to Baghdad to work with the charity Save the Children, focusing in particular on the understaffed paediatric hospital. Naturally the city, and indeed all of Iraq, was short of drugs and supplies, and so instead of being directly concerned with patient care, Del took on a coordinating role, concentrating on "enhancing [the] capability [of the health services], and suggesting projects to help in [its] reconstruction and modernisation." Still, he thinks he could have done more, the only constraint being the time he would have had to spend in Iraq. How did he feel, going to a place that was literally a war zone? "I was prepared for the risks," he says, adding, "What brought me back was greater than what could have kicked me out again." He tells me in no uncertain terms how liberating it felt to be back in the city of his youth, "now that the atmosphere of fear and terror is gone."

    In his (obviously limited) free time, Del makes sure to spend time with his family: "I look after a young family [he has a wife and three children] and sizeable garden, as well as my ageing parents. I keep in touch with them and my siblings, who are very supportive of what I do." Besides that, he socialises a lot with friends. Writing—in Kurdish, English, or Arabic (he also knows a little Persian and Turkish)—for various journals and participating in KSMA activities (Del is still actively involved even though he has given up the chair) occupy the rest of his leisure time. I ask Del how he manages to have a life outside his work—perhaps he might have some useful tips—and he replies: "With difficulty. I have a very supportive wife, who is also Kurdish, and try to organise my time well, but it's not always easy."

    Ever the activist, Del has these words of advice for medics: "Stand up to human rights abuses anywhere in the world; as medics we can do more than politicians to make the world a better place. As doctors, we have the right to push politicians for improved health services for people in other countries, and this gives us the best angle, and moral high ground, for lobbying."


    Rusheng Chew, third year medical student

    University of Nottingham, Nottingham


    Friday, 26 October 2001

    Bioterrorism and the New World Order

    Out of the ashes of anthrax rises the future world order

    Dr Dlawer Ala'Aldeen PhD MRCPath:
    Consultant Microbiologist
    Chairman, Kurdish Scientific and Medical Association

    Published in www.Kurdishmedia.com on 26 October, 2001.

    The long dreaded bio-terror is a reality now, infecting the heart of business and democracy, and is now moving between continents. For the second time in a decade, the United States and United Kingdom find themselves cutting strange deals to rally friends and foes to protect yet another fragile coalition. In the process, the leaders of freedom-loving countries are forced to compromise on the very basic principles of human rights and “foreign policy with human face”. There is nothing new in this, but could it be the start of a new era, the spark of a new world order?

    Agents of bioterror: Almost any infective agent, that can damage humans can be considered a potential bioweapon. It is interesting that the list of agents stockpiled by the Russians and Americans includes agents as ineffective as typhus, Q-fever and brucella which are not fatal in the modern era of antibiotics and include crop damaging agents such as wheat stem rust and rice blast that will not affect humans. Iraqi bioweapon programme also included animal agents such as Camel pox.

    Of the endless list of possible agents, which are invariably either bacteria or viruses, only anthrax, plague, small pox and botulinum toxin are thought to be likely agents to be used by terrorists. Of these, anthrax is probably the most serious bioterror agent because it needs the simplest of manufacturing infrastructure and is most durable and suitable for many forms of delivery, including, as we have seen, by mail. However, like most chemical and biological weapons (CBWs), anthrax is largely a horror agent. In the modern era most biological agents are now poor weapons in battle zones because soldiers are trained to fight in chemical and biological protection suits, and are usually vaccinated against the bacterium. The question therefore is why then are member states of the United Nations obsessed with producing and stockpiling them? What is the anthrax agent? Anthrax is caused by a bacterium called Bacillus anthracis. Under the microscope it is rod shaped and, when stained with a special dye (Gram stain), it has the distinctive look of a match box. The bacterium grows fast in the presence of plenty of nutrition, such as in-vivo in humans or in-vitro in laboratory culture media. This is the vegetative form. When the organism runs out of food, or faces a harsh physiological environment, it reduces its biological activity to absolute minimum. It forms a rigid capsule around its DNA and essential enzymes and brings life to almost total standstill. This capsulated form of the bug is called the “spore”. Sporulation is not only a key to survival, but also to transportation and dissemination. Spores are tinny, easily air-born and can remain viable in the for decades in the soil until transmitted to a nutritious environment again, such as mammalian body. Anthrax is primarily the disease of herbivore animal who would ingest soil-contaminated vegetables and develop intestinal anthrax, followed by blood poisoning and death. Humans acquire from herbivores via contaminated animal products.

    What is anthrax? Anthrax denotes the clinical conditions that arise from infection with B. anthracis. The word anthrax is derived from the Greek “anthrakis” (black), which is the colour of the classical postulating skin lesion, known as the “malignant pustule”. This form of anthrax is by far the most common, and the mildest, form of the disease and is an occupational health problem. Now extremely rare in UK and USA, is an occupational health problem. affecting the exposed parts of the body in those who handle infected animals or their products (e.g. meat, wool, goat-hair).

    The skin form of anthrax is the most likely one to be acquired from mail-delivered spores and is treatable with antibiotics. In the absence of treatment, cutaneous anthrax can become complicated and develop into fatal blood poisoning.. Another form of anthrax is the intestinal one, acquired via ingestion of contaminated animal products and may be fatal. This is even rarer in the UK than the skin form and is most unlikely to be acquired from the envelope delivered spores.

    In contrast, the more severe form of the disease is the inhalational (pulmonary) anthrax, which is almost 90% fatal, unless aborted at the incubation period or treated at the early prodromal phase (when the first flu-like signs and symptoms start appearing). Here, air-borne spores are inhaled, reach the lungs and are transported via to middle part of the chest (mediastinal lymph nodes), where they germinate. The period between inhalation and germination could be as short as a couple of days or as long as 60 days or more (hence the recommended period of antibiotic prophylaxis). After germination, the organism grows exponentially and within a few days manifest itself as full-blown pulmonary anthrax.

    Replicating bacteria release powerful toxins (poisons) that cause swelling, haemorrhage and cell death in the infected tissues (hence the black colour and the name anthrakis). The number of inhaled spores sufficient to kill a person is any thing between a few thousands to a few tens of thousands, depending on the victims health status.

    Can terrorists prepare anthrax spores:

    The Japanese group of Aum Shinrikyo sect, which consisted of skilled medics and scientists, produced and disseminated (unsuccessfully) anthrax spores in Japan. An anthrax-vaccinated terrorist with basic microbiology skills can easily manufacture quantities of anthrax spores from local animal isolates. There is no shortage of bacterial isolates in endemic areas, such as Africa and Middle East. The essential tools and elements can be found in a domestic kitchen. Concentrates anthrax cultures can just as easily reduced to crude spore-enriched powders. However, production of refined, weapon-grade, spores that can be more efficiently aerosolised will require more sophisticated biotechnology infrastructure, which is unlikely to have been established by Al-Qaida’s in Afghanistan.

    Can terrorists access established sources from UN member states? For a more than a decade, there has been major concerns about the fate of old Soviet stocks that were left unprotected. Many countries, and possibly terrorist groups, are thought to have attempted to take advantage of the power vacuum that immediately followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The latest USA anthrax isolates are unlikely to have originated from Soviet CBW plants, they are said to be sensitive to penicillin and doxycycline (the two first line antibiotics in naturally occurring anthrax). Russian scientists are known to have engineered strains resistant to these antibiotics. The latest American outbreak is thought to have originated from a single source and the strain is thought to be a derivative of the virulent “Ames strain” which is used by researchers around the world. This strain was first isolated in the 1950s from a dead animal in Ames, Iowa and has been passed around between researchers.

    Iraq is another likely source of anthrax for the Al-Qaida terrorists who would have plenty in common with the regime in Baghdad. In an interview with the Al-Jazeera satellite channel in 1998, Bin Laden stressed, shockingly, that it is his religious duty to acquire CBWs. Mr Dick Cheney, US Vice-President, also admitted that Bin Laden has over the years tried to acquire CBWs, and the US Government have copies of the manuals that Al-Qaida have actually used to train people with respect to “how to deploy and use these kinds of substances”.

    Mr Richard Butler, the latest UN’s Chief CBW inspector who inspected Iraq for several years in the 1990s, reported that Mohammad Atta (the senior hijacker who died in the first plane crash in New York) had met Iraqi officials in Prague in June 2001, when deadly presents could have changed hands. Mr Butler also emphasised that Iraq had rebuilt its CBW programme since the UN inspections were stopped a few years ago. Saddam is known to have had hidden undeclared CBW stocks in residential areas and in closely guarded ordinary graves in Baghdad cemeteries; indeed experts believe that no less than half of Iraq’s old stockpiles probably remain unaccounted for. Furthermore, Iraq is thought to have recently acquired gigantic bacteriological fermenters that are required for mass production of bacterial cultures.

    Despite these, the US and UN Governments are reluctant to point fingers at Iraq or the Al-Qaida terrorists. This is probably because they are trying to protect the fragile coalition which includes the pro-Iraqi Russians, Chinese and Arab states. They are also attempting to avoid infuriating many Arabs and Muslims who have long been exploited by Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.

    Can the terrorists deliver spores efficiently? The Aum Shinrikyo cult of Japan, who managed to poison Tokyo underground commuters with the nerve agent, sarin, failed to deliver anthrax successfully in and around the city, despite repeated attempts. The latest envelop-delivery method is the poorest of all methods one could think of. The worst that it can cause is the skin form of anthrax and rarely, but tragically, inhalational form. It is, however, a major publicity-attracting form that created panic, disrupted peoples social lives and will no doubt inflict further damage to the US economy. The nightmare scenario is if the terrorists were able to make the spores air-born and cause more inhalational anthrax in least suspecting populations. The terrorists were able to aerosolise anthrax in the ventilation system of US House of Representatives, but congressmen are not the least suspecting population.

    Atta is known to have enquired about crop-dusting planes in Florida, not far from where the first case was discovered. His plan might have been to spray American cities with spores and cause inhalational anthrax . In 1972, WHO experts suggested that 50 Kg of anthrax spores, released from an aircraft over an urban population of five million would cause 250,000 cases of the disease. Another report estimated that releasing a cloud of 100 Kg of spores upwind of Washington DC could cause between 130,000 and 3m deaths. This explains why crop-dusting planes have all been grounded in the US. However, the biggest worry is the thought of the quantities of anthrax spores that Atta was planning to aerosolise. Surely, he must have been thinking about more than just a few envelope-loads. Worse, did he bring back any thing other than anthrax from Prague, e.g. nerve agents that Iraqi has used previously.

    Should we be concerned? Our best defence in the West is clearly our knowledge combined with the current high state of alert. The police and health care workers have a higher index of suspicion, and in the UK we have always been well-placed to deal with deliberate CBW incidents and outbreaks, which are not that different from those occurring naturally or by accident. There are policies for outbreak-controls and contingency plans have been issued (now revised in the light of recent events) by the Department of Health. Our defence will be further strengthened by informing and reassuring our public, including the healthcare workers. Anthrax does not spread easily between people and remains susceptible to many antibiotics, and, in the UK at least, there will be no shortage of antibiotic supply. Vaccine supply will not be an issue as vaccination will only be considered for a selected few, including those whose job it is to search, identify and/or control outbreaks. By now, the British public have learnt enough about the terrorists’ ill-chosen method of anthrax delivery, therefore, the risk of big outbreaks is minimal. However, the terrorists, by definition, are there to terrify and in that they have partly succeeded in the USA.

    The role of the UN. Long and agonising discussions among nations since 1925, lead to several CBW-related conventions and treaties over the decades. The treaty of 1972 was considered inadequate and after 21 years of further discussions, a relatively comprehensive chemical weapons convention was signed in Paris in 1993 under the title "The Convention on the Prohibition of the Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction", which is self-explanatory. However, little progress has been made in terms of its implementation. So much so that no serious international measures were taken to prevent further spread into the hand of small groups and terrorists. The list of countries now known, or strongly believed, to possess CBW number more than 19, all of whom are signatories of the above treaty. They include Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, USA, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia. Iraq is the only country documented by the United Nations to have breached the treaties and to have used CW against the neighbouring Iran and the Kurdish population inside its own boundaries. Therefore, it is the urgent task of the United Nations to put an end, once and for all, to the production, proliferation and use of biological weapons.

    The future world order: President Bush insists that “the best defence against terrorism is a strong offensive against terrorists”. At last, perhaps, the world’s only superpower is now focused on making the world a better place to live in. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviets and the Western democracies were heavily engaged in supporting powerful dictators in order to secure business and influence in strategic parts of the world, riding roughshod over fundamental principles of civil rights and turning a blind eye to clear violations of human rights by their “trade-partners”. The US and UK fully supported Iraq’s campaign to stop the Iranian business-unfriendly Islamic fundamentalism. Saddam’s massive programme of CBW (built by Western companies) was allowed to continue and the poisoning with Nerve gas of 15000 Kurdish civilians in Halabje (Kurdistan, Iraq) went unnoticed. Only when Saddam endangered Western interests by invading Kuwait, military action taken to stop him. He was punished but left injured and abandoned for the past decade.

    In sharp contrast, the West fully supported the most primitive Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan to stop the spread of communism. The job was done, the Soviet Union collapsed and Afghanistan too was abandoned, as repeatedly acknowledged by Tony Blair in recent weeks. Blair promised not to abandon Afghanistan after this war and went on mediating between Arabs and Israelis.

    Phase two of this campaign is supposed to uproot the causes of terrorism. This time they better not fail, for even worse is likely to come. Iraq is thought to have had made serious progress late 1980s in making and testing nuclear bombs. The fundamentalist Shi’as of Iran are thought to have made serious progress on this track too and Pakistan, ruled by a military dictator, successfully tested a nuclear bomb recently. The threat of weapons of mass destruction has never been greater and will not diminish, given the conflict-ridden globe of today. Tony Blair and George Bush are now morally committed to a project that has no end. Inevitably they would have win the backing of countries at the expense of suppressed minorities. The Russians, the Chinese and the Turks will now have the free hand of managing “internal affairs” in Chechnya, Tibet and Kurdistan in the manner they deem appropriate. The ruling Generals of Pakistan will take charge of implementing “democracy” in the neighbouring Afghanistan.

    The cold war era was disastrous for the disadvantaged people of the Third World, and the so called “New World Order” was not any different. We have to acknowledge that a better world requires a stable world, achievable through settled disputes and protected human rights. Good business requires stable markets, which requires stable democracies, as we have learnt in Europe. Widespread democracy will pave the way for establishing a better harmonious global village, where there should be no room for gross human right abuses. [End].

    Table of bioweapon agents on next page

    List of microbial agents of USA, Russia and Iraq
    USA Russia IRAQ
    Anthrax
    Botulinum toxin
    Anthrax
    Botulinum toxin
    Anthrax
    Botulinum toxin
    Eastern and Western equine
    Korean hemorrhagic fever
    Bolivian hemorrhagic fever
    Melioidosis dengue fever
    Rift Valley fever
    Chikungunya disease virus
    Ricin
    Rice brown spot disease
    Late blight of potato
    Stem rust of cereal
    Newcastle disease virus
    Fowl plague virus
    Marburg virus
    Ebola
    Machupo virus
    Japanese encephalitis
    Russian spring-summer encephalitis
    Ornithosis
    African swine fever virus
    Wheat stem rust
    Gas gangrene
    Aflatoxin
    Trichothecene Mycotoxins
    Wheat cover smut
    Ricin
    Hemorrhagic conjuctivitis virus
    Rotavirus
    Camel pox

    Brucellosis
    Encephalitis
    Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis
    Argentinian hemorrhagic fever
    Tularemia
    Q-fever
    Lassa fever
    Glanders
    plague
    Yellow fever
    Psittacosis
    Typhus
    Rice blast
    Rinderpest virus

    Brucellosis
    Encephalitis
    Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis
    Argentinian hemorrhagic fever
    Tularemia
    Q-feverLassa fever
    Glandersplague
    yellow fever
    Psittacosis
    Typhus
    Rice blast
    Rinderpest virus


    Published in www.Kurdishmedia.com on 26 October, 2001.

    Sunday, 1 May 1994

    Playing by the rules: Kurds Shia and Sunni Iraqis

    Playing by the Rules

    Dlawer Ala ‘Aldeen


    In: Iraq since the Gulf War, Prospects for Democracy. Editor: Fran Hazelton, for CARDRI. Zed Books Ltd. London & New Jersey. 1994. Chapter 18, pages 232-243

    The artificial boundaries of the modem state of Iraq, which were laid down by the British in the 1920s and have been protected ever since by the major powers, created a heterogeneous combination of ethnic and religious groups. The British, militarily dominant after the First World War, drew the map of Iraq by annexing the southern part of Kurdish lands - the Ottoman province of Mosul - to the Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia inhabited mainly by Arabs, namely Baghdad and Basra. In the process, they denied the Kurdish people any right to an independent Kurdish state. The Kurds of southern Kurdistan have been through seventy years of forced co-existence with the Sunni and Shi’i Arabs under the rule of Sunni Arabs in Baghdad. The division of Kurdistan and amalgamation of these divergent groups created one of the most unstable countries in the Middle East. The plight of the Kurds (and their armed struggle for basic human rights) and the plight of the Shi’i Arabs in the south have been major contributors to instability in the entire region.

    In the 1930s and 1940s, the southern Kurds somehow adapted to the new reality and started thinking in the context of modern Iraq. This was at the expense of their national identity and their human and political rights. With the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958, Britain finally lost influence as an imperial power within Iraq and the fate of the Kurds was left entirely in the hands of a series of undemocratic Arab nationalist governments. Without exception, these regimes — all of which were supported by either, or both, Cold War superpowers -- refused to recognize the Kurds’ democratic rights or demand for self-determination. Since the Ba’thists came to power - first in 1963 and then in 1968 - the very existence of the Kurds has been at risk. To the superpowers, the violation of human rights and suppression of the people of Iraq were no more than ‘internal affairs’ so long as the regime was deemed indispensable for trade and most recently for preventing the spread of the Shi’i Islamic revolution.

    The ‘sacred’ boundaries of Iraq and exclusively Sunni rule in Baghdad became the only recognized image of Iraq during the era of the two superpowers. All policies were worked out around those boundaries which ensured that they remained unquestioned. However, with the emergence of the United States as the leading, or the only, master of the world, international relations have changed and old policies are no longer applicable. The clock must now turn the American way. Sadly, however, there is no evidence that the USA has developed any well thought-out policy towards Iraq. Its only obvious policy has been a reaction to events, and too little too late. Many observers have the impression that the US administration changes its policies frequently. This, and the way the USA conducted the Gulf War, demonstrates their ignorance of Iraq’s social and political structure.

    The USA has long valued Saddam Husain as an economic and political partner. However, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, it strongly indicated that he was no longer a partner and should go, hence General Schwarzkopf’s desire to march all the way to Baghdad. But when, in the intifada of March 1991, the Iraqi people had the opportunity of removing Saddam Husain and replacing him with a Shi’i-dominated opposition, the Americans pulled away the rug and actively sought to prevent his downfall. Not having prepared a ‘friendly’ alternative (a military dictator with a different name), the USA accepted Saddam Husain as the ‘devil they knew’, preferable to the one they did not. They allowed the ‘internal affairs’ to carry on. The Shi’is were slaughtered in the south and the Kurds were left in the wilderness.

    The British, however, are acknowledged to have a better understanding of the area, and have long conducted the policy they see as in their best interest. British policy has nevertheless time and again proved to be catastrophic for the people of Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. The British have had more knowledge, but always followed the USA, who have no thought-out policy. Fortunately for the Iraqi people, by the time of the mass exodus of refugees from Iraqi Kurdistan in April 1991, Margaret Thatcher had her own personal policy towards Saddam Husain. She had developed a deep dislike for him and, although no longer in power, was strong enough to make people listen in Britain and the USA. She initiated a sequence of events that resulted in John Major’s passionate move to intervene militarily in Kurdistan (with or without the Americans). Instead of letting the British take the moral high ground, the Americans jumped in ahead and led the way into the ‘quagmire’ to save lives. This was a classic example of US policy. Lives were saved in Kurdistan and George Bush became Hajji Bush. But the ‘safe havens’ were set up only in a part of Iraqi Kurdistan, less than half the area from which the refugees had fled. As for the Shi’is in the south, their untelevized suffering remained an ‘internal affair’.

    Kurdish safe haven

    The Allies made a deliberate effort to limit the Kurdish safe haven to the province of Dohuk where no more than 800,000 people had been dis placed. The majority of the refugees (1.2-1.5 million) were fleeing eastward towards Iran from the major cities of Kirkuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyya. Operation ‘Provide Comfort’ was an attempt to appease Turkey. Great efforts were made to stop the refugees entering Turkey by providing immediate aid on the mountains, Refugees were actively encouraged to return to their homes under the impression that the Allies would stay there to protect them. Turkey closed the border from day one and succeeded in creating enough pressure to have the refugee burden shouldered internationally. The Iranians, while opposed to the whole idea of the safe haven and regarding it much like a second Israel, tried to play the Turkish game and announced the closure of their border in the face of the tide of refugees. Their calls for others to shoulder the burden were largely ignored by Western governments (except for some limited aid mostly from non-governmental organizations), and fortunately they never closed the border, The Kurdish refugees along the Iranian border cried for help and for [ extension of the safe haven, but they too were ignored. Masses of refugees fleeing the provinces of Kirkuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyya remained in the open at Saddam’s mercy without aid or protection. They were trapped between the Iraqi army and the border with Iran, far from the safe haven in Dohuk province to the north-west, adjoining the Turkish border. Iran did not allow international aid to cross its border. The 36th parallel, which provided air cover for less than half of Iraqi Kurdistan, was not sufficient to inhibit Iraqi army advances south of the line. Thus, Allied protection not only remained inadequate throughout the period but, more sadly, the whole of operation ‘Provide Comfort’ was abandoned in July 1991. The Allies left the area before their task was completed.

    In October 1991, the Iraqi government suddenly withdrew from the three main Kurdish governorates of Arbil, Dohuk and Sulaimaniyya and imposed a strict embargo on the entire area, leaving the strangled Kurds as the sole authorities in charge. The purpose of the Iraqi government’s gamble was not entirely obvious. It was believed to be a blackmail attempt which assumed that Iran, Turkey, Arab countries and the Allies would rush in to prevent the Kurds from running their own affairs for fear of a Kurdish independent state being established. Iran, Turkey and Syria began holding regular meetings to discuss the Kurdish situation, and publicly declared that they would not tolerate any talk of Kurdish independence or the break-up of Iraq. Nevertheless, the Kurdish parties were left alone to run a de facto state, with no income and no direct foreign support. None of the Western governments have offered direct financial support to the elected Kurdish administration which is seeking to lead, feed and police between 3.5 and 4 million people. One US government aid official attempted at a London conference in July 1993 to justify his government’s lack of action, by referring to the Kurds’ inability to eliminate the corruption inherited from Saddam’s regime. He ignored the need for financial support to
    combat corruption and the fact that Western support enabled Saddam to establish such corruption in the first place.

    Saddam Husain’s government is able to extract, refine and sell oil. It is still able to provide people with basic services, while the Kurdish region has been deprived of the means of providing such services. No attempt has been made to relieve the sanctions on the Kurds or allow them to generate some hard-currency income. Even the small amount of money made available to the United Nations for relief in Kurdistan was wasted through Baghdad. Furthermore, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are no longer backed to provide alternative support for the Kurds, and some have clearly been instructed not to deal directly with the legitimate, elected authorities in Kurdistan.

    Southern Iraq

    The uprising in the south of Iraq had a different tragic fate. Thanks to Iranian interference with the Shi’i uprising and the Allies’ lack of interference in Saddam’s counter-attack, Iraqi Shi’is were badly defeated. Tens of thousands of people were massacred during and after the uprising, and the true figures of those killed may never be known. Since the intifada, the level of repression of the people and destruction of their historical religious institutions has intensified to such an extent that the entire Shi’i cultural legacy is in danger. The ‘modernization’ of mosques, construction of highways over holy cemeteries and the ‘reorganization’ of the structure of the Shi’i clerical school have all accelerated since 1991.

    The Marsh Arabs are one of the most ancient communities in the Middle East. They are now facing total destruction of their community and way of life. Like all other Iraqi communities, they suffered a great deal from oppression and from the Iran-Iraq war. Iii addition, the hard-to-govern marshlands form a refuge for army deserters and opposition members. This meant they have suffered government military offensives, including air attacks, the use of chemical weapons, underwater mines, burning of reed beds and water poisoning. Having failed so far to achieve total control of the Marsh Arabs, the government’s last resort has been to speed up and expand the southern desalination project (the so-called ‘Third River’ project). The clear purpose of this project is to drain the marshes and facilitate the government’s control over the area, thereby eliminating it as a base for political opposition. However, a spin-off is the desalination of the areas between the Tigris and Euphrates and possibly the exploitation of oil-fields under the marshes. Drainage has probably reached an irreversible stage, with vast areas already drained and dried.

    All this is actively taking place south of the 32nd parallel, under the nose of Allied surveillance aircraft. Protective air cover has not stopped the Iraqi regime on the ground continuing to violate both human rights and UN Resolution 688. Saddam’s bombardment of the area has, if anything, intensified since the creation of the no-fly zone. Air cover without monitoring on the ground has proved almost as inadequate as not providing any cover. A no-fly zone with no safe haven for the Shi’is in the south means continued persecution, humiliation, starvation and destruction of long established social and religious structures.

    The opposition and the future political system

    Since the creation of modern Iraq, the Sunni Arab minority has monopolized power. This was convenient for the former superpower but catastrophic for the Kurdish and Shi’i populations and the rest of the Middle East. With an ethnically and religiously diverse population forcibly combined within artificial boundaries, Iraqi governments failed to minimize the country’s potential for disintegration by establishing a civilized constitution that would secure people’s rights and strengthen the affinity between them.

    For a long time, the Iraqi opposition has remained disunited. This is hardly surprising. The various groups come from different backgrounds and have distinct interests. Their diverse backers include Iran, Syria, Sa’udi Arabia, Turkey and the CLA. However, sharing a single enemy, their common sense dictates the formation of a low affinity coalition. This has never been easy.

    Clearly, the sections of the Iraqi opposition that enjoy wide popular support and have a strong organizational base inside Iraq are the Kurds and the Shi’ is. Alliances between Kurdish and Shi’i political organizations are therefore vital for any progress by the opposition, even though they are not monolithic groups. The rest of the opposition groups, important though they may be, are mainly loose organizations with little fame or following inside Iraq. Despite the diversity of the Iraqi opposition, there is fortunately at present a higher level of understanding among the various groups than ever before. All have accepted multi-party democracy as the only alternative to Saddam Husain, though they do not seem to have achieved unanimity on the issue of a future federal system for Iraq.

    The Iraqi opposition has had to pass many tests before being able to present itself to the world as a credible alternative to Saddam 1-lusain. It has been expected to demonstrate that it represents the views of all the people of Iraq and enjoys the moral authority to act on their behalf. But its biggest test is to demonstrate that it has understood the rules of the game and can project itself as a coalition of professional, moderate statesmen who can relate to the West. It has not passed all the tests yet. It has not been able to prove that it would contribute to peace and stability and would not disturb the balance of power in the region; that it would not pose a threat to the West’s lifeline interest (the oil in the Gulf) or to Israel; that it would establish a capitalistic, pro-American free-market economy. It may even be expected to guarantee the Americans a lion’s share of the future reconstruction contracts (as in Kuwait) to repair Iraq’s crippled infrastructure, which is estimated at around $200 billion.

    In the same way as dictatorship by the minority Sunni Arabs has proved catastrophic, the dictatorship of any other ethnic or religious groups will undoubtedly have a similar consequence. For instance, in the absence of complete democracy, a future Shi’i government based on clerical dictator ship will be suicidal. The non-Shi’i Iraqis, including Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Christians, have good reasons to fear such a dictatorship. All these groups, however, accept that a parliamentary system with a Shi’i majority is legitimate, tolerable and acceptable. Iraqi Shi’i leaders, willingly or not, seem to have accepted such a scenario, although the fundamentalists among them (and many so called ‘moderate’ Shi’i leaders) cannot accept Kurdish demands for limited autonomy, let alone self-determination. Many nationalist Sunni Arabs share the same feelings about the Kurds. Therefore, only a fully democratic constitution can guarantee human rights for all Iraqis and the creation of a stable country.

    Since the March 1991 intifada, the Iraqi opposition in exile has come together and developed more mutual understanding than ever before. All parties are clearly convinced that their only chance of survival and of creating a formidable alternative to Saddam Husain’s rule is to reach such consensus, This perspective is shared, albeit with varying emphasis, by all three main communities that comprise Iraqi society: Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shi’is.

    Kurds

    The Kurds have long realized the grave risk in the sort term of insisting on an independent Kurdish state, and have accepted the current boundaries of Iraq. The only hope for them of securing some of their desired rights in the foreseeable future seems to lie in them committing themselves to an integral but democratic Iraq. The ‘State of Kurdistan’ remains the dream of every Kurd in the same way as every Palestinian dreams of the ‘State of Palestine’. Nevertheless, the Kurdish political organizations are genuinely insisting on coexisting with the Arabs in Iraq. The Kurdish leaders have recently come under growing pressure from sections of the Kurdish population for greater commitment to the Kurdish right of self-determination (including independence). However, the leaders have so far skilfully and successfully managed to resist pressure, persuading people to weigh risks against interests.

    Looking back at the history of Baghdad’s Kurdish relations, it becomes apparent that the more aggressive the regime has been in treating the Kurds, the more demanding the Kurds have become. From the 1920s to the 1950s the Iraqi monarchy ignored the cultural and political rights of the Kurds, but treated individuals as full citizens. During those years, the Kurdish movement, for its part, restricted its political demands to little more than cultural rights. Since the 1960s, under republican rule, succes sive regimes have further denied Kurdish tights and stepped up their suppression. At the same time, Kurdish desire for self-rule increased and ‘autonomy’ became the slogan of the armed struggle.

    Under Ba’thist rule and after a decade of genocidal war, coexistence with Baghdad has become increasingly difficult. The Kurds have developed a stronger desire for divorce from Baghdad. Indeed, the deteriorating relationship between Baghdad and the Kurds may soon reach a point of no return where mutual trust and coexistence become impossible. This is why only multi-party democracy with a parliamentary constitution can enhance Baghdad-Kurdish affinity, which a federal system will hopefully sustain into the foreseeable future.

    Sunni Arabs

    The loose term ‘Sunni Arabs’ refers to a heterogeneous combination of tribal, semi-tribal and non-tribal peoples occupying the triangle of Iraq between Mosul, Ramadi and Baghdad. This collection of non-religious, mainly nationalist Arabs is the social base of the Ba’thist oppressive machinery, with its monopolization of absolute power. Opposition to the Ba’thist regime is at its weakest in this region, and almost all Sunni Arab anti-Saddam activists are abroad. They enjoy less popular support than the Shi’is or Kurds and inside Iraq they are virtually unheard-of.

    Among the Sunni Arab political organizations, there are many extreme pan-Arab nationalists who stress Iraq’s Arab identity and its role as a potential leader of the ‘Arab national liberation movement’. Groups such as former Ba’thists and the current pro-Syrian Ba’th Party not only insist on a firmly integrated Iraq and think that democracy will dismember it, but also see the expansion of Iraq and the formation with Syria of a giant United Arab Republic as a dream ticket. These ‘leftist Ba’thists’ count on Saddam’s Ba’th Party as their organizational base in Iraq, hoping that Saddam’s downfall will allow the exiled Ba’thists to fill his vacant post and continue Ba’thist domination.

    The rest of the Sunni Arab opposition (i.e. the majority) consists of moderate democratic groups which are genuinely interested in establishing a constitution based on a Western-style democracy. They have long accepted that without this, the disintegration of Iraq is inevitable. Some have gone so far as to suggest a federal system (with a federal Kurdish state) for Iraq. It is important, however, that most of the organizations which have been arbitrarily labelled ‘Sunni Arab organizations’ are not founded on the basis of such an ethnic/religious identity. They all have a wide spectrum of membership, including Shi’is, Kurds and Christians.

    Shi’i

    The terms ‘Shi’i organizations’ and ‘Shi’i opposition’ have been incorrectly used to describe Shi’ i political/religious organizations or the people of southern Iraq. Apart from the purely clerical organizations, which recruit on the basis of Shi’i-Islamic religious commitment, the rest arc largely party-political organizations driven by the plight of the people of the South. Shi’is in Iraq suffered from persecution under the Ba’thists simply because of their religious identity, just as the Kurds were persecuted because of their ethnic identity. However, it is important to stress that not all Shi’is in Iraq support the Shi’i clergy or the Shi’i political’ religious organizations, and not all Shi’is wish to see an ‘Islamic state’ in Iraq. All the various political viewpoints and affiliations can be found in the Shi’i community, developed according to personal ideologies and interests. Nevertheless, the way that the Iraqi regime has insulted the spiritual symbols of Shi’is and denied them their human rights has in creased support for the clerical leadership abroad.

    Such support is split between party-political organizations, like the Da’wa Party and the more religious pro-Iran clerical groups led by Al-Hakim. Al-Hakim is the son of one who epitomizes the Shi’i religion for many Shi’is and is regarded by many as a symbol of their struggle against Saddam. More importantly, al-Hakim is now the head of the Tehran-based Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the umbrella organization of all Iraqi Shi’i groups. It is interesting to note that there is no unanimity within SCIRI on Iraq’s future. Some have no problem with a modern Western-style democracy and accept the open market economy in principle. Others would accept nothing short of a pure Islamic state with a Shi’i-clergy dictatorship. During the Gulf War, members of SCIRI prayed for an Iranian victory which would carry them to power in Baghdad.

    The end of the Iran-Iraq War and the changed circumstances it brought about helped lend a new dimension to Iraqi Shi’i thinking. More importantly, years of bitter experience in opposition have eventually enabled Shi’i organizations to understand the rules of the game of modern international politics. Whether they play by these rules is another matter; they ignored them for years and only recently have they given some indications of abiding by them. Nowadays, moderate Shi’i personalities are given a higher profile in international lobbying than the mainstream radicals of SCIRI. They have openly endorsed a Western-style democracy and are actively keen to be seen as truly modern statesmen. It is important to note that most Shi’i organizations no longer style themselves as the ‘only’ alternatives to Saddam Husain. Behind the scenes, however, a great majority of SCIRI members have not thoroughly digested the above rules, or the notion of a Western-style democracy in Iraq, let alone the rights of ethnic and religious minorities or the notion of a federal system.

    The obvious dependence of the Iraqi Shi’i organizations, particularly the SCIRI leadership, on Iran, has had tragic consequences for the Iraqi opposition and the spring 1991 intifada, as it has masked the fundamental differences and genuine disagreements between the Iranian clergy and the Iraqi Shi’i party political leaders. There are innumerable religious and political differences between the two sides. For a start, the Iraqi Shi’i organizations do not believe in the same Wilayat Al-Faqih, in which ultimate power is concentrated in the person of al-faqih. Such differences are deep rooted and go back centuries. More importantly, the Iraqi Shi’is strongly resent Iranian interference in their internal affairs and in Iraqi opposition affairs. On a private level, Iraqi Shi’ i leaders do complain about this interference. Publicly, however, they would not put down their ‘religious brothers’ as the Western media do, because this would not serve their purposes. Also, they see no reason for giving up a ‘brother’, especially as they still await a gesture of good will from the West or its allies in the Arab world. It is unfortunate that the notion of Iran’s Islamic state or Shi’i fundamentalism has been generalized to include all Iraq’s Shi’i population in the South. Iranian attempts to export the Shi’i revolution to Iraq, Sa’udi Arabia, Afghanistan, the Lebanon and the former USSR made East and West unite in opposition.

    It is tragic that the Iraqi Shi’i organizations have underestimated the power and danger of an unrivalled superpower. But the bigger tragedy lies in the illiteracy of this superpower which is yet to demonstrate skill and logic in manipulating the world. The only logic applied to US policies is ‘protection of the US national interest’, with no serious attempt to under stand local politics and cultural values. Thus, the US administration has yet to demonstrate an understanding of the differences between Iraqi and Iranian Shi’i, and the very complex nature of their relations. In the same way as Shi’ I organizations have realized that their only hope of participa tion in power is to accept Western-style democracy, the Americans should realize that without the participation of Shi’i political organizations in power there will be no stable, united and peaceful Iraq. Furthermore, as the Kurdish population of Iraqi Kurdistan will not settle for anything less than a federal state of Kurdistan within a federal Iraq, the Shi’is will not settle for anything less than full participation in any future governing institution. Unless the rights of these two long-suppressed groups are secured, and unless the West starts winning the good will of these people, there will be no guarantees for a stable market in Iraq or secure business with future governments.

    The time for dictatorial rules in Iraq is over, and the time for democracy is now long overdue. The only system capable of saving Iraq’s integrity is a genuinely democratic multi-party parliamentary system. Until recently, many believed that in an Islamic developing country of the Middle East it would be difficult to establish such a Western-style democratic system. These views, however, were put to the test in May 1992 in Iraqi Kurdistan, with the first historical opportunity to establish a parliamentary system in part of Iraq.

    The Kurdish federal state as a model for Iraq

    Kurdish internal politics has many similarities with that of Iraq as a whole. It has comparable ingredients of conflict and bellicosity. Politically, there are the two main bitter rivals, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in addition to the communists, right-wing nationalist parties, Islamic parties, Christian parties, and others. Ethnically, there are Kurds (Soranis, Bahdinis, Hawramis, Failis), Turco mans, Assyrians, Armenians and Arabs. Religiously, there are Muslims (Sunnis and Shi’is), Christians and Yazidis. In fact, Kurdistan is more heterogeneous than any other part of Iraq. Nevertheless, it was possible to combine all these diverse groups under one legislative and executive system in which all parties (political, ethnic or religious) are represented. A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable to see leaders of the KDP and PUK even dine together; now they dine, travel and rule together. Both parties have realized the importance of the success of the experiment on which their own future and the future of their people depends. Their high level of collaboration and mutual compromise has provided security and reassurance for the people of Kurdistan.

    This experience shows that irrespective of the ethnic and religious multiplicity, cultural diversity and geographical location of the nation, it is possible to establish a truly democratic system with a considerable degree of harmony. The actual constitution need not be an exact replica of that of any of the Western systems. In the same way as different Western countries have developed their own systems, Iraq can develop its own. The initial set-up of the current democratic system in Kurdistan was agreed before the election of 1992 by the different rival parties under the coalition of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF). The end result was the establishment of a unique parliamentary system which is well adapted to local politics and cultural values. Also, the rights of minorities like Christians have been secured through special mechanisms. As time goes by, the parliament will gradually develop the constitution and put down the roots of the system.

    Despite the absence of any real income or external support, and despite the double imposition of sanctions, the democratic system in Kurdistan has managed to survive and grow in strength. The vast majority of its current problems are due to lack of funds and/or political security. How-ever, there are a few problems which are purely local and require immediate attention. For instance, the problem of the supreme leader of the Kurdish Federal State, locally named ‘the head of the Kurdish Liberation Movement’ has proved difficult to resolve. In the circumstances, one could argue that the people of Kurdistan were lucky that this issue was not resolved in 1992, because not all parties were convinced of the necessity of such a leader and they had not agreed on the extent of his or her executive power. The whole concept of the election of such a leader was raised only days before the 1992 election, and arguments about the powers of the post continued until election day. Even now, the rival parties have not resolved the issue.

    Failure to elect an outright leader in the first round of voting meant that the two most powerful individuals in Kurdish politics - Jalal Talabani and Mas’ud Barzani -remained outside the system of government in Kurdistan. Without them, the Kurdish parliament and the Kurdish government remained relatively weak and financially poor. Throughout the past decade and a half these two leaders have had the ultimate decision-making power and they now jointly head the military coalition of the IKF. Even though they have remained outside parliament and have not been given any state positions, they constitute the ultimate authority behind the governing body in Kurdistan. They have retained the power to appoint (or fire) a prime minister, choose his cabinet and appoint (or fire) the speaker of the parliament. Furthermore, on the international platform, they act on behalf of the Kurdish parliament and its government. Their absence from government has been seen as a weakness, both in the internal authority and in the international standing of that institution. Their inclusion in the legislative and/or executive bodies, in whatever capacity, is an absolute necessity. The two leaders of the KDP and PUK have demonstrated their genuine interest in supporting the elected bodies and demanded that the Peshmerga forces and the general population see them as their legitimate rulers. Indeed, without the blessing of the two leaders, the whole experiment could have failed.

    However, careful consideration clearly must be paid to the kind of executive and legislative powers to be given to the sovereign leader. His/her relation with the legislative and executive institutions must be well defined before the election battle is conducted and such definition has to be formulated in a way that leaves ultimate authority with the parliament. There is no reason why a single leader cannot be elected by the people of Iraq.

    The experience in Kurdistan showed that the vast majority of Kurds had not decided who they would vote for until near the election date, when they were still examining manifestos to see who would protect their interests best. The same thing should apply to the people of Iraq, including those in the south. The people are sufficiently sophisticated politically to think in terms of peace, justice, economic well-being and freedom rather than religious fundamentalism or Arab supremacy.

    Currently, the Iraqi opposition has chosen a council of joint leaders consisting of a Kurd, a Shi’i and a Sunni, but the ultimate test for people’s choice should be determined by a direct free election with nothing to stop any candidate becoming president, regardless of whether he/she is an Arab Sunni, a Kurd, a Shi’i, a Christian, a Turcoman, a Yazidi or a Communist. In Kurdistan the candidates for the leadership contest included representatives of four different parties, two of which were relatively small. One was an Islamic party represented by a Sunni clergyman, the other was socialist. One of the major candidates was a Bahdini Kurd while the others were all Soranis. Many Sunni clergymen and religious Kurds voted for agnostic political parties rather than the Islamic one, and many Sorani Kurds voted for the Bahdini candidate and vice versa.

    Conclusion

    There remains a wide gulf between the Allies and the Iraqi opposition, and between different groups within the Iraqi opposition. The first has resulted from a lack of understanding between the two sides, caused by the ignorance and obsessive approach of Western governments (particularly the USA) towards the Iraqi opposition, and its fear of the unknown when it comes to alternatives to Saddam Husain’s regime. On the other hand, some Iraqi groups (particularly the Shi’i organizations) have not yet learnt to play by the rules of modern politics under the supremacy of the USA. Each side, it seems, will have to begin to learn from the other. The Shi’i groups need to demonstrate true independence from Iran and the Allies need to demonstrate more skill and sophistication to help them achieve just that. Without winning the good will of the Iraqi people and the inclusion of Shi’is in the game, Iraq will neither be a stable country in the region, nor will it be a peaceful market for the West.

    The gulfs between the Kurds, the Shi’ is and the rest of the Iraqi opposition have largely been created by the stubborn demand of the pro Iranian Shi’i groups for an Islamic State of Iraq, with a clerical dictatorship and the absolute denial of the aspirations of other ethnic and religious groups. Sunni Arab nationalists are just as undemocratic and stubborn. Both groups fear the disintegration of Iraq and resent the Kurdish movement and the declaration of a Federal State of Kurdistan. The Kurds have not yet fought for an independent state and have done their utmost to reassure all Iraqis, but further denial of their rights will undoubtedly fuel enthusiasm for such a fight. Iraqi opposition parties need closer ties and better understanding than ever before. Replacing one dictatorship with another is certainly no longer acceptable to lraqis. Democracy is the only alternative to Saddam Husain that will secure stability and peace.