Playing by the rules: Kurds Shia and Sunni Iraqis

Playing by the Rules

Dlawer Ala ‘Aldeen

In: Iraq since the Gulf War, Prospects for Democracy. Editor: Fran Hazelton, for CARDRI. Zed Books Ltd. London & New Jersey. 1994. Chapter 18, pages 232-243

The artificial boundaries of the modem state of Iraq, which were laid down by the British in the 1920s and have been protected ever since by the major powers, created a heterogeneous combination of ethnic and religious groups. The British, militarily dominant after the First World War, drew the map of Iraq by annexing the southern part of Kurdish lands - the Ottoman province of Mosul - to the Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia inhabited mainly by Arabs, namely Baghdad and Basra. In the process, they denied the Kurdish people any right to an independent Kurdish state. The Kurds of southern Kurdistan have been through seventy years of forced co-existence with the Sunni and Shi’i Arabs under the rule of Sunni Arabs in Baghdad. The division of Kurdistan and amalgamation of these divergent groups created one of the most unstable countries in the Middle East. The plight of the Kurds (and their armed struggle for basic human rights) and the plight of the Shi’i Arabs in the south have been major contributors to instability in the entire region.

In the 1930s and 1940s, the southern Kurds somehow adapted to the new reality and started thinking in the context of modern Iraq. This was at the expense of their national identity and their human and political rights. With the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958, Britain finally lost influence as an imperial power within Iraq and the fate of the Kurds was left entirely in the hands of a series of undemocratic Arab nationalist governments. Without exception, these regimes — all of which were supported by either, or both, Cold War superpowers -- refused to recognize the Kurds’ democratic rights or demand for self-determination. Since the Ba’thists came to power - first in 1963 and then in 1968 - the very existence of the Kurds has been at risk. To the superpowers, the violation of human rights and suppression of the people of Iraq were no more than ‘internal affairs’ so long as the regime was deemed indispensable for trade and most recently for preventing the spread of the Shi’i Islamic revolution.

The ‘sacred’ boundaries of Iraq and exclusively Sunni rule in Baghdad became the only recognized image of Iraq during the era of the two superpowers. All policies were worked out around those boundaries which ensured that they remained unquestioned. However, with the emergence of the United States as the leading, or the only, master of the world, international relations have changed and old policies are no longer applicable. The clock must now turn the American way. Sadly, however, there is no evidence that the USA has developed any well thought-out policy towards Iraq. Its only obvious policy has been a reaction to events, and too little too late. Many observers have the impression that the US administration changes its policies frequently. This, and the way the USA conducted the Gulf War, demonstrates their ignorance of Iraq’s social and political structure.

The USA has long valued Saddam Husain as an economic and political partner. However, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, it strongly indicated that he was no longer a partner and should go, hence General Schwarzkopf’s desire to march all the way to Baghdad. But when, in the intifada of March 1991, the Iraqi people had the opportunity of removing Saddam Husain and replacing him with a Shi’i-dominated opposition, the Americans pulled away the rug and actively sought to prevent his downfall. Not having prepared a ‘friendly’ alternative (a military dictator with a different name), the USA accepted Saddam Husain as the ‘devil they knew’, preferable to the one they did not. They allowed the ‘internal affairs’ to carry on. The Shi’is were slaughtered in the south and the Kurds were left in the wilderness.

The British, however, are acknowledged to have a better understanding of the area, and have long conducted the policy they see as in their best interest. British policy has nevertheless time and again proved to be catastrophic for the people of Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. The British have had more knowledge, but always followed the USA, who have no thought-out policy. Fortunately for the Iraqi people, by the time of the mass exodus of refugees from Iraqi Kurdistan in April 1991, Margaret Thatcher had her own personal policy towards Saddam Husain. She had developed a deep dislike for him and, although no longer in power, was strong enough to make people listen in Britain and the USA. She initiated a sequence of events that resulted in John Major’s passionate move to intervene militarily in Kurdistan (with or without the Americans). Instead of letting the British take the moral high ground, the Americans jumped in ahead and led the way into the ‘quagmire’ to save lives. This was a classic example of US policy. Lives were saved in Kurdistan and George Bush became Hajji Bush. But the ‘safe havens’ were set up only in a part of Iraqi Kurdistan, less than half the area from which the refugees had fled. As for the Shi’is in the south, their untelevized suffering remained an ‘internal affair’.

Kurdish safe haven

The Allies made a deliberate effort to limit the Kurdish safe haven to the province of Dohuk where no more than 800,000 people had been dis placed. The majority of the refugees (1.2-1.5 million) were fleeing eastward towards Iran from the major cities of Kirkuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyya. Operation ‘Provide Comfort’ was an attempt to appease Turkey. Great efforts were made to stop the refugees entering Turkey by providing immediate aid on the mountains, Refugees were actively encouraged to return to their homes under the impression that the Allies would stay there to protect them. Turkey closed the border from day one and succeeded in creating enough pressure to have the refugee burden shouldered internationally. The Iranians, while opposed to the whole idea of the safe haven and regarding it much like a second Israel, tried to play the Turkish game and announced the closure of their border in the face of the tide of refugees. Their calls for others to shoulder the burden were largely ignored by Western governments (except for some limited aid mostly from non-governmental organizations), and fortunately they never closed the border, The Kurdish refugees along the Iranian border cried for help and for [ extension of the safe haven, but they too were ignored. Masses of refugees fleeing the provinces of Kirkuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyya remained in the open at Saddam’s mercy without aid or protection. They were trapped between the Iraqi army and the border with Iran, far from the safe haven in Dohuk province to the north-west, adjoining the Turkish border. Iran did not allow international aid to cross its border. The 36th parallel, which provided air cover for less than half of Iraqi Kurdistan, was not sufficient to inhibit Iraqi army advances south of the line. Thus, Allied protection not only remained inadequate throughout the period but, more sadly, the whole of operation ‘Provide Comfort’ was abandoned in July 1991. The Allies left the area before their task was completed.

In October 1991, the Iraqi government suddenly withdrew from the three main Kurdish governorates of Arbil, Dohuk and Sulaimaniyya and imposed a strict embargo on the entire area, leaving the strangled Kurds as the sole authorities in charge. The purpose of the Iraqi government’s gamble was not entirely obvious. It was believed to be a blackmail attempt which assumed that Iran, Turkey, Arab countries and the Allies would rush in to prevent the Kurds from running their own affairs for fear of a Kurdish independent state being established. Iran, Turkey and Syria began holding regular meetings to discuss the Kurdish situation, and publicly declared that they would not tolerate any talk of Kurdish independence or the break-up of Iraq. Nevertheless, the Kurdish parties were left alone to run a de facto state, with no income and no direct foreign support. None of the Western governments have offered direct financial support to the elected Kurdish administration which is seeking to lead, feed and police between 3.5 and 4 million people. One US government aid official attempted at a London conference in July 1993 to justify his government’s lack of action, by referring to the Kurds’ inability to eliminate the corruption inherited from Saddam’s regime. He ignored the need for financial support to
combat corruption and the fact that Western support enabled Saddam to establish such corruption in the first place.

Saddam Husain’s government is able to extract, refine and sell oil. It is still able to provide people with basic services, while the Kurdish region has been deprived of the means of providing such services. No attempt has been made to relieve the sanctions on the Kurds or allow them to generate some hard-currency income. Even the small amount of money made available to the United Nations for relief in Kurdistan was wasted through Baghdad. Furthermore, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are no longer backed to provide alternative support for the Kurds, and some have clearly been instructed not to deal directly with the legitimate, elected authorities in Kurdistan.

Southern Iraq

The uprising in the south of Iraq had a different tragic fate. Thanks to Iranian interference with the Shi’i uprising and the Allies’ lack of interference in Saddam’s counter-attack, Iraqi Shi’is were badly defeated. Tens of thousands of people were massacred during and after the uprising, and the true figures of those killed may never be known. Since the intifada, the level of repression of the people and destruction of their historical religious institutions has intensified to such an extent that the entire Shi’i cultural legacy is in danger. The ‘modernization’ of mosques, construction of highways over holy cemeteries and the ‘reorganization’ of the structure of the Shi’i clerical school have all accelerated since 1991.

The Marsh Arabs are one of the most ancient communities in the Middle East. They are now facing total destruction of their community and way of life. Like all other Iraqi communities, they suffered a great deal from oppression and from the Iran-Iraq war. Iii addition, the hard-to-govern marshlands form a refuge for army deserters and opposition members. This meant they have suffered government military offensives, including air attacks, the use of chemical weapons, underwater mines, burning of reed beds and water poisoning. Having failed so far to achieve total control of the Marsh Arabs, the government’s last resort has been to speed up and expand the southern desalination project (the so-called ‘Third River’ project). The clear purpose of this project is to drain the marshes and facilitate the government’s control over the area, thereby eliminating it as a base for political opposition. However, a spin-off is the desalination of the areas between the Tigris and Euphrates and possibly the exploitation of oil-fields under the marshes. Drainage has probably reached an irreversible stage, with vast areas already drained and dried.

All this is actively taking place south of the 32nd parallel, under the nose of Allied surveillance aircraft. Protective air cover has not stopped the Iraqi regime on the ground continuing to violate both human rights and UN Resolution 688. Saddam’s bombardment of the area has, if anything, intensified since the creation of the no-fly zone. Air cover without monitoring on the ground has proved almost as inadequate as not providing any cover. A no-fly zone with no safe haven for the Shi’is in the south means continued persecution, humiliation, starvation and destruction of long established social and religious structures.

The opposition and the future political system

Since the creation of modern Iraq, the Sunni Arab minority has monopolized power. This was convenient for the former superpower but catastrophic for the Kurdish and Shi’i populations and the rest of the Middle East. With an ethnically and religiously diverse population forcibly combined within artificial boundaries, Iraqi governments failed to minimize the country’s potential for disintegration by establishing a civilized constitution that would secure people’s rights and strengthen the affinity between them.

For a long time, the Iraqi opposition has remained disunited. This is hardly surprising. The various groups come from different backgrounds and have distinct interests. Their diverse backers include Iran, Syria, Sa’udi Arabia, Turkey and the CLA. However, sharing a single enemy, their common sense dictates the formation of a low affinity coalition. This has never been easy.

Clearly, the sections of the Iraqi opposition that enjoy wide popular support and have a strong organizational base inside Iraq are the Kurds and the Shi’ is. Alliances between Kurdish and Shi’i political organizations are therefore vital for any progress by the opposition, even though they are not monolithic groups. The rest of the opposition groups, important though they may be, are mainly loose organizations with little fame or following inside Iraq. Despite the diversity of the Iraqi opposition, there is fortunately at present a higher level of understanding among the various groups than ever before. All have accepted multi-party democracy as the only alternative to Saddam Husain, though they do not seem to have achieved unanimity on the issue of a future federal system for Iraq.

The Iraqi opposition has had to pass many tests before being able to present itself to the world as a credible alternative to Saddam 1-lusain. It has been expected to demonstrate that it represents the views of all the people of Iraq and enjoys the moral authority to act on their behalf. But its biggest test is to demonstrate that it has understood the rules of the game and can project itself as a coalition of professional, moderate statesmen who can relate to the West. It has not passed all the tests yet. It has not been able to prove that it would contribute to peace and stability and would not disturb the balance of power in the region; that it would not pose a threat to the West’s lifeline interest (the oil in the Gulf) or to Israel; that it would establish a capitalistic, pro-American free-market economy. It may even be expected to guarantee the Americans a lion’s share of the future reconstruction contracts (as in Kuwait) to repair Iraq’s crippled infrastructure, which is estimated at around $200 billion.

In the same way as dictatorship by the minority Sunni Arabs has proved catastrophic, the dictatorship of any other ethnic or religious groups will undoubtedly have a similar consequence. For instance, in the absence of complete democracy, a future Shi’i government based on clerical dictator ship will be suicidal. The non-Shi’i Iraqis, including Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Christians, have good reasons to fear such a dictatorship. All these groups, however, accept that a parliamentary system with a Shi’i majority is legitimate, tolerable and acceptable. Iraqi Shi’i leaders, willingly or not, seem to have accepted such a scenario, although the fundamentalists among them (and many so called ‘moderate’ Shi’i leaders) cannot accept Kurdish demands for limited autonomy, let alone self-determination. Many nationalist Sunni Arabs share the same feelings about the Kurds. Therefore, only a fully democratic constitution can guarantee human rights for all Iraqis and the creation of a stable country.

Since the March 1991 intifada, the Iraqi opposition in exile has come together and developed more mutual understanding than ever before. All parties are clearly convinced that their only chance of survival and of creating a formidable alternative to Saddam Husain’s rule is to reach such consensus, This perspective is shared, albeit with varying emphasis, by all three main communities that comprise Iraqi society: Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shi’is.

Kurds

The Kurds have long realized the grave risk in the sort term of insisting on an independent Kurdish state, and have accepted the current boundaries of Iraq. The only hope for them of securing some of their desired rights in the foreseeable future seems to lie in them committing themselves to an integral but democratic Iraq. The ‘State of Kurdistan’ remains the dream of every Kurd in the same way as every Palestinian dreams of the ‘State of Palestine’. Nevertheless, the Kurdish political organizations are genuinely insisting on coexisting with the Arabs in Iraq. The Kurdish leaders have recently come under growing pressure from sections of the Kurdish population for greater commitment to the Kurdish right of self-determination (including independence). However, the leaders have so far skilfully and successfully managed to resist pressure, persuading people to weigh risks against interests.

Looking back at the history of Baghdad’s Kurdish relations, it becomes apparent that the more aggressive the regime has been in treating the Kurds, the more demanding the Kurds have become. From the 1920s to the 1950s the Iraqi monarchy ignored the cultural and political rights of the Kurds, but treated individuals as full citizens. During those years, the Kurdish movement, for its part, restricted its political demands to little more than cultural rights. Since the 1960s, under republican rule, succes sive regimes have further denied Kurdish tights and stepped up their suppression. At the same time, Kurdish desire for self-rule increased and ‘autonomy’ became the slogan of the armed struggle.

Under Ba’thist rule and after a decade of genocidal war, coexistence with Baghdad has become increasingly difficult. The Kurds have developed a stronger desire for divorce from Baghdad. Indeed, the deteriorating relationship between Baghdad and the Kurds may soon reach a point of no return where mutual trust and coexistence become impossible. This is why only multi-party democracy with a parliamentary constitution can enhance Baghdad-Kurdish affinity, which a federal system will hopefully sustain into the foreseeable future.

Sunni Arabs

The loose term ‘Sunni Arabs’ refers to a heterogeneous combination of tribal, semi-tribal and non-tribal peoples occupying the triangle of Iraq between Mosul, Ramadi and Baghdad. This collection of non-religious, mainly nationalist Arabs is the social base of the Ba’thist oppressive machinery, with its monopolization of absolute power. Opposition to the Ba’thist regime is at its weakest in this region, and almost all Sunni Arab anti-Saddam activists are abroad. They enjoy less popular support than the Shi’is or Kurds and inside Iraq they are virtually unheard-of.

Among the Sunni Arab political organizations, there are many extreme pan-Arab nationalists who stress Iraq’s Arab identity and its role as a potential leader of the ‘Arab national liberation movement’. Groups such as former Ba’thists and the current pro-Syrian Ba’th Party not only insist on a firmly integrated Iraq and think that democracy will dismember it, but also see the expansion of Iraq and the formation with Syria of a giant United Arab Republic as a dream ticket. These ‘leftist Ba’thists’ count on Saddam’s Ba’th Party as their organizational base in Iraq, hoping that Saddam’s downfall will allow the exiled Ba’thists to fill his vacant post and continue Ba’thist domination.

The rest of the Sunni Arab opposition (i.e. the majority) consists of moderate democratic groups which are genuinely interested in establishing a constitution based on a Western-style democracy. They have long accepted that without this, the disintegration of Iraq is inevitable. Some have gone so far as to suggest a federal system (with a federal Kurdish state) for Iraq. It is important, however, that most of the organizations which have been arbitrarily labelled ‘Sunni Arab organizations’ are not founded on the basis of such an ethnic/religious identity. They all have a wide spectrum of membership, including Shi’is, Kurds and Christians.

Shi’i

The terms ‘Shi’i organizations’ and ‘Shi’i opposition’ have been incorrectly used to describe Shi’ i political/religious organizations or the people of southern Iraq. Apart from the purely clerical organizations, which recruit on the basis of Shi’i-Islamic religious commitment, the rest arc largely party-political organizations driven by the plight of the people of the South. Shi’is in Iraq suffered from persecution under the Ba’thists simply because of their religious identity, just as the Kurds were persecuted because of their ethnic identity. However, it is important to stress that not all Shi’is in Iraq support the Shi’i clergy or the Shi’i political’ religious organizations, and not all Shi’is wish to see an ‘Islamic state’ in Iraq. All the various political viewpoints and affiliations can be found in the Shi’i community, developed according to personal ideologies and interests. Nevertheless, the way that the Iraqi regime has insulted the spiritual symbols of Shi’is and denied them their human rights has in creased support for the clerical leadership abroad.

Such support is split between party-political organizations, like the Da’wa Party and the more religious pro-Iran clerical groups led by Al-Hakim. Al-Hakim is the son of one who epitomizes the Shi’i religion for many Shi’is and is regarded by many as a symbol of their struggle against Saddam. More importantly, al-Hakim is now the head of the Tehran-based Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the umbrella organization of all Iraqi Shi’i groups. It is interesting to note that there is no unanimity within SCIRI on Iraq’s future. Some have no problem with a modern Western-style democracy and accept the open market economy in principle. Others would accept nothing short of a pure Islamic state with a Shi’i-clergy dictatorship. During the Gulf War, members of SCIRI prayed for an Iranian victory which would carry them to power in Baghdad.

The end of the Iran-Iraq War and the changed circumstances it brought about helped lend a new dimension to Iraqi Shi’i thinking. More importantly, years of bitter experience in opposition have eventually enabled Shi’i organizations to understand the rules of the game of modern international politics. Whether they play by these rules is another matter; they ignored them for years and only recently have they given some indications of abiding by them. Nowadays, moderate Shi’i personalities are given a higher profile in international lobbying than the mainstream radicals of SCIRI. They have openly endorsed a Western-style democracy and are actively keen to be seen as truly modern statesmen. It is important to note that most Shi’i organizations no longer style themselves as the ‘only’ alternatives to Saddam Husain. Behind the scenes, however, a great majority of SCIRI members have not thoroughly digested the above rules, or the notion of a Western-style democracy in Iraq, let alone the rights of ethnic and religious minorities or the notion of a federal system.

The obvious dependence of the Iraqi Shi’i organizations, particularly the SCIRI leadership, on Iran, has had tragic consequences for the Iraqi opposition and the spring 1991 intifada, as it has masked the fundamental differences and genuine disagreements between the Iranian clergy and the Iraqi Shi’i party political leaders. There are innumerable religious and political differences between the two sides. For a start, the Iraqi Shi’i organizations do not believe in the same Wilayat Al-Faqih, in which ultimate power is concentrated in the person of al-faqih. Such differences are deep rooted and go back centuries. More importantly, the Iraqi Shi’is strongly resent Iranian interference in their internal affairs and in Iraqi opposition affairs. On a private level, Iraqi Shi’ i leaders do complain about this interference. Publicly, however, they would not put down their ‘religious brothers’ as the Western media do, because this would not serve their purposes. Also, they see no reason for giving up a ‘brother’, especially as they still await a gesture of good will from the West or its allies in the Arab world. It is unfortunate that the notion of Iran’s Islamic state or Shi’i fundamentalism has been generalized to include all Iraq’s Shi’i population in the South. Iranian attempts to export the Shi’i revolution to Iraq, Sa’udi Arabia, Afghanistan, the Lebanon and the former USSR made East and West unite in opposition.

It is tragic that the Iraqi Shi’i organizations have underestimated the power and danger of an unrivalled superpower. But the bigger tragedy lies in the illiteracy of this superpower which is yet to demonstrate skill and logic in manipulating the world. The only logic applied to US policies is ‘protection of the US national interest’, with no serious attempt to under stand local politics and cultural values. Thus, the US administration has yet to demonstrate an understanding of the differences between Iraqi and Iranian Shi’i, and the very complex nature of their relations. In the same way as Shi’ I organizations have realized that their only hope of participa tion in power is to accept Western-style democracy, the Americans should realize that without the participation of Shi’i political organizations in power there will be no stable, united and peaceful Iraq. Furthermore, as the Kurdish population of Iraqi Kurdistan will not settle for anything less than a federal state of Kurdistan within a federal Iraq, the Shi’is will not settle for anything less than full participation in any future governing institution. Unless the rights of these two long-suppressed groups are secured, and unless the West starts winning the good will of these people, there will be no guarantees for a stable market in Iraq or secure business with future governments.

The time for dictatorial rules in Iraq is over, and the time for democracy is now long overdue. The only system capable of saving Iraq’s integrity is a genuinely democratic multi-party parliamentary system. Until recently, many believed that in an Islamic developing country of the Middle East it would be difficult to establish such a Western-style democratic system. These views, however, were put to the test in May 1992 in Iraqi Kurdistan, with the first historical opportunity to establish a parliamentary system in part of Iraq.

The Kurdish federal state as a model for Iraq

Kurdish internal politics has many similarities with that of Iraq as a whole. It has comparable ingredients of conflict and bellicosity. Politically, there are the two main bitter rivals, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in addition to the communists, right-wing nationalist parties, Islamic parties, Christian parties, and others. Ethnically, there are Kurds (Soranis, Bahdinis, Hawramis, Failis), Turco mans, Assyrians, Armenians and Arabs. Religiously, there are Muslims (Sunnis and Shi’is), Christians and Yazidis. In fact, Kurdistan is more heterogeneous than any other part of Iraq. Nevertheless, it was possible to combine all these diverse groups under one legislative and executive system in which all parties (political, ethnic or religious) are represented. A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable to see leaders of the KDP and PUK even dine together; now they dine, travel and rule together. Both parties have realized the importance of the success of the experiment on which their own future and the future of their people depends. Their high level of collaboration and mutual compromise has provided security and reassurance for the people of Kurdistan.

This experience shows that irrespective of the ethnic and religious multiplicity, cultural diversity and geographical location of the nation, it is possible to establish a truly democratic system with a considerable degree of harmony. The actual constitution need not be an exact replica of that of any of the Western systems. In the same way as different Western countries have developed their own systems, Iraq can develop its own. The initial set-up of the current democratic system in Kurdistan was agreed before the election of 1992 by the different rival parties under the coalition of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF). The end result was the establishment of a unique parliamentary system which is well adapted to local politics and cultural values. Also, the rights of minorities like Christians have been secured through special mechanisms. As time goes by, the parliament will gradually develop the constitution and put down the roots of the system.

Despite the absence of any real income or external support, and despite the double imposition of sanctions, the democratic system in Kurdistan has managed to survive and grow in strength. The vast majority of its current problems are due to lack of funds and/or political security. How-ever, there are a few problems which are purely local and require immediate attention. For instance, the problem of the supreme leader of the Kurdish Federal State, locally named ‘the head of the Kurdish Liberation Movement’ has proved difficult to resolve. In the circumstances, one could argue that the people of Kurdistan were lucky that this issue was not resolved in 1992, because not all parties were convinced of the necessity of such a leader and they had not agreed on the extent of his or her executive power. The whole concept of the election of such a leader was raised only days before the 1992 election, and arguments about the powers of the post continued until election day. Even now, the rival parties have not resolved the issue.

Failure to elect an outright leader in the first round of voting meant that the two most powerful individuals in Kurdish politics - Jalal Talabani and Mas’ud Barzani -remained outside the system of government in Kurdistan. Without them, the Kurdish parliament and the Kurdish government remained relatively weak and financially poor. Throughout the past decade and a half these two leaders have had the ultimate decision-making power and they now jointly head the military coalition of the IKF. Even though they have remained outside parliament and have not been given any state positions, they constitute the ultimate authority behind the governing body in Kurdistan. They have retained the power to appoint (or fire) a prime minister, choose his cabinet and appoint (or fire) the speaker of the parliament. Furthermore, on the international platform, they act on behalf of the Kurdish parliament and its government. Their absence from government has been seen as a weakness, both in the internal authority and in the international standing of that institution. Their inclusion in the legislative and/or executive bodies, in whatever capacity, is an absolute necessity. The two leaders of the KDP and PUK have demonstrated their genuine interest in supporting the elected bodies and demanded that the Peshmerga forces and the general population see them as their legitimate rulers. Indeed, without the blessing of the two leaders, the whole experiment could have failed.

However, careful consideration clearly must be paid to the kind of executive and legislative powers to be given to the sovereign leader. His/her relation with the legislative and executive institutions must be well defined before the election battle is conducted and such definition has to be formulated in a way that leaves ultimate authority with the parliament. There is no reason why a single leader cannot be elected by the people of Iraq.

The experience in Kurdistan showed that the vast majority of Kurds had not decided who they would vote for until near the election date, when they were still examining manifestos to see who would protect their interests best. The same thing should apply to the people of Iraq, including those in the south. The people are sufficiently sophisticated politically to think in terms of peace, justice, economic well-being and freedom rather than religious fundamentalism or Arab supremacy.

Currently, the Iraqi opposition has chosen a council of joint leaders consisting of a Kurd, a Shi’i and a Sunni, but the ultimate test for people’s choice should be determined by a direct free election with nothing to stop any candidate becoming president, regardless of whether he/she is an Arab Sunni, a Kurd, a Shi’i, a Christian, a Turcoman, a Yazidi or a Communist. In Kurdistan the candidates for the leadership contest included representatives of four different parties, two of which were relatively small. One was an Islamic party represented by a Sunni clergyman, the other was socialist. One of the major candidates was a Bahdini Kurd while the others were all Soranis. Many Sunni clergymen and religious Kurds voted for agnostic political parties rather than the Islamic one, and many Sorani Kurds voted for the Bahdini candidate and vice versa.

Conclusion

There remains a wide gulf between the Allies and the Iraqi opposition, and between different groups within the Iraqi opposition. The first has resulted from a lack of understanding between the two sides, caused by the ignorance and obsessive approach of Western governments (particularly the USA) towards the Iraqi opposition, and its fear of the unknown when it comes to alternatives to Saddam Husain’s regime. On the other hand, some Iraqi groups (particularly the Shi’i organizations) have not yet learnt to play by the rules of modern politics under the supremacy of the USA. Each side, it seems, will have to begin to learn from the other. The Shi’i groups need to demonstrate true independence from Iran and the Allies need to demonstrate more skill and sophistication to help them achieve just that. Without winning the good will of the Iraqi people and the inclusion of Shi’is in the game, Iraq will neither be a stable country in the region, nor will it be a peaceful market for the West.

The gulfs between the Kurds, the Shi’ is and the rest of the Iraqi opposition have largely been created by the stubborn demand of the pro Iranian Shi’i groups for an Islamic State of Iraq, with a clerical dictatorship and the absolute denial of the aspirations of other ethnic and religious groups. Sunni Arab nationalists are just as undemocratic and stubborn. Both groups fear the disintegration of Iraq and resent the Kurdish movement and the declaration of a Federal State of Kurdistan. The Kurds have not yet fought for an independent state and have done their utmost to reassure all Iraqis, but further denial of their rights will undoubtedly fuel enthusiasm for such a fight. Iraqi opposition parties need closer ties and better understanding than ever before. Replacing one dictatorship with another is certainly no longer acceptable to lraqis. Democracy is the only alternative to Saddam Husain that will secure stability and peace.

Meeting Thatcher: help fleeing Kurds

Thatcher urges 'mercy mission' of tents and food to fleeing Kurds

By Michael Simms:
The Guardain: Thursday 4th April, 1991

MARGARET Thatcher led forceful calls in Britain yesterday for immediate international action to help the Kurds. After receiving a deputation of Kurdish exiles at her home in Belgravia, she said it was not the time for "legal niceties". The Kurds had appealed to her as "a mother and a grandmother" to use her influence with the Prime Minister and President Bush, but she carefully avoided any hint of conflict with the policies being outlined by her successor.

She declined to mention any need for renewed military intervention by the allied forces, or by anyone else. "It should not be beyond the wit of man to get planes there with tents, with food, and with warm blankets." she said. "I think we should take very firm steps. We should go now - it is a real mercy mission."

Dr Dlawer Ala'Aldeen. of the Kurdish Scientific and Medical Association said Mrs Thatcher promised to do all she could to help. "She was very sympathetic, she was very understanding and she has been very well informed about the situation." Mrs Thatcher said later that she had agreed to meet the Kurdish deputation after hearing radio reports describing the "pitiful state" of refugees in the mountains bordering Turkey.

Death Clouds: Saddams use of CW

DEATH CLOUDS

Saddam Hussein’s Chemical War Against the Kurds

By Dlawer Abdul Aziz Ala'Aldeen

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. Poison and Saddam Hussein
3. Kurdish fears
4. Events prior to the first use of chemical wepons in Kurdistan
5. Mustard gas and the first clouds of death in Kurdistan
6. Nerve gas and the Anfal operations
7. The casualties and damages
8. The environment
9. Saddam's aggression rewarded
10. References

1. Documents I
2. Documents II
3. Documents III
4. Documents IV
5. Table of attacks and casualties
6. Maps of Iraq and Kurdistan

INTRODUCTION

The Gulf war between Iraq and the United States-led coalition forces has highlighted, as never before, the potentially appalling destructive capability of a regime armed with chemical and biological weapons. Military commentators and the media have speculated endlessly on whether Saddam Hussein would use his massive arsenal of chemical weapons. Yet the reality is that Saddarn's Ba'thist regime has already unleashed these terrible weapons time and time again and with massive loss of life. The victims were the Kurdish people of Iraq - who have long fought for their plight to be recognised internationally and for the monstrous use of chemical weapons to be ended forever.

Modern Iraq emerged from the Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia following Britain's military dominance of the region after the First World War. The British drew up the borders of the modern Iraqi state by annexing Kurdish lands to the north and, in the process, denying the Kurdish people any right to an independent Kurdish state. Since the 1920s, the Kurds in Iraq have suffered political dominance by a succession of Arab regimes based in the capital Baghdad. After the overthrow of the Hashimite monarchy in 1958, Britain finally lost influence as an imperial power within Iraq and the fate of the Kurds was left entirely in the hands of a series of undemocratic, Arab nationalist governments. Without exception, these regimes refused to acknowledge the Kurds' right to full citizenship, far less the Kurdish demand for self-determination. In recent decades, the people of Iraqi Kurdistan have campaigned for political rights and have been forced to resort to armed struggle against the Baghdad government to secure civil rights. Their cause has contributed to the political instability of the Middle East and so, the Kurds would argue, must also be accommodated in any solution of the region's problems.

Governments from East and West, including the two major superpowers, have consistently refused to address the Kurdish issue, in part because stability in the region has not always been in their political or economic interests. During the Cold War era, both sides were heavily engaged in supporting powerful, yet often dictatorial regimes in the region, particularly in strategically important countries such as Iraq. The driving motive of business and trade led the major powers to ride roughshod over fundamental principles of civil rights and to turn a blind eye to clear violations of human rights by their Middle Eastern trade partners. Moreover, companies trading with Iraq chose to violate international agreements by supplying plant and raw materials that enabled a vast arsenal of weapons of mass destruction to be accumulated.

This neglect by industrial nations has allowed the proliferation of chemical weapons and the production of these weapons across the globe. It is the urgent task of the United Nations to put an end, once and for all, to the production, proliferation and use of chemical and biological weapons. It would be made clear that the international community will not suffer arsenal of chemical weapons to be used against states or, indeed, against the minority populations of a particular nation.

In the Gulf war between Iraq and the US-led coalition forces, such an arsenal of chemical weapons was targeted against the Western powers who were Saddam Hussein's former allies. The old Cold War order had broken down and both antagonists seemed to have misunderstood the emerging order. Saddam over-reached himself and perhaps misjudged his former allies by invading Kuwait and the Western powers seemed suddenly to have rediscovered their long-forgotten allegiance to the principles of nationhood and autonomy in their defense of Kuwait - a moral cloak, cynics would say, for defending their economic interests. But a new political and economic imperative is sure to emerge from the ashes of war - the necessity for a stable Middle East that will not be vulnerable to the whims of dictatorship or the economic dictates of powerful nations outside the region. If such harmony is to be achieved, then it will surely be on the basis of independent, democratic states who have firmly grasped the ideal of self-determination and who have finally secured that right, perhaps at the expense, of the West's industrial / military superpowers. Moreover, if the establishment of democracy in the nation states of the Middle East is to be the foundation of further peace and prosperity, then the fundamental issue of democratic and civil rights for the Kurdish people will also have to be confronted. There can be no negotiated, democratic settlement of the region 's problems unless the democratic aspirations of the Kurds are fulfilled. Any international conference on the region must include the legitimate representatives of the Kurdish people if it is, in any way, to herald a new democratic and peaceful order for all the peoples of the Middle East.

POISON AND SADDAM HUSSEIN

Iraq is not the only country to have used chemical weapons and the Kurds are not the first victims of Iraq's poison gases. However, it s the first time in history that these weapons of mass-destruction have been used by a state against its own civilians to suppress internal democratic opposition, or as weapons of genocide to eradicate an ethnic minority.

The recent history of the Kurds in Iraq consists of a long series of tragedies, of which only the major ones have gained world public awareness and generated varying degrees of international concern. Only the holocausts of Halabja (March, 1988) and Bahdinan (August, 1988) became well publicised, but these are just two episodes in a long saga of tragedy. There have been numerous other chemical attacks which were not publicised or investigated by the international community despite consistent allegations and appeals by the Kurds. This report will focus on these less publicised but equally significant occasions when the Iraqi Government used various chemical weapons in Kurdistan against the Kurds between April, 1987 and October, 1988.

The record of the current Iraqi Ba'thist Party, which seized power through a coup d'etat in 1968 [1], reveals a long history of ruthlessness towards its opponents and national minorities. This includes physical and psychological harassment of people; unlawful extermination of individuals and members of the Kurdish and non-Kurdish pro-democracy opposition; violent suppression of mass unrest and, in the case of armed insurgency, bloody and exhaustive warfare on a massive scale regardless of cost.

when crowded schools, education centres and other public buildings were targeted on April 24th 1974 [7]. During the four years of negotiation that preceded this war, the Ba'thist government made several failed attempts to assassinate the powerful Kurdish leader, Mala Mustafa Barzani. One of these attempts, in 1972, involved offering Barzani and his colleagues oranges that had been injected with deadly poisons.

KURDISH FEARS

Rumours began to emerge in the early eighties about Iraq's development of a poison weapon capability. I remember when organophosphorus pesticides started to disappear from Iraqi shops at this time, supporting fears that chemical weapons were being produced. Concern grew that such a capability might enable the Government to gain the upper hand in its war against the Kurds as well as in the Gulf war against Iran. We had no reason to believe that Saddam Hussein would hesitate to use any weapons at his disposal to suppress the "trouble-making" Kurds, and once a chemical weapons capability was ready then it would be only a matter of time before the Kurds were experimented on. However, many still believed that despite his previous record, Saddam Hussein would probably not go as far as using these internationally-banned and indiscriminate mass-destruction weapons against his own civilians. This probably played some part, in addition to financial and political difficulties, in people's lack of preparations for defence against chemical weapons.

Although chemical weapons were not used against them until April, 1987, the Kurds had witnessed these weapons being used on Kurdish soil in Iranian Kurdistan in January, 1982, and against Iranian troops in the fierce battles of Haji Omaran and Grdamand in Arbil province, late in 1983 [8]. Initially, suspicion that Saddam intended to use poison gases against the Kurdish democratic opposition was based on rumour, and speculation on the Iraqi military psychology. Suspicions were subsequently confirmed when taped communications, captured high-ranking military officers [9] and military documents revealed the Ba'thists' terrible plans.

Documents I and II, shown below, were captured by Peshmargas (freedom fighters) of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and clearly demonstrate the Iraqi military preparations for the use of chemical and biological weapons long before their eventual use. It is important to note that document I refers to the distribution and stocking of biological materials in addition to chemical ones. This was a further evidence that Iraq had developed biological weapons early in the eighties and that it most probably had the means to deploy them. This evidence of biological weapons did not gain international publicity until late in 1988 when news of the use in Kurdistan of biological agents like Typhoid and other infectious micro-organisms were reported [10, 11].

EVENTS PRIOR TO THE FIRST USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN KURDISTAN

It is important to look at the events prior to the use of chemical weapons in Kurdistan to enable the formation of a comprehensive picture of their deployment Therefore, a number of relevant historical events will be mentioned before presenting the available data concerning actual attacks.

Kurds in Iraq had been fighting to win basic human and political rights from successive central governments in Iraq for many decades, and for more than twenty years against the current Ba'thist government [1, 12]. Since 1975, the Ba'thists had never publicly admitted the existence of the unsolved Kurdish question or the presence of a significant Kurdish opposition, internally or externally. Suddenly, at the end of 1983, Saddam Hussein officially recognised the cause for which the Kurds had been fighting. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the two major Kurdish political organisations in Iraqi-Kurdistan, was approached for negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish issue. This was probably a result of several factors, including Saddam's intention to use the PUK with its armed forces and followers to aid his efforts in the Gulf war. The PUK leaders, desperate for a respite after long years of hardship, struggle and isolation, welcomed the offer despite their awareness of the government's intentions and despite the lack of trust between the two sides. Thus, 13-month-long bilateral negotiations towards a mutual understanding began in December, 1983.

The PUK saw a number of possible long-term achievements to be gained in these negotiations. For the first time since 1975, the Ba'thists officially recognised the Kurdish movement; they implicitly recognised the right of the Kurds to fight for their rights and confirmed that no genuine autonomy had been granted to them. In private, Saddam Hussein went as far as making a number of concessions to Talabani, the leader of PUK, promising a number of changes in Kurdistan toward a long lasting peace [13]. This political game ended in January 1985, and lead eventually to renewed fighting between the two sides. Once the PUK resumed fighting, it managed to inflict severe blows on government forces and exert more effective and crippling military pressure on the Iraqi army in the north than ever before, not only in the countryside but also in the government controlled big towns and major cities. Liberated areas were expanding everyday and more than one quarter of Iraq's entire army was tied up again in the north to face the Kurds [12]. The moral, political and military strength of the Kurdish forces was boosted a great deal with the rapprochement of the PUK, KDP and the other main Kurdish political groups and parties with the subsequent formation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front. The latter was formed under the slogan of "the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a democratic Iraq and autonomous Kurdistan" [14].

Iran, the natural beneficiary of this renewed fighting, approached the PUK for new relations to combine forces against Saddam. Indeed, joint operations were undertaken with small numbers of Pasdars (Iranian Revolutionary guards) joined the Peshmargas in attacks on military targets inside Kurdish cities like Kirkuk. This was, naturally, unacceptable to Saddam Hussein. By spring 1987, the Kurds had become the only powerful and influential internal opposition, controlling massive liberated territories. The PUK alone had a firm grip over a land bigger than the Kuwaiti emirate, including the Arbil and Sulaymania provinces. The KDP had a similar grip over the Bahdinan area in the Duhok and Mousil provinces. There were, of course, grey areas where control over villages and towns alternated, with the government in control in the day and the Peshmargas at night The Peshmargas threat to the major Kurdish cities of Arbil,

Sulaymania, Duhok and Kirkuk and the half-Kurdish city of Mousil was growing. This was in addition to the ever-increasing pressure on Saddam from the South with the lack of any hope of a foreseeable truce with, or victory over, Iran. Saddam Hussein was growing impatient every day and was convinced that he could not eradicate, or even suppress, the ever-growing Kurdish movement by the use of "conventional" measures. Therefore, he did not hesitate to grant his powerful cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid, Governor of Northern Iraq [15], full access to Iraq's military capabilities, including chemical weapons, in order to eradicate the Kurdish movement. This former soldier of the Iraqi army was the very Al-Majid who recently earned international opprobrium when he was appointed as Governor of Kuwait in August 1990 [16], following Iraq's invasion. Al-Majid's prime responsibility in Kurdistan was to ensure a total and permanent suppression of the Kurds and complete Arabisation of the important Kurdish towns and cities regardless of costs or methods used. One example of the methods he applied in Kurdistan is the horrific revenge killings in retaliation for Kurdish military operations. People were forced to watch the public execution of young Kurds (aged between 14-35) on the high streets of Arbil, Sulaymania and Kirkuk as retaliation for the killing of Ba'thist security agents by the Peshmargas [20]. Al-Majid's other tactics to regain control over the liberated territories were:

1. to remove and deport all the people from the "grey" areas where the government retained only partial control, raze their villages to the ground and prohibit re-building or any other activity (see document LII below).
2. to impose a total economic blockade on defined "prohibition zones" where shoot-to-kill policies were applied and no moving creature was allowed to survive (see documents III and IV below).
3. to bum down crops, farms, bushes, trees and other plants and to spoil the water supply.
4. and finally, to launch systematic, and highly organised attacks on liberated areas at several stages (the Anfal operations, see below) on different fronts, in order to regain control over these areas.

Steps 1, 2 and 3 were all preparations for 4 in order to minimise the support to Kurdish fighters before the final attacks and to impose a total blockade on the whole region including the vast number of civilians and peasants who inhabited the area. It became evident that the target was not merely the Peshmargas but the whole population of Kurdistan. Thus, over 4,000 villages were demolished [15] and half a million people deported and scattered all over Iraq [12], even to desert part of the Arab south where they were forced to live in "Protected Camps", comparable to the Nazi concentration camps. Villagers, who were not even warned or made aware of the Government's plans for them, faced the same treatment as the Peshmargas.

MUSTARD GAS AND THE FIRST CLOUDS OF DEATH IN KURDISTAN

On April 15th, 1987, four planes flew very low over Helladen, Bergallu, Kanitu, Sirwan, Awazic, Noljika and Chinara, all in Sulaymania province [15], and dropped very unusual bombs in each of these small towns and villages. The people were unfamiliar with the strange sound of the bombs, the unusual colour of the smoke, the absence of the normal rocket attacks and the peculiar tin-like bomb shells that actually fell. It was long feared that the Iraqi Government might seek to use chemical weapons in battles with the Peshmarga. However, it did not occur to the villagers that these odd-looking shells were poison weapons, being dropped without any prior fighting or provocation in the area [20]. In Bargalu, five men went to the scene of the bombing after the planes had left and began close examination of the shells and craters. Puzzled by their findings, some (like Mr. Rawaz) went as far as touching the peculiar shells, carrying them to the town centre. It was past midnight before examiners of the bombs, one of whom (Hakem Omar Aziz) now lives in London, started developing puffy and watery eyes, dry throats and harsh coughs. They suffered skin bums and developed blistered armpits and groins during the following days. Describing his injuries, Hakem Omar said that it took two weeks before he could see again and at least a month before his skin lesions healed. In another village, a young shepherd had attempted to dismantle an unexploded bomb in order to use the contents for making fishing bombs, not knowing that this time it contained not TNT but a deadly poison.

As a result of this first attack there were tens of serious casualties. In Bargalu, almost all the inhabitants suffered from severe headaches, weakness and other mild symptoms which took several days to disappear. Those who were exposed to heavy doses of the gas, because they were close to the attack area or were downwind, suffered extensive eye, skin and lung injuries. Infection of the wounds often led to complications and many died as a result. Those who survived tended to be disfigured by scars, developed various eye problems or had chronic breathing disorders [17]. Doctors stressed that lack of proper advice on protective measures and ignorance played a significant role in worsening the effects of these bombs. There were no laboratory means of identifying the chemical used. However, from the symptoms and injuries the doctors concluded that a powerful vesicant poison, like Mustard gas, was the agent used in these raids.

On the very next day, April 16th, Arbil province was attacked by Iraqi planes and several villages were bombed with similar poisonous gases. These villages were Sheikh Wassanan, Totma, Zeni, Ballokawa, Alana, Darash and the whole of the valley of Balisan. In Sheilch Wassanan, a village in Rawanduz district - Arbil province consisting of 150 houses and a population of approximately 500 people, 12 aircraft attacked at 7.00 am for nearly 15 minutes using conventional and chemical weapons [18]. Everybody was poisoned to some extent in this village and 121 civilians were killed instantly, including 76 children aged between one day and eight years, with the rest injured [15]. 286 of the injured civilians hurried towards the city of Arbil to seek medical attention. The victims managed to enter the city's main hospital (Arbil Teaching Hospital) where they were initially admitted. The authorities soon approached them, demanding their signature on a declaration in which Iran was named as the "perpetrator" of the attack. The victims refused to sign the declaration and so the authorities rounded them up and took them prisoner. The fate of these victims was not known for a long time. Only late that year it became known that they were being kept in a military prison in Arbil (near the exit which leads to Mousil) for a few days where they were deprived of all kinds of facilities [19]. The authorities asked them again to sign the declaration and appear on Iraqi television to incriminate Iran for this chemical attack on their village but these victims refused to do so. In this prison, 202 of the victims died over a short period as a result of their untreated skin bums, lung damage, infections and other injuries caused by exposure to the mustard gas. The remaining 84 relatively healthy adults and children were taken to a secret spot near Rashkin village, not far from Arbil military base where they were killed and buried in mass graves [19]. A military medical doctor, who witnessed the tragic scene and later defected to Iran and then to the West, revealed that the bodies were burnt before they were buried. It became known that even the bodies of those who died in Arbil prison were taken away by the security forces (Istikhbarat) led by Mamand Qishqayee and destroyed [19]. The horror of this mass-murder shocked the people of Kurdistan. Relatives of the victims were prevented from speaking about or mourning their missing family in public.

From our contacts with doctors and paramedics in the Kurdish cities, we learnt that all the staff were ordered not to treat or in any way assist victims and were ordered to inform the authorities about the presence of any patient bearing wounds from chemical weapons. Failure to do so, or any moves to publicise the occurrence of such injuries, would be subjected to the severest punishment possible. My mother was severely injured in one of these attacks and was subsequently taken to Arbil for proper medical treatment. There she consulted one of my old medical colleagues in Arbil Teaching Hospital who was shocked and terrified by their meeting. He refused to examine my mother and his only advice to her was to go back to where she came from as soon as possible, or else she would be caught by the authorities like those in Sheikh Wassanan and would not be seen again.

The attacks of April 15th and 16th were followed by daily attacks on villages and Peshmarga strongholds in Arbil and Sulaymania provinces for at least six days (as shown in the table below), causing death and injury to hundreds of people. On May Day, 1987, the people in the liberated areas of Duhok, another province in Iraqi Kurdistan, witnessed their first raids by chemical weapons in which two people died and tens were injured. The major Kurdish province of Kirkuk, the richest oil province in Iraq, suffered poison attacks for the first time on May 23rd, 1987, when Tomar, Gargan and Qamargan villages were bombarded and tens of victims, including seven children died.

By mid 1987 chemical attacks on the Kurds had become a daily reality and it was clear that the Government would no longer hesitate to use these weapons in spite of the indiscriminate nature of poison gas attack. Unlike the war with Iran, where chemical weapon attacks were almost always preceded by fierce fighting and concern over military defeat, most attacks in Kurdistan were completely unprovoked and were not preceded by military activities by the Peshmarga in those areas. On the contrary, the government used chemical weapons as a preliminary step to terrify people and generate panic before waging organised military offensives. Furthemore, in many instances aircraft were witnessed dropping bombs on uninhabited land and farms far from villages for no apparent military reason other than the poisoning of the environment [20].

NERVE GAS AND THE ANFAL OPERATIONS

Mustard gas at first remained the predominant chemical weapon used and it was not until the Government launched the "Anfal Operations" that the more toxic nerve gases were used on a wide scale in Kurdistan. "Anfal" is an ancient Islamic term, which originally denoted the plunder and slaves seized in the cause of a Jihad or holy war. Termed Anfal by the Ba'thists, these operations in 1988 consisted of carefully-planned and highly-organised massive multi-stage offensives on Peshmarga strongholds directly supervised by Saddam Hussein who was based in Sulaymania [13,15]. The attacks started with Sulaymania's Jaffaty valley in early February, 1988 (Anfal-I). Anfal-I lasted till late March. Anfal-II focused on the Garmian area and was waged during April, 1988. Anfal-Ill concentrated on the liberated areas of Arbil province in May, and Anfal-IV on Duhok and Mousil provinces in late August and early September, 1988. All these Anfal operations were preceded and synchronised with systematic waves of poison gas attacks that killed people instantly without leaving any apparent injuries.

Escaping death became more difficult. The conventional methods of protection were no longer useful as the gases (odourless and lighter than mustard gas) seeped through the wet breathing-turbans, damaging the respiratory system of the victim. People were seen gasping and struggling for breath and helplessly lying on the ground jerking with convulsions. Mr. K. Bakhtiar, 27, a victim and eye witness recalled his experience when his village was attacked by the fast killing nerve gas. He said: "We all knew it was a gas attack and tried to follow the usual steps of protection. But this time it was different. First, I saw people behaving strangely and so were the animals, acting as if they were struggling. Some were lying on the ground. I saw birds falling off the trees. Every thing was mad. I knew that the situation was very dangerous and I was frightened and did not know what to do but to run away towards the hill. I felt like I was weak, unable to run or fully control my movements. My mouth was full, I could not see properly, but worst of all, I could not breath normally. I did not know what I was doing and realised that I must be dying. I can not remember any more and I must have lost concience. Doctors tell me that it is a true miracle that I am alive and I believe so too. This is my second life and I am trying to enjoy the most of it."

The numbers of deaths increased considerably. In Halabja, 5,000 died and over 9,000 were injured [15]. It is important to clarify events before the holocaust of Halabja and to stress a very important historical fact, as I have noticed that the world media, press and public have been mislead so far. Halabja was not occupied by Iranian troops before the Iraqi planes bombarded the town with chemical weapons. Halabja was liberated from government control by the Kurdish Peshmargas, mainly from the PUK who were partially assisted by the other Kurdish organisations [21]. Mr Shawkat Haji Mushir, a member of the leadership committee of the PUK, led 500 Peshmarga and fought his way towards Halabja while government forces were busy carrying out the Anfal-I operation in Jafaty valley. The people of Halabja, desperate for freedom, welcomed the native Peshmargas, including their leader who was himself from the town of Halabja. Except for a cameraman and two unarmed individuals, no Iranians participated in this operation. Saddam Hussein, astonished by the people's loyalty to the Peshmarga, tried publicly to link the battle for Halabja to the Iraq-Iran war, despite the fact that no battle front with Iran had been opened in that area and no Iranian official had entered the town. Iraqi planes then bombarded the town with poison gas. Only after that, the Iranians came to the rescue of the victims and entered Halabja. Their humanitarian efforts were much appreciated by all in the town, however, the authorities in Iran attempted to take advantage of the tragic scenes there for political propaganda. They obtained the film, which was taken earlier while the town being freed by the Peshmarga, and combined it with footage taken after the bombardment [21, 22]. The way events were presented in their film indicated that the whole operation was an Iranian victory over Iraqis and that the people of Halabja had welcomed the Iranian occupiers. The Kurds later paled a heavy price for this mispresentation of events - for which, the Iranians expressed their regrets.

In Dashti Koya, and the Valley of Smaguli and Balisan over 200 died and over 1,200 were injured in one day on March 27th, 1988. On the same day, Qaradagh district, including the heavily inhabited town and the near-by villages, were heavily bombarded. In this attack, of the hundreds of casualties, 412 injured civilians headed towards Sulaymania seeking medical treatment, but failed in the attempt. The same story of Sheikhwassanan was repeated the military forces in Tanjaro rounded up the victims and stopped them from reaching Sulaymannia. They were never seen again.

THE CASUALTIES AND DAMAGES

Chemical attacks became increasingly intense and widespread all over Kurdistan. However, during the first year, before February 1988, the effects of the attacks grew relatively less and less disastrous. People were building up experience and gathering information on how to protect themselves from the poisons so as to avoid unnecessarily extensive injuries. Some obtained old gas masks and others learned how to breath through wet cloths containing charcoal. People were told that mustard gas is heavier than air and during attacks they learnt to rush to the top of the mountains and to sit around a big fire and not to scurry to the traditional refuge in the caves as they have done through out history unless they built a fire at the cave mouth, drank plenty of water and took thorough showers as soon as possible [20]. The efficacy of these measures became evident in the following months when recorded casualties decreased relatively in terms of numbers and severity despite the greater intensity and widening scale of the attacks.

The available data, see the table below, consists of reported victims with chemical injuries only [15, 17, 20, 21, 23, 28]. It was not easy to maintain a proper record of the casualties in these areas due to the far from ideal circumstances of collecting information. Not registered were those who suffered mild injuries, those who did not come forward for treatment and those who were outside the attack areas and received injuries as a result of breathing-in poison blown by the wind. The latter casualties were much higher than all initial estimates, due to the massive scale of the attacks. An eye witness, Mrs N. Khidir, 49, spoke about her experience in Bargalu when she, and many others, woke up in the morning with headaches, tight chests and a general feeling of weakness. At first she thought her symptoms were due to a bout of flu, but it soon became known that they had been breathing in poison gas which had traveled on the wind from Sargalu, a village few miles away, which was bombarded late the previous night with artillery shells loaded with chemical weapons.

Panic would fill the minds of the people in risk areas with each air raid or artillery bombardment. The whole population would run in panic, screaming "Kimiawy, Kimiawy". Children ran in fear looking for parents, parents wandered in panic trying to account for members of their family. Some would rush to their homes to grab breathing cloths (or old gas masks for the few lucky ones) and then dash to higher altitudes. Mr. F. Karim, 29, an eye witness, said that on one occasion "as soon as the cloud from smoke of the bombs started to spread we went climbing the mountain. Only after reaching the top I realised that I was running with one bare foot and had dropped a fruit sack which I was carrying at the time. I was shaking and we were all looking down at the village in the valley watching the other villagers, including women, children and even animals, running in all directions and we could hear them crying. I suddenly realised that my handicapped cousin was left behind. I wanted to go back and rescue him, but friends stopped me and said 'if you go down you will never come back and we will lose you both. The only thing you could do is to sit down and pray for him'. Mr Karim added "He is martyred, and I still feel guilty because I forgot him at the time of panic, I should have behaved like a brave man and should have saved him despite the risks".

Soon after the planes had gone, people would head towards the areas attacked to assist the injured and bury the dead. The injured were usually taken to local health centres, where young Peshmarga doctors or paramedics were based. For the doctors, the difficulties were endless. In most areas they could not offer any treatment. In most centres, no oxygen or life-support machines were at their disposal to support victims with severe lung or bone marrow damages. They were only able to offer first aid, advice and some symptom- relieving agents like pain killers or eye drops. They used to clean the wounds with antiseptics and protect them from infection. "The severely affected either died before us or were sent across the border to Iran" said one doctor [17]. Doctors and paramedics and their health centres were also occasionally victims of the bombardments. Mr Abdul Aziz, 59, told me about an attack on Bargalu on September 3rd, 1987, when he and his wife were severely injured along with several others. The whole area was covered in clouds smelling of rotten onions and people were hurrying to climb the nearby Sekanian hill, seeking a higher altitude. Some people with physical injuries rushed to the local health centre, but the centre itself was cloaked in smoke from the chemical bombs and could offer no help not only during the attack, but for some time after.

THE ENVIRONMENT

Also not included in the available data is the amount of damage inflicted by the chemical weapons on the environment and wild life. Mr Omer, 28, injured in March, 1988, and currently being treated in Germany for disfiguring scars and other long-term effects of mustard gas, told us that he and 200 others were in Shanakhsy when Iraqi planes dropped their bombs one afternoon. People evacuated the village in panic, but by late that night the majority of the people had returned to their homes. They re- inhabited the poisoned environment and started drinking water, eating food (particularly fruit) and used contaminated furniture and beds only to wake up after midnight suffering from symptoms identical to those suffered by the people they had assisted earlier in the day. Furthermore, after the attack many people from neighbouring villages came to the assistance of the victims without taking protective measures, handling the victims and contaminated materials. They too subsequently became victims of mustard poisoning.

Kurdistan is the most fertile part of Iraq, which is normally self-sufficient in wheat, barley, oats, vegetables, timber, dairy products, meat and poultry [6]. The inhabitants of the attacked areas are mainly peasants who rely on agriculture and domestic animals for their living. The environment was rendered completely uninhabitable for long periods after each attack. Depending on the distance from the bombarded spots, plants and trees suffered varying degrees of damage [20]. In general, the whole area, including the land and green plants turned yellow. Nothing new grew in the heavily contaminated areas near the attack spots for more than one or two years despite heavy rains during winter. The grass and low-growing plants died within a short time with no hope of recovery. Higher growing plants and trees turned yellow and lost leaves but recovered later. The damage was progressively milder further from the centre of the attack. Water sources were contaminated and rendered undrinkable.

Animals like birds, chickens, sheep, goats, cows, donkeys, cats, guard dogs and even insects like bees were not spared [20]. Animals suffered in various ways. Some were directly affected just like the humans and killed instantly or suffered from watery eyes, burnt skin, damaged lungs and ill health. Others were indirectly affected either through eating contaminated grass and wild plants or drinking contaminated water. Many starved due to lack of healthy pet food and were therefore put down by their owners. Some of the sick animals and even the more healthy ones were sold at very cheap prices (one tenth or even one twentieth of normal). Owners of these animals had tremendous problems in selling diary products like milk, yoghurt and cheese and even meat because people in the cities refused to buy potentially contaminated animal products. This also forced owners to destroy their animals. It goes without saying that the local wild life all suffered a great deal. There were scenes of snakes lying dead on the ground; falcons lying dead as a result of feeding on the carcasses of poisoned animals; frogs and tortoises lying dead at the lakesides and fish floating dead in the water, dead flies, cockroaches and earthworms were everywhere.

SADDAM'S AGGRESSION REWARDED

By the end of May, 1988 the area looked like a different planet. The land had become uninhabitable and the people, including the Peshmargas, had to retreat from the Sulaymania area and parts of Arbil province in the face of massive poison attacks. Elsewhere, the Kurds were still able to maintain liberated areas and Peshmargas were able to repulse Government forces in fierce battles, inflicting heavy losses on the government. The situation remained unstable throughout this period until Iraq signed the truce with Iran and the subsequent arrival of United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observatory Groups (UNIIMOG) at the border between the two countries. The UNIIMOG troops were refused access to the Kurdish areas by Iraq despite requests. The Government transferred more troops from the south to Kurdistan and built up a large army ready for offensives. Towards the middle of August, a few days after the truce with Iran became effective, the count down started for Saddam to make good his promise made to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia when the latter suggested an achievable solution for the Kurdish problem in Iraq [24]. Saddam's reply to the King was that he would deal with the Kurds "once and for all". Thus, the period from August 25th to September 1st (the Bahdinan holocaust) became another tragic watershed in the Kurdish struggle for human rights and self-determination and in Kurdish relations with the central government and the Arab people of Iraq. Within a few days, thousands were gassed to death; tens of thousands were made refugees and thousands more were captured to face life in a heavily guarded camp as prisoners of war. The captives were dumped in a camp on open land to suffer the most appalling conditions and the harsh winter of Hoshtirmil near the city of Arbil. They were deprived of food and shelter. Over 70 children died within the first few weeks as did several elderly and pregnant women.

The lucky ones who managed to cross the border into Turkey were accepted as "guests" and kept in three camps, Diyarbakir, Mardin and Mus. There, in exile, the Iraqi Kurds suffered fear, abuse and neglect [25]. One year after their arrival in Mardin, 2070 of the refugees were poisoned [26]. The symptoms suggested use of some form of neuro toxic agent. Blood samples from victims were tested in United Kingdom laboratories, including the National Poison Unit of Guy's Hospital [27]. The toxicologists concluded that an unusually potent organophosphorus nerve poison must have been the cause. They also suggested that the poison was most probably of the kind used by the Iraqi Government as a chemical weapon. All the circumstantial and scientific evidence pointed to deliberate poisoning.

The Bahdinan tragedy gained international publicity and aroused public concern world wide. But the governments of the major world powers and of the Middle Eastern countries failed to condemn Saddam for this inhuman attack on his own citizens. The Soviet Union failed to comment on the tragedy in its own internal media and went as far as condemning the Western media for publicising the gas attacks calling it "American propaganda" against sovereign Iraq based on "no evidence" [29]. Some Western countries even rewarded Saddam by increasing his credit for buying military hardware [30]. Most of the Arab states failed to express any humanitarian concern and some of them, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt went as far as strongly defending Saddam before the United Nation's Security Council members. Mr Ghazy Al-Rayes, Sheikh Nasser Almanquor respectively the ambassadors for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia joined with Sadiq Al-Mashat, the Iraqi ambassador to the United Kingdom (now to the United States) on a visit to Mr. William Waldegrave, then United Kingdom Foreign Minister, in condemning the British media coverage and "Britain's campaign against Iraq", encouraging the British Government to disbelieve Kurdish claims about the use of chemical weapons [31].

The impotence of the international community and the lack of condemnation from individual governments in the face of Saddam's clear violation of human rights allowed this regime to continue with its genocidal war. Indeed, some expert media commentators suggested that western impotence acted as an incentive to Saddam to continue these monstrous attacks [32]. Chemical bombardment of Sheikh Bizeni and Hamea in Kirkuk province and Chami Razan in Sulaymania province in mid October, 1988, only a few weeks after the Bahdinan holocaust, showed that Saddam was swift to realise the opportunity that this lack of opposition offered him.

REFERENCES

1. Saddam's Iraq, Revolution or Reaction. CARDRI. 1989. Zed Books. London. UK.
2. Amnesty International "A l-Nashra Al-I khbaria". (Arabic). March, 1988.
3. Amnesty International news release. Al Index: MDE 14.1 .1988. Distr. SCIPO. International Embargo. 13.1 .1 988.
4. Hazhir Teimourian. The Times. 13. 1. 1988.
5. Index on Censorship. March 1988. Vol. 17. P39.
6. Anthony McDermott. In: The Kurds. The Minority Rights Group. Report No. 23. May 1981.
7. David Hurst. The Guardian. 7.5.1974.
8. Use of Chemical Warfare by the Iraqi Regime. November 1986. Published by: War Information Headquarters, Supreme Defence Council. Tehran-Iran.
9. Gwynne Roberts. Winds of Death. A film shown on "Dispatches"- channel 4. United Kingdom. 23.11.1988.
10. New Scientist. 22.9 .1988.
11. Sunday Telegraph. 25. 9.1988.
12. David McDowall. The Kurds. The Minority Rights Group. Report No. 23. March, 1989.
13. Personal communications with Jalal Talabani, Dr. K. Hawrami and Dr. F Masum.
14. Iraqi Kurdistan Front declaration. July, 1987. Published in: Al-Sharara No. 7. (Arabic) July, 1987 and Gal No. 26. (Arabic) August, 1987.
15. The Kurdish Focus. Issue No.1. January, 1989. Published by the PUK.
16. Newsweek 1 .10.1990.
17. Personal inteiviews with Kurdish doctors with first hand experience.
18. Parang. (Kurdish), 1988. Issue No. 1. Page 4.
19. A Hor,jfic Butchery in Arbil Prison. (Arabic) 1988. Published by the Kurdistan Popualar Democratic Party, Branch of Europe.
20. A series of personal interviews with Kurdish victims and eye witnesses. 1989 and 1990.
21. A personal interview with Mr Shawkat Haji Mushir, member of the leadership committee of the PUK. London. November, 1990.
22. The Catastrophe of the Century. Halabja, another Nightmare. Film (on video) produced and distributed by Iran.
23. Materials supplied by Mr. Hoshiar Zebari, member of the executi e committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. 1988.
24. Halga Graham. Observer. 28.8. 1988.
25. Ekram Maie. The Kurdish Observer. 1990. Issue No.6.
26. Tim Kelsey. The Independent. 12. 6 .1 989.
27. The Lancet. 32.1990. Vol. 33S. P287-8.
28. Memorandom of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front. Published by the IKF, 1990.
29. Pravda. 11.9 .1 988.
30. Tim Kelsey. The Independent. 5 .10.1988.
31. John Bulloch. The Independent. 12.10.1 988.
32. James Adams, Defence Correspondent of the Sunday Times. In: Amnesty International advertisment. Published in various newspapers, including The Independent of 17.11.1990 and 1 .12.1 990.

لۆبی كوردی و خه‌باتی ده‌ره‌وه‌ی ووڵات

‌ خه‌باتی ده‌ره‌وه‌ی ووڵات: چی بكه‌ين و له‌ كوێوه‌ ده‌ست پێ بكه‌ين

په‌يڤ، مانگی ئوكتۆبه‌ری ١۹۹٠- ژماره (١٢ و ١۳)، لاپه‌ڕه‌١٢٥۹-١٢٧٥

دلاوه‌ر عه‌بدولعه‌زيز عه‌لائه‌ددين

كاتی نوسينی ئه‌و ووتاره‌

له‌دوای كيميا بارانی هه‌ڵه‌بجه‌ و ئه‌نفال، پارسه‌نگی هێزه‌كان له‌ شاخه‌كانی كوردستانی باشوور سه‌رتاپا سه‌راوبن بوون. هه‌تا شه‌‌ڕی هه‌شت ساڵه‌ی عيراق و ئێران به‌رده‌وام بوو، بزوتنه‌وه‌ی ڕزگاريخوازی كورد و ده‌سه‌ڵاتی حيزبه‌ كورديه‌كان ڕووی له‌ به‌هێزی بوو. به‌ڵام له‌دوای كۆتايی هاتنی شه‌ڕی، ڕژێمی عيراق ده‌ستی بۆ ئه‌نجامدانی كه‌مپه‌ينی جێنۆسايدی دژ به‌ كوردی به‌تاڵ بوو بوو. ئيتر به‌ هێزێكی دڕنده‌ و مونه‌ززه‌مه‌وه‌، به‌ شێوه‌يه‌كی سيسته‌ماتيك، كه‌وته‌ قه‌ڵاچۆ كردنی ژيان له‌ ته‌واوی شاخ و دێهاتی كوردستان. به‌ سه‌دان هه‌زار گوند نشينی كوردستانی ڕاگوێزايه‌وه‌ ناو كه‌مپه‌كان، كه‌ ناسرابوون به‌ (القری المجمعه‌). به‌ ده‌يان هه‌زار خيزانی زينده‌به‌چاڵ كرد، دارستانی ده‌سوتاند، ماڵ و باخ و له‌وه‌ڕ و ژينگه‌ی دێهاته‌كانی كاو كرد، و به‌وانه‌ بناغه‌ی شه‌ڕی پارتيزانی پێشمه‌رگه‌ی هه‌لته‌كاند.

سه‌ركرده‌كانی يه‌كێتی و پارتی و حيزبه‌ بچووكه‌كانی تر، به‌ خۆيان و پێشمه‌رگه‌يانه‌وه‌‌ په‌ڕينه‌وه‌ ديوی ئێران. لێشاوی په‌ناهه‌نده‌ به‌ره‌و هه‌نده‌ران زيادی كرد. زۆربه‌ی سه‌ركرده‌كان، پێشمه‌رگه‌كانيان به‌جێ هێشت و خۆيان گه‌يانده‌ ووڵاته‌كانی دراوسێی و ئه‌وروپا و ئه‌مه‌ريكا و شوێنی تر. هاوكات ڕژێمی سه‌ددام له‌و په‌ڕی توانا و هێزی سه‌ربازی و سياسی دابوو، و چه‌نگی له‌ حوكم باشتر گير ببوو، و پشتگيری ديپلۆماسی نێوده‌وڵه‌تيشی هه‌ر له‌ به‌رزیدا بوو.

كوردستان شوێنێكی كه‌ئيب بوو، كوردی ده‌ره‌وه و ناوه‌وه‌ی كوردستان خۆيان به‌ لێقه‌وماو ده‌زانی، تووشی نائومێدی بوبون و هه‌ستيان به‌ هه‌ره‌س هێنانی شۆڕش ده‌كرد. له‌ ديوه‌خانه‌كاندا، كۆمه‌ڵگای كوردی خه‌ريكی به‌خۆ داچوونه‌وه‌ و ده‌ربڕينی ناڕه‌زايی بوون. سه‌ركرده‌كان له‌ گێژاوك دابوون و خۆيان به‌ بێ چاره‌ و بێ به‌رنامه‌ ده‌بينی. هه‌يان بوو دانی به‌ سه‌رلێشێواوی ده‌نا، و هه‌شيان بوو هانای بۆ شيعارات و فاكته‌ری گه‌شبينيی ده‌برد. خه‌ڵك و جه‌ماوه‌ر و ڕۆشنبير و بگره‌ ئه‌ندامانی حيزبه‌كانيش بڕوايان به‌ سه‌ركرده‌كان كز بوو بوو. كه‌وتبوونه‌ ڕه‌خنه‌ و گله‌يی كاری و ئۆباری تراژيديای هه‌له‌بجه‌ و ئه‌نفاليان ده‌خسته‌ ئه‌ستۆی هه‌ڵه‌ سياسيه‌ مه‌زنه‌كانی سه‌ركرده كورده‌‌كان. هه‌يان بوو داوای گۆرينی سه‌ركرده‌كانيان ده‌كرد، و هه‌يان بوو داوای سه‌رله‌نوێ دروست كردنه‌وه‌ی حيزبێكی پان و بۆری تازه‌ی ده‌كرد.

له‌و سه‌رده‌مه‌دا، خه‌باتی چه‌كدار له‌ كوردستانی باشوور گه‌يشتبوه‌ ڕاده‌ی نه‌مان. هاوكات، له‌ ده‌ره‌وه‌ی ووڵاتيش خه‌باتی لۆبی كردن له‌ ئاستێكی زۆر نزمدا بوو. سه‌ڕه‌ڕ‌ای ئه‌زموونی ده‌يان ساڵی بزووتنه‌وه‌ی ڕزگاريخوازی كوردی، حيزبه‌ كورديه‌كان له‌ هه‌نده‌ران زۆر بێ دۆست و بێ كه‌س و بێ ساحێب و بێ به‌رنامه‌ بوون. بۆ نموونه‌، له‌ نێو زياتر له‌ ٤٥٠ ئه‌ندام په‌رله‌مانی كۆنزێرڤه‌تيڤی به‌ريتانيدا ته‌نانه‌ت تاقه‌ ئه‌ندامێكی ئه‌و حيزبه‌ ده‌سه‌ڵاتداره‌ په‌يوه‌ندی به‌ كورده‌وه‌ نه‌بوو. له‌به‌ر به‌رژه‌وه‌ندی ئابوری و ستراتيژی سياسيان، حكومه‌تی ثاتچه‌ری به‌ريتانی و ڕۆنالد ڕێگه‌نی ئه‌مه‌ريكی نه‌له‌ نزيك و نه‌ له‌ دووره‌وه‌ خۆيان له‌ كه‌مه‌ نه‌ته‌وه‌يه‌كی وه‌ك كورد نه‌ده‌گه‌ياند. له‌ به‌رامبه‌ر ئه‌وانه‌يشدا، ژماره‌ی كوردی هه‌نده‌ران زۆر كه‌م و كه‌مكاريگه‌ر بوون. ئه‌وه‌ی هه‌بوو يان خه‌ريكی خوێندن و كاسبی بوو، وه‌يان خه‌ريكی حيزبايه‌تی له‌نێو كۆمه‌ڵگای كوردی بوو. ململانێی پارتی و يه‌كێتی هه‌روه‌ك ئێستا به‌رده‌وام تێكده‌ر بوو.

ژماره‌ی ئه‌و سه‌ركرده‌ حيزبيه‌ زمانزان و شاره‌زايانه‌ی كه‌ له‌ سيسته‌می ئه‌وروپی و ئه‌مه‌ريكی گه‌يشتبوون، زۆر كه‌م بوون و به‌ په‌نجه‌ی ده‌ست ده‌ژمێردران. لۆبی كوردی پێويستی به‌ هيممه‌تی هه‌موو لايه‌ك بوو. له‌و كاته‌دا خۆم و چه‌ند دۆستێكی ناحيزبی، كه‌وتبووينه‌ خۆ ڕێك خستن و كه‌مپه‌ينی لۆبی كردن، شان به‌ شانی ئه‌و چه‌ند كادره‌ حيزبيه‌ شاره‌زايانه‌ی كه‌ ڕۆلی ئاكتيڤيان هه‌بوو. هه‌مووشمان له‌ هه‌وڵ و هه‌ڵه‌ و هيممه‌تی ڕۆژانه‌ی خۆمانه‌وه‌ فێری كاری لۆبی ده‌بوين. بايی ئه‌وه‌نده‌ ئه‌زموونمان په‌يدا كردبوو كه‌ بتوانين ڕاوێژكاريی پێشكه‌ش به‌ سه‌ركرده‌ كورديه‌كان بكه‌ين.

له‌و سه‌رده‌مه‌دابوو، له‌ ساڵی ١۹٨۹ و ١۹۹٠دا، هه‌ردوو به‌ڕێزان، مام جه‌لال تاله‌بانی و كاك مه‌سعود‌ به‌رزانی له‌ سه‌ردانی به‌ريتانيادا داوای ديده‌نی منيان كرد. مام جه‌لالم له‌ ماڵی دكتۆر له‌تيف ديت و كاك مه‌سعودم به‌ هاوه‌ڵی كاك هۆشيار زێباری له‌ ئوتێلی ساڤۆی (ستراند)ی له‌نده‌ن ديت. هه‌ردو سه‌ركرده‌ داوای هاوكاريان لێ كردم سه‌باره‌ت به‌ لۆبی كردن له‌ په‌رله‌مان و ميديا و سيسته‌می حوكمڕانی به‌ريتانی. دوا به‌ دوای له‌و ديده‌نيانه‌دا، ڕاپۆرتێكم بۆ به‌رنامه‌ی لۆبی كردن له‌ ووڵاتێكی وه‌ك به‌ريتانيا پێشكه‌ش به‌ هه‌ردوو سه‌رۆك و سه‌كرده‌كانی به‌ره‌ی كوردستانی كرد. له‌ نزيكه‌وه‌ ئاگادار بووم كه‌وا سه‌ركردايه‌تی پارتی و يه‌كێتی دا ڕاپۆرته‌كه‌يان تاوتوێ كرد بوو، و چه‌ندين بڕياری بنه‌ڕه‌تيان له‌سه‌ر لۆبيكردنی حيزبه‌كانيان دابوو. دواتر، له‌به‌ر گرنگی بابه‌ته‌كه‌ و وه‌ك سه‌ره‌تايه‌ك بۆ ليكۆڵينه‌وه‌ و به‌ هيوای ده‌وڵه‌مه‌ند كردنی بيركاريه‌كان، ڕاپۆرته‌كه‌م كرده‌ ووتارێك و له‌ گۆڤاری (په‌يڤ)دا بڵاوم كرده‌وه‌. گۆڤاری په‌يڤ له‌لايه‌ن (مه‌ڵبه‌ندی ڕۆشنبيری كوردی Kurdish Cultural Centre-KCC)ی له‌ شاری له‌نده‌ن بڵاو ده‌كرايه‌وه‌.



سه‌ره‌تايه‌ك بۆ لێكۆڵينه‌وه‌

خه‌باتی ده‌ره‌وه‌ی ووڵات: چی بكه‌ين و له‌ كوێوه‌ ده‌ست پێ بكه‌ين

په‌يڤ، مانگی ئوكتۆبه‌ری ١۹۹٠- ژماره (١٢ و ١۳)، لاپه‌ڕه‌١٢٥۹-١٢٧٥


ئيمڕۆ له‌ سه‌رتاپای كوردستاندا، دوای زنجيره‌ كاره‌ساتێك له‌ گشت پارچه‌كانيدا، كۆمه‌ڵانی خه‌ڵكی كورد كه‌وتونه‌ته‌ گێژاوی بيركردنه‌وه‌ و لێدوان و گفتوگۆ، بۆ وه‌ڵام دانه‌وه‌ی چه‌ندين پرسياری گرنگ و له‌به‌ر چاو، وه‌ك:

بۆچی شۆرشی كورد نه‌يتوانيوه‌ به‌ سه‌ركه‌وتوويی و ڕاست و ڕه‌وانی درێژه‌ به‌ خه‌باتی خۆی بدات؟
بۆچی شۆڕشگێرانی كورد نه‌يانتوانيوه‌ سوود له‌ هه‌ڵه‌ی ڕابردوو وه‌ربگرن بۆ خه‌باتی داهاتويان؟
بۆچی سه‌ركرده‌كانی شۆرش سوودێكی ئه‌وتۆيان وه‌رنه‌گرت له‌ هه‌ل و مه‌رج و بار و دۆخی ناكۆك و شله‌ژاوی وڵاته‌ داگيركه‌ره‌كانی كوردستان، به‌ تايبه‌تی له‌ ساڵانی شه‌ڕی هه‌شت ساڵه‌ی كه‌نداو؟
بۆچی دووچاری ڕۆژێكی ڕه‌شی وه‌ك ئيمڕۆ بوين؟
به‌كام ڕێگه‌ له‌و زۆنگاوه‌ ڕزگاريمان ده‌بێت؟ ئيتر چی بكه‌ين و له‌ كوێوه‌ ده‌ست پێ بكه‌ين؟

هه‌ر پرسيارێك له‌وانه‌ ده‌يان لق و پۆپی لێ ده‌بێته‌وه. هه‌ڵبه‌ته‌ وه‌ڵام دانه‌وه‌ی ئه‌م پرسيارانه خۆی له‌ خۆی دا كارێكی زۆر قورس و ئاڵۆزه‌ و پێويستی به‌ لێكۆڵينه‌وه‌ و بيركردنه‌وه‌ی قوڵ و سه‌رێكی سارد و دڵێكی گه‌رم هه‌يه‌. پێويستی به‌ بيركردنه‌وه‌ و نوسينی ئازاد و نه‌ترسه‌. پێويستی به‌ وره‌ی به‌رز و جورئه‌ته‌ بۆ ده‌رخستنی ڕاستيه‌كان. پێويستی به‌ به‌رپاكردنی زنجيره‌ لێدوان و گفتوگۆيه‌كی ئازاد و داهێنه‌رانه‌يه‌. ئه‌و لێكۆڵينه‌وه‌ و هه‌وڵ و ته‌قه‌‌ڵلايانه‌ش به‌ يه‌ك كه‌س و دووكه‌س ئه‌نجام نادرێ و ئه‌ركی تاقمێكی تايبه‌تيش نيه‌، به‌ڵكو ئه‌كێكی هاوبه‌شی تێكڕای گه‌ڵی كورده‌ به‌ گشتی، و ئه‌ركی ڕۆشنبيران و خاوه‌ن بير و قه‌ڵه‌م به‌ده‌ستانی كورديشه‌ به‌تايبه‌تی. هه‌روه‌ها جێ به‌جێ كردنيشی پێويستی به‌ هاوكاری و ڕا ده‌ربڕين و به‌شداری كردنی هه‌موو لايه‌ك و هه‌موو لايه‌نێكه‌. له‌ هه‌موو لايه‌نێك گرنگتر بۆ هاريكاری، لايه‌نه‌ حيزبيه‌كان و ڕێكخراوه ناحيزبيه‌كانن.

ڕه‌خنه‌

ئێمه‌ به‌ گشتی حه‌ز به‌ ڕه‌خنه‌ی ئاشكرا ناكه‌ين، ڕه‌خنه‌ی نوسراوه‌ و ده‌نگ ده‌ربڕين به‌دڵی فراوان له‌ دۆستيش وه‌رناگرين، ئه‌گه‌رچی هه‌موو جۆره‌ ڕه‌خنه‌يه‌ك له‌ ژووری كۆبونه‌وه‌ و له‌ ديوه‌خانه‌كاندا قبوڵ ده‌كه‌ين. هه‌ربۆيه‌ش، ته‌نيا لايه‌نه‌ دژ به‌يه‌كه‌كان كه‌م و كوڕی و هه‌ڵه‌ی يه‌كتر بڵاو ده‌كه‌نه‌وه‌، به‌ مه‌به‌ستی بريندار كردن و ئابڕوو بردنی به‌رامبه‌ر‌، بۆ سوك كردن و ڕيسوا كردن و كه‌م كردنه‌وه‌ی لايه‌نگيران، واته‌ نه‌ك به‌ نيازی خزمه‌ت و پته‌و كردن. جا باشترين چاره‌ بۆ ڕێگرتن له‌ ڕه‌خنه‌ی تێكده‌ر ئه‌وه‌يه‌ كه‌ هه‌ر لايه‌نه‌ ده‌رگای ڕه‌خنه‌ی داهێنه‌ر له‌به‌رده‌م دۆست و هه‌وادار و هاوخه‌باته‌كانی بكاته‌وه‌، نه‌ك ته‌نيا له‌ ژووری كۆبوونه‌وه‌ و ديوه‌خانه‌كاندا، به‌ڵكو له‌سه‌ر كاغه‌زی بڵاو كراوه‌ش. ئه‌م كاره‌ش ده‌بێته‌ هۆی داهێنانی چه‌رخێكی نوێ له‌ ئازادی ده‌ربڕين و په‌روه‌رده‌كردن و فراوانكردنی مێشك.

وه‌ك ده‌ست پێشكه‌ريه‌ك، بۆ جۆش دانی ئه‌م لێكۆڵينه‌وه‌يه‌، وای به‌ چاك ده‌زانم كه‌ پێشنيار و بۆچوونی خۆم بخه‌مه‌ سه‌ر ئه‌و لاپه‌ڕانه‌ و چاوێك به‌ بارودۆخه‌كه‌ بخشێنم. له‌ كاتی نوسيندا نه‌مويست بكه‌ومه‌ موجامه‌له‌ كردنی ئه‌و لايه‌ن و ئه‌م لايه‌ن، و له‌ ڕاستی و تاڵی واقيعه‌كه‌ بترسم، و دوودڵی له‌ ده‌رخستنی ڕاستی بكه‌‌م، وه‌يان له‌ ئاشكراكردنی ئه‌و بابه‌تانه‌ی كه‌ له‌ مێشكی زۆربه‌ی ڕۆشنبيراندا ده‌خولێته‌وه. مه‌به‌ستم له‌ و باسه‌دا تانه‌ و توانج نيه‌، له‌ هيچ لايه‌ك. به‌ش به‌ حاڵی خۆم هه‌موو هه‌وڵ و ته‌قه‌ڵڵايه‌كی دلسۆزانه‌ به‌ نيشتمان په‌روه‌ريی ده‌زانم، حه‌ز به‌ يه‌كگرتنه‌وه‌ی هه‌موو هه‌وڵ و ته‌قه‌ڵڵايه‌كان ده‌كه‌م له‌ گۆڕه‌پانی خه‌باتدا. ئه‌وه‌ی لێره‌دا به‌ره‌و ڕووی خوێنه‌ری ده‌كه‌مه‌وه‌ بۆ تێكدان نيه‌ به‌ڵكو بۆ دروست كردن و داهێنان و هاوكاريه‌.

بۆ ده‌ست نيشان كردنی هه‌نگاوی يه‌كه‌م، ديمه‌نێكی بچووكی وێنه‌ مه‌زنه‌كه‌ ده‌كه‌مه‌ نموونه‌ و ده‌يخه‌مه‌ به‌ر شێ كردنه‌وه,‌ تاوه‌كو سه‌ره‌تا پڕاكتيكه‌كانی بخه‌مه‌ ڕوو. له‌به‌ر پێك چوونی پێداويسته‌كانی خه‌بات له‌ گشت پارچه‌كانی كوردستاندا، كوردستانی خواروو (عيراق) ده‌كه‌مه‌ نموونه‌ی بابه‌ت. وه‌ سه‌ره‌ڕای زۆری و بڵاوی شوێن و شێوازه‌كانی خه‌بات، خه‌باتی ده‌ره‌وه‌ی ووڵات ده‌كه‌مه‌ چه‌قی لێكۆڵينه‌وه‌، و كه‌مپه‌ينی ناو به‌ريتانياش ده‌كه‌مه‌ نمونه‌ی خه‌باتی گه‌لی كورد له‌ ده‌ره‌وه‌ی كوردستاندا. خه‌باتی ووڵاتانی تر و ناوه‌وه‌ی ووڵات و به‌شه‌كانی تری كوردستان بۆ خه‌ڵكی شاره‌زاتر و خاوه‌ن ئه‌زمونی مه‌زنتر لێ ده‌گه‌ڕێم.

چۆن له‌و زۆنگاوه‌ ڕزگارمان ده‌بێت و چی بكه‌ين و له‌ كوێوه‌ ده‌ست پێبكه‌ين؟

ڕووداوه‌كانی سێ ساڵی ڕابوردوو (١۹٨٧-١۹۹٠) بارو دۆخێكی نوێی نائاسايی و ناهه‌مواريان په‌يدا كرد. شلۆقی و شله‌ژان و سه‌رلێ شێوان گه‌يشتوونه‌ته‌ ڕاده‌يه‌كی ئه‌وتۆ كه‌ هه‌رگيز به‌ خۆمانه‌وه‌ نه‌ديوه‌. ئاشكراشه‌ كه‌ ميلله‌ته‌كه‌مان به‌وه‌ ڕانه‌هاتووه‌ و نه‌خشه‌ی ئاماده‌ كراويشی نه‌بووه‌ بۆ به‌ره‌نگار بوونه‌وه‌ی ته‌نگوچه‌ڵه‌مه‌ی شێوه‌ نوێ و خۆڕاگرتن و مانه‌وه‌ به‌ زيندوويی. وه‌نه‌بێ ئه‌وه‌ی ڕووی دا كۆتايی كاره‌ساتان بێ، به‌ڵكو به‌ گوێره‌ی به‌ڵگه‌كان و پارسه‌نگه لاسه‌نگ بوه‌كه‌ی سياسه‌تی زلهێزه‌كان و ووڵاته‌كانی ڕۆژهه‌ڵاتی ناوه‌ڕاست، وا پێ ده‌چێ كه‌ ئه‌گه‌ر سه‌ره‌تای كاره‌سات نه‌بێ، ده‌توانم بڵێم ناوه‌ڕاست و جه‌رگه‌ی كاره‌ساته،‌ و له‌وه‌ خراپتريشی به‌دواوه‌يه‌. له‌ هه‌مووشيان جه‌رگبڕتر، بێ ئاماده‌يی سه‌ركرده‌كانه‌ بۆ به‌ره‌نگاربوونه‌وه‌ی چاره‌نوسی نه‌بينراو. ڕه‌نگه‌ خه‌ڵكه‌كه‌ هه‌ستی پێ بكه‌ن، به‌ڵام پێوه‌ی ديار نيه‌ كه‌ حيسابی ڕۆژی له‌وه‌ ڕه‌شتريان كردبێ.

له‌كۆنه‌وه‌ - بگره‌ له‌ سه‌ره‌تای سه‌ده‌ی شازده‌هه‌مه‌وه‌ - بزووتنه‌وه‌ و خه‌باتی كورد له‌ سه‌ر شێوه‌ی زنجيره‌ی كورتی چه‌ند ساڵی بوه‌. هێلی به‌يانی (كێرڤ) سه‌ركه‌وتن و ده‌ستكه‌وته‌كانی به‌رده‌وام به‌ره‌و به‌رزی ڕۆيشتوه‌ هه‌تاكو گه‌يشتۆته‌ ڕاده‌يه‌ك، ئينجا كتوپڕ و يه‌كسه‌ر هه‌ره‌سی هێناوه‌ و نزيك بۆته‌وه‌ له‌ سفر، و بگره‌ كه‌وتۆته‌ ئاستێكی نزمتر له‌ خاڵی ده‌ستپێكردنه‌وه‌. كۆتاييه‌كانی هه‌رده‌م كاره‌ساتی دڵته‌زێنی له‌دوا بوه‌. ئه‌گه‌ر دوور نه‌ڕۆين، هه‌ر له‌ مێژووی ئه‌م سه‌ده‌يه‌دا (سه‌ده‌ی بيسته‌م) چه‌ندين نمونه‌ی زيندومان ده‌ست ده‌كه‌وێ. وه‌ك زنجيره‌ی شۆرشه‌كانی شێخ مه‌حمود و كۆماری مه‌هاباد و شۆڕشی ئه‌يلول و بگره‌ دوا شۆڕشيش. سيناريۆی گه‌شه‌كردن و لاواز بوون، سه‌ركه‌وتن و ڕووخان، به‌رزی و نزمی له‌ گشتياندا هه‌يه‌. به‌ڵام ده‌ڵته‌زێنترينی ئه‌م دياردانه‌ دووباره‌ بوونه‌وه‌ی هه‌مان هه‌ڵه‌، هه‌مان سياسه‌ت، هه‌مان تاكتيك و هه‌مان هه‌ره‌سه‌.

له‌ كۆڕی باسدا، بارو دۆخی ئێستا هه‌ڵده‌سه‌نگێندرێ. به‌شدارانی كۆڕه‌كانی باس، بيرو بۆ چوونيان جيا جيايه‌ سه‌باره‌ت به‌ پێدا چوونه‌وه‌ی كۆن و تاوانبار كردنی سه‌ركرده‌كان لايه‌نێك بۆ كاره‌سات و پێشبينی و پێشنياريان بۆ دوا ڕۆژ. ئه‌وانه‌ به‌ گشتی سێ به‌شن:

١- به‌شێكی ڕ‌‌ه‌ش بين، وای داده‌نێن كه‌وا كار له‌ كار ترازاوه‌ و هه‌موو شت له‌ده‌ست چووه‌ و هه‌ره‌س ڕووی داوه‌ (به‌ شێوه‌يه‌كی ناديار). ئه‌وانه‌ هێز و پته‌ويی پارت و ڕێكخراوه‌كان به‌ قه‌واره‌يه‌كی به‌تاڵ داده‌نێن، و جموجۆليشيان به‌ په‌له‌ ڕوحه‌ و په‌له‌قاژه‌ی مانه‌وه‌ ده‌ده‌نه‌ قه‌ڵه‌م بۆ ده‌ست پێوه‌ گرتنی ئه‌ندام و لايه‌نگير و هه‌وادارانيان.

٢- به‌شێكی تر كه‌ دان به‌ مه‌زنی كاره‌ساته‌دا دانانێن، و به‌ ئومێدن كه‌ له‌ ماوه‌يه‌كی كه‌مدا، له‌ ئه‌نجامی گۆڕانكاری نێو ده‌وڵه‌تی و زلهێزه‌كان، سه‌ركه‌وتن و ده‌سكه‌وتی گه‌وره‌ به‌ر كورد بكه‌وێ. هه‌ڵگری ئه‌و بيرو ڕايه‌ پاشه‌كشه‌يی و به‌سه‌رهاتی كورد ده‌خه‌نه‌ پاڵ تێك چوونی پارسه‌نگی سياسی جيهانی. ئه‌و به‌شه،‌ لايه‌نه‌ كوردييه‌كان به‌ خاوه‌ن موباده‌ره‌ وه‌يان ياريكه‌ری به‌توانای ناو ياری نێو ده‌وڵه‌تی دانانێن.

۳- به‌شێكی تێكه‌ڵ و نايه‌كسان كه‌ بيروڕايان بريتيه‌ له‌ ئه‌نجامی لێكدانی دوو به‌شه‌كه‌ی سه‌ره‌وه‌. ئه‌وانه‌ بارو دۆخ هه‌ڵده‌سه‌نگێنن و ڕۆلی هه‌رلايه‌ك دياری ده‌كه‌ن. بڕوايان به‌ گۆڕان هه‌يه‌ و بڕواشيان به‌ گرنگی گۆڕانكاری ناوه‌خۆ و ده‌ست وه‌شاندن و جموجۆڵی خودی كورد هه‌يه‌.



ڕۆلی سه‌ركرده‌كان له‌ داهێنانی كاره‌سات

له‌نێو كۆڕی هه‌مان باسدا، دووجۆره‌ ڕای تريش هه‌ن‌، سه‌باره‌ت به‌ ڕۆلی سه‌ركرده‌ و خاوه‌ن ده‌سه‌ڵاته‌كانی ناو پارت و ڕێكخراوه‌كان له‌ دروست كردنی حاله‌تی ئيمڕۆ:

أ‌- لايه‌نێك كه‌ ئۆباڵی كاره‌سات ده‌خه‌نه‌ ملی سه‌ركرده‌كان و لاچوونيان ده‌كه‌ن به‌ مه‌رجێكی گرنگی گۆڕان. به‌ڕای ئه‌وانه‌، سه‌ركرده‌كان نه‌يانتوانيوه‌ له‌ نێو گۆڕانكاريه‌ چه‌ندايه‌تی و چۆنايه‌تيه‌كانی جيهاندا بنج و بنه‌وانی مه‌سه‌له‌كه‌ تێ بگه‌ن، وه‌ پێش بينی و نه‌خشه‌كانيان له‌سه‌ر بناغه‌ی شيكردنه‌وه‌ی زانستيانه‌ی ڕياليستی دانه‌ڕێژراوه‌, و پلانه‌ سياسيه‌كانيان ته‌نيا ڕۆژانه‌ بووه‌. جگه‌ له‌وه‌ش تاوانی ململانێ و براكوژی كورد ده‌خه‌نه‌ ئه‌ستۆی سه‌ركردايه‌تيه‌كان، و به‌هۆكارێكی سه‌ره‌كی دواكه‌وتن و كاره‌ساتيان له‌ قه‌له‌م ده‌ده‌ن. هه‌روه‌ها تاوانباريان ده‌كه‌ن به‌وه‌ی كه‌ نه‌يانتوانيوه‌ ده‌رفه‌تی شه‌ڕی كه‌نداو (١۹٨٠-١۹٨٨) بۆ قازانجی كورد بقۆزنه‌وه‌.

ب‌- لايه‌نی دووهه‌م زياتر دوژمنانی كورد و پاڵپشته‌ زلهێزه‌كانيان له‌ ئاست به‌سه‌رهاتی كورد تاوانبار ده‌كه‌ن. پيلانی زلهێزه‌ خاوه‌ن به‌رژه‌وه‌نديه‌كان و بازاڕگێڕه‌كانيان به‌ سه‌رچاوه‌ی هه‌موو كاره‌ساتێك ده‌زانن. تاوان له‌ سه‌ركرده‌كانی كورد لاده‌به‌ن و وای داده‌نێن كه‌ سياسی كورد ئه‌وه‌ی له‌سه‌ری بووه‌ به‌گوێره‌ی توانا به‌ شێوه‌يه‌كی گونجاو ئه‌نجامی داوه‌. هه‌ر بۆيه‌ش وای داده‌نێن كه‌ ئه‌گه‌ر هه‌ر تاقمێكی تر سه‌كردايه‌تی كوردی كردبايه‌ به‌ هه‌مان ڕێڕه‌ودا ده‌چوو. بۆيه‌ش هه‌ڵگرانی ئه‌و ڕايه‌ به‌ ئومێدن كه‌ هه‌مان سه‌ركرده‌كانی ئێستا به‌ كاری گۆڕانكاريه‌كان‌ هه‌ڵبستن و كه‌مپه‌ينی لێكۆڵينه‌وه‌ بگرنه‌ ئه‌ستۆ.

ج - بێگومان لايه‌نی نێو ئه‌م دوولايه‌نه‌ش ده‌بێ هه‌بێ كه‌ هه‌ردوو خاڵ كۆ ده‌كاته‌وه‌ سه‌ر يه‌كتر و به‌شێكی
تاوان ده‌خاته ملی سه‌ركرده‌ و به‌شێكی تريش ده‌گه‌ڕێنێته‌وه‌ بۆ باری سياسی و پارسه‌نگی زلهێزه‌كان.

كه‌واته‌ پوخته‌ی راو بۆچوونه‌كان له‌سه‌ر يه‌ك خاڵ ڕێك ده‌كه‌ون و كۆ ده‌بنه‌وه‌، ئه‌ويش ئه‌وه‌يه‌ كه‌ "گۆڕانكاری پێويسته‌".

جۆری‌ گۆڕانگاری‌

به‌ڵێ، گۆڕانكاری له‌ گشت لايه‌نه‌كانی بزوتنه‌وه‌ی ڕزگاريخوازی گه‌ڵی كورد پێويسته‌. پێويسته‌ هه‌موولايه‌ك ئاماده‌ی ئه‌و گۆڕانه‌ بن، له‌ گه‌وره‌وه‌ هه‌تا بچووك. مه‌به‌ست له‌ گۆڕانيش هه‌ر قسه‌و چيڕۆك يان تيۆری بێ پڕاكتيك نيه‌، به‌لكو گۆڕانێكی بنه‌ڕ‌‌تی دروستكه‌ره‌ له‌ سه‌رتاپای خه‌بات و سيسته‌می ڕێكخراوه‌ييماندا، له‌ جۆری بير كردنه‌وه‌ و فه‌لسه‌فه‌ و به‌ره‌و پيره‌وه‌ چوونی ته‌نگ و چه‌ڵه‌مه‌كانماندا. گۆڕانێك كه‌ له‌گه‌ڵ ئاستی خه‌بات نوێ و ئاستی گيروگرفته‌كانمان بگونجێ و به‌رده‌وامێتی بداته‌ بزوتنه‌وه‌كه‌مان و له‌ ڕێڕه‌وی ساڵانی داهاتوودا كاريگه‌ر و پێشخه‌ر و هێز به‌خشكه‌ر بێ.

بێگومان ئه‌و گۆڕانانه‌ كارێكی ئاسان نيه‌. مه‌به‌ستيشم له‌ گۆڕانی له‌ناكاو و كتوپڕ نيه‌. به‌ڵكو مه‌به‌ستم گۆڕانی به‌ پلان و نه‌خشه‌يه‌، گۆڕانی ديراسه‌كراو و پله‌ پله‌يه‌ به‌ره‌و ئامانجێكی دياریكراو و وێنه‌ گيراوی ڕياليستی. گۆڕانێك كه‌ ڕه‌نگه‌ ساڵه‌های ساڵ بخايه‌نێ. گۆڕانی كتوپڕ ڕه‌نگه‌ زيانی زياتر بێ له‌ سوودی، ئه‌گه‌ر بێ نه‌خشه‌ و زانست بێ. بۆ نموونه‌، له‌و چه‌ند زيجيره‌ بزووتنه‌وه‌يه‌ی ده‌يان ساڵی ڕابوردوودا، ميلله‌ت فێری خه‌باتی پارتيزانی بووه‌، وسيسته‌می ڕێكخراوه‌كانيش به‌گوێره‌ی چه‌باتی پارتيزانی دروست بوون. پارت و ڕێكخراوه‌كانيش جۆری به‌ڕێوه‌ چوونيان وه‌ك نيمچه‌ حكومه‌تێكه‌. خه‌ڵكێكی زۆر له‌ ژێر سايه‌يان ژيانی ڕاهێناوه‌، جا چی به‌ شێوه‌ی ئه‌ندام بێ يان لايه‌نگير وه‌يان هه‌وادار، چی پێشمه‌رگه‌ بێ و چی خێزانی پێشمه‌رگه‌. بگره‌ به‌ سه‌دان و هه‌زاران، ڕێكخراوه‌كانيان كردۆته‌ پاڵپشتی ژيانيان و سه‌رچاوه‌ی پاره‌ و به‌ڕێوه‌ چوونيان. له‌ دوور و نزيكيشه‌وه‌ چه‌لكانێكی زۆر، له‌ناو شار و دێهاته‌كانی كوردستان يان له‌ ئێران و له‌ توران، ئومێدێكی مه‌زن و ئاواتێكی به‌ تينيان به‌ سياسه‌تی ڕێكخراوه‌اكانه‌ بۆ وه‌رسوڕاندنی چه‌رخ و سه‌ركردايه‌تی بزوتنه‌وه‌كه‌ به‌ره‌و ڕزگاری وه‌يان بۆ باشتر كردنی وه‌زع.

كه‌واته‌ له‌ كاتێكی وه‌ك ئێستادا، له‌ناكاو و كتوپڕ، به‌بێ بوونی سيسته‌مێكی ئه‌لته‌رنه‌تيڤ و شوێنگر، نه‌مانی ئه‌و پارت و ڕێخراوه‌ سياسيانه‌، وه‌يان لادانی تاقمی سه‌ركرده‌كانيان به‌ يه‌كجار، ده‌بێته‌ مايه‌ی ڕوخاندنی سيسته‌مه‌ له‌باره‌كه‌ و سه‌رچاوه‌ی ژيانی چه‌ندين و ڕوخاندنی شكۆی ئاواتی هه‌زاران و كوژاندنه‌وه‌ی چرای هيوای خه‌ڵكێكی ساده، ئيتر ئه‌وه‌ خۆی له‌ خۆیدا ده‌بێته كاره‌سات. به‌لام له كاتێكدا ئه‌گه‌ر به‌رنامه‌يه‌كی نه‌خشه‌ كێشراو و هه‌ڵسه‌نگێنراوی پله‌ به‌ پله‌ ئه‌نجام دراو سيسته‌می شوێنگری ئه‌لته‌رنه‌تيڤ دابمه‌زرێ، ئه‌و كات گۆڕينی سيسته‌می خه‌باتی كلاسيكی پارتيزانی به‌ سوك و ئاسانتر ئه‌نجام ده‌درێ.

كه‌مپه‌ين له‌ ده‌ره‌وه‌ی ووڵات

له‌ پێناو به‌رپا كردنی زنجيره‌يه‌كی نه‌پچڕاو له‌ گفتوگۆی فيكری و پڕاكتيكی بۆ ليكۆڵينه‌وه‌ و گه‌شه‌دانی لايه‌نه‌ جياجياكانی كه‌مو كۆڕيه‌كانی خه‌باتی نوێمان، لێره‌دا بيشنياری خۆم ده‌خه‌مه‌ ڕوو له‌سه‌ر يه‌كێك له‌و لايه‌نانه‌. ئه‌ويش لايه‌نی خه‌بات و كه‌مپه‌ينه‌ له ده‌ره‌وه‌ی ووڵات، لايه‌نێك كه‌ گرنگيه‌ مه‌زنه‌كه‌ی له‌و چه‌ند ساڵه‌ی دواييدا به‌ده‌ر كه‌وتوه‌. ئێستا ڕوون بۆته‌وه‌ كه‌ شوێنی ئه‌و خه‌باته‌ گرنگ و بگره‌ سه‌ره‌كیه‌‌ له‌ سه‌رخستنی بزوتنه‌وه‌كه‌. ئومێد له‌و پێشنياره‌ شی كردنه‌وه‌ و ڕووناكی خستنه سه‌ر چه‌ند لايه‌نێكی گرنگی كه‌مپه‌ينه‌ له‌ ده‌ره‌وه‌ی ووڵات. زه‌قی خاڵه‌كانيش و گرنگی دانم به‌ فاكته‌ره‌كان له‌سه‌ر بناغه‌ی ئه‌زموونێكی كورتی دووسێ ساڵييه‌ له‌و گۆڕه‌پانه‌. بێگومان كه‌م و كوڕی زۆر تێدايه‌، به‌لام وه‌ك سه‌ره‌تايه‌كی گۆڕاو ده‌توانرێت گه‌شه‌ی پێ بدرێت و بگۆڕدرێت و گفتوگۆی له‌سه‌ر بكرێ.

بۆ ميلله‌تێكی ٢٠-٢٥ مليۆنی وه‌ك ئێمه‌، جێی داخه‌ كه‌ ئه‌زموونی خه‌باتكه‌رانی پێشوو له‌ ده‌ره‌وه‌ی وڵات به‌ شێوه‌ی پێويست ناگواسترێته‌وه‌ له‌ نه‌وه‌يه‌كه‌وه‌ بۆ نه‌وه‌يه‌كی تر. له‌ جياتی ئه‌وه‌ی ئه‌زموون و په‌يوه‌نديه‌كان و كاروبارمان ڕۆژ به‌ ڕۆژ ڕووه‌و زيادی بێ، ده‌بينين ئاسته‌كه‌ی هه‌ر له‌ به‌رزی و نزمييه‌ و به‌شێكی به‌فيڕۆ ده‌ڕوات و به‌شێكی كه‌ڵكی لێ وه‌رناگيرێت. له‌وانه‌ش گرنگتر، نه‌بوونی نوێنه‌رێكی دياری كراو و ناسراو و نه‌گۆڕه‌ بۆ كورد. خه‌ڵكی بێگانه‌، له‌ كاتی پێويست يان "نوێنه‌ری نمونه‌يی" نادۆزنه‌وه‌ يان له‌ جياتی يه‌ك، ده‌يان نوێنه‌ريان لێ ده‌چێته‌ پێش و هه‌ريه‌كه‌يان وێنه و نه‌خشه‌ی جياجيای كوردستانيان پێشان ده‌ده‌ن.

بنكه‌يه‌ك بۆ نوێنه‌رايه‌تی كورد

كه‌وه‌اته‌، ئه‌وه‌ی به‌ ئاشكرا پێويستمانه‌، بۆ خۆمان و بۆ لۆبی بێگانه‌ش، بريتيه‌ له‌ بوونی (بنكه‌) يان (سه‌رچاوه‌)يێكیه‌ (مرجع، مكتب، قاعده‌، مه‌قه‌ڕ، بيرۆ، يان هه‌ر ناوێكی تر). بنكه‌يه‌ك كه‌ به‌ نوێنه‌ری كورد بناسرێت و بڕوای پێ بكرێ له‌ لايه‌ن خۆمان و بێگانه‌شه‌وه‌. ئه‌و بنكه‌يه‌ش ئه‌زموونی به‌ره‌و زيادی بێ و لێی نه‌فه‌وتێ. ئه‌زموونی بنوسرێته‌وه‌ و بگوازرێته‌وه‌ له‌ يه‌كێك بۆ يه‌كێك تر و له نه‌وه‌يه‌كه‌وه‌ بۆ نه‌وه‌يه‌كی تر.

كاری "بنكه‌" ده‌بێ دياری كراو و له‌سه‌ر شێوه‌ی نيمچه‌ ده‌ستوورێك داڕيژراو بێت. واته‌ به‌ جۆرێك كه‌ له‌گه‌ڵ كاروباری ڕێكخراوه‌كانی تر ته‌واوكه‌ری يه‌كتر بن. ده‌بێ بنكه‌كه‌ زمانحاڵی (ناطق) ره‌سمی باڵی سياسی كوردی بێ. گوڕ و هێزی كاروباره‌كانی خۆی بخاته‌ سه‌ر ئه‌م كارانه‌ی خواره‌وه‌:

- په‌يوه‌ندی ڕاگه‌ياندن (ديعائی، ميديا)
- لۆبی له‌ په‌رله‌مانی
- لۆبی له‌ نێو حكومه‌ت
- لۆبی له‌ نێو ڕێكخراوه‌ ناميريه‌كان
- پاره‌ په‌يدا كردن
- كاری تر

پێويسته‌ بنكه‌ له‌ سه‌ر شێوه‌ی ده‌زگا (موئه‌سسه‌سه‌)يه‌كی ئه‌نترناسيونالی بێ، وه‌ك كۆمپانيايه‌ك خاوه‌ن سيسته‌م و فه‌رمانبه‌ر بێ و لقی له‌ هه‌موو وڵاتان هه‌بێ. به‌ پێی گرنگی وڵاته‌كه‌، ئيمكانياتی ماددی زۆر و كه‌م و بۆ لقه‌كان ته‌رخان بكرێت. له‌سه‌ره‌تادا، هه‌ر بۆ نمونه، به‌و گوێره‌ جوگرافيه‌ ده‌توانرێت دابه‌ش بكرێت: به‌ريتانيا، ئه‌مريكا، ئه‌لمانيا، سويد، فه‌ره‌نسا، وڵاتانی تری ڕۆژئاوا، ئوستراليا، وڵاتانی سۆشياليست. جگه‌ له‌وانه‌ش، ده‌بێ بنكه‌ له‌ ئێران و وڵاته‌ عه‌ره‌بيه‌كان (وه‌ك سوريا، و ميسر)يش هه‌بێت، به‌ڵام خه‌بات له‌وانه‌ وه‌ك وڵاتانی ديموكراسی په‌رله‌مانی نيه‌. هه‌روه‌ها له‌ دواڕۆژدا، له‌ ساڵانی دوای ١۹۹٢دا ئه‌وروپای ڕۆژئاوا (به‌ تايبه‌تی ئه‌لمانيای يه‌كگرتوو) گرنگيه‌كه‌ی زياتريش ده‌بێ له‌ ئێستا.

كارهه‌ڵسوڕانی بنكه‌

پێويسته‌ ناوی "بنكه"كه‌ دياری كرواو و هه‌ميشه‌ نه‌گۆڕ بێ و هه‌موو كارێكی به‌ هه‌مان ناو ئه‌نجام بدرێ، تاكو نه‌بێته‌ مايه‌ی سه‌ر لێ شێوان. ناوه‌كه‌ش باشتره‌ كه‌ ده‌لاله‌ت له‌ ناوه‌رۆكی كاروباره‌كه‌ی بكات.‌ باشتريشه‌ ئه‌گه‌ر ووشه‌ی مافی مرۆڤيشی تێدا بێت. ئه‌ندامان و كارگيڕانی بنكه‌ش ده‌كرێنه‌ دوو به‌ش:

أ- ئه‌ندامانی كۆميته‌ی سه‌رپه‌رشتی كه‌ر

ئه‌وانه‌ پێك دێن له‌ نوێنه‌ری ڕێكخراوه‌ جياجياكان، به‌ تايبه‌تی سياسيه‌كان، به‌ گوێره‌ی ڕێكه‌وتن. ئه‌ركی كۆميته‌ بريتيه‌ له‌ دياريكردنی ڕێڕه‌و و سياسه‌تی به‌ڕێوه‌چوون و په‌يوه‌نديه‌كانی بنكه‌يه‌ و سه‌په‌رشتیكردنی فه‌رمانبه‌ران.

ب- كادر

كادر وه‌ك فه‌رمانبه‌رێك ده‌ست نيشان ده‌كرێت و به‌ مووچه‌ و به‌ جۆری فولتايم كار ده‌كات. پێويسته‌ ٢-٤ كادری شاره‌زا و لێزان و لێهاتوو (محترف) په‌يدا بكرێن يان فێر بكرێن. شه‌رت نيه‌ كادر كورد بێ، به‌ڵكو ڕه‌نگه‌ باشتر بێ ئه‌گه‌ر خه‌ڵكی وڵاته‌كه‌ خۆی بێ. ده‌بێ زمانی ئه‌و وڵاته‌ به‌ ڕ‌‌ه‌وانی بزانێ، به‌لكو ئه‌وه‌يان شه‌رتێكی هه‌ره‌ بنه‌ڕه‌تيه‌. له‌هجه‌ و شێوه‌ی دوان و گفتوگۆی ده‌بێ ڕۆشنبيرانه‌ و ديپلۆماسی و نه‌رم بێ، چونكه‌ سه‌ركه‌وتويی كه‌مپه‌ينه‌كه‌ به‌نده‌ به‌ زمانزانی و لێهاتوويی كادره‌كه‌. پێويسته‌ كادر توندڕه‌وی (تطرف)ی ئاينی و سياسی و عه‌قيده‌ی نه‌بێ، و نه‌ زۆر چه‌پڕه‌و و نه‌ زۆر ڕاستڕه‌و نه‌بێ. به‌ڵكو ده‌بێ بۆ به‌رژه‌وه‌ندی كورد بتوانی له‌گه‌ڵ چه‌پ و ڕاست يان له‌گه‌ڵ دۆست و دوژمنی فه‌لسه‌فيه‌كه‌ی خۆی دابنيشێ و بدوێ، و دۆست و لايه‌نگير و په‌يوه‌ندی شه‌خسی له‌نێو چه‌پ و ڕاستدا په‌يدا بكات.

شه‌رت نيه‌ كادر سۆز (عه‌طف)ی بۆ كورد هه‌بێ، چونكه‌ ئه‌و كاره‌ی پێی هه‌ڵده‌ستێ له‌ ڕێگه‌ی سۆز و عه‌تفه‌وه‌ ئه‌نجام نادرێ، به‌ڵكو ئه‌وه‌ ئه‌ركی خۆيه‌تی و به‌ پێی ئه‌و كاره‌ موچه‌ی ده‌درێتی. ئه‌گه‌ر كه‌مته‌رخه‌م بوو، سه‌ركۆنه‌ ده‌كرێ و به‌ڵكو ده‌رده‌كرێت. بێگومان ده‌بێ بڕوای به‌ مه‌سه‌له‌كه‌ هه‌بێ و له‌ ڕابوردووش هه‌لوێستی دژبه‌ به‌رژه‌وه‌ندی كوردی نه‌بووبێ. كه‌واته‌ پوخته‌كه‌ی ده‌بێ (محترف)ێكی به‌ خاوه‌ن بڕوا بێ نه‌ك (هاوي) يه‌كی (متعاطف).

كاروباری كادير، له‌ چه‌ند ده‌زگايه‌كی بنه‌ڕه‌تی و نابنه‌ڕ‌‌تيدا خۆی ده‌بينێته‌وه‌. له‌وانه‌:

- ميديا (ڕۆژنامه‌، گۆڤار، ته‌له‌فزيۆن، ڕاديۆ ...هتد)
- په‌رله‌مان (ئه‌ندامی هه‌ڵبژێردراو، لۆرده‌كان، حكومه‌ت، ئۆپۆزيسيۆن ... هتد)
- پيتاك و پاره‌ كۆ كردنه‌وه‌ (له‌ ڕيكخراوی خه‌يری، دروست كردنی پڕۆژه‌ی به‌ سوود بۆ بنكه‌ و ...هتد)
- هی تر (ڕێكخراوی ناميری، كه‌نيسه‌، كه‌سايه‌تی ناسراو و ئه‌كاديمی و نوسه‌ر ... هتد)

هه‌موو ئه‌و كارانه‌ بۆ تاقه‌ كادرێك زۆرن. كه‌مترين ژماره‌ دوو كادره‌ و گه‌ر زياتريش كه‌وتنه‌ ڕيزه‌وه‌ ئه‌و باشتره، به‌ تايبه‌تی‌ بۆ به‌رفراوان كردن و ڕێگرتن له‌ ‌فه‌وتانی ئه‌زموون له‌ ‌كاتی دابڕانی كادرێك.

ميديا

خه‌ڵكی ميديا، به‌ هه‌موو شێوه‌كانيه‌وه‌، له‌ بازاڕدا به‌ دوای دوو شت دا ده‌گه‌رێن، كه‌ دۆزيانه‌وه‌ به‌بێ دوودڵی ده‌يكڕن. يه‌كه‌ميان هه‌واڵ (خه‌به‌ر)، و دوه‌ميان چيڕۆك (قصه، حيكايه‌ت‌)ه‌.

هه‌واڵ بريتيه‌ له‌ "گۆڕانی له‌ناكاو"‌ له‌ گشت بابه‌تێك. كوژرانی تاكه‌ كه‌سێك له‌ ووڵاتێكی ئارامی وه‌ك سويسرا هه‌واڵێكی گرنگه، كه‌چی هه‌واڵی گرنگ له‌ شه‌رێكی خوێناوی وه‌ك عيراق-ئێراندا ‌برتتيه‌ له‌ نه‌كوژرانی سه‌رباز‌. درامای گۆڕانی له‌ناكاو، به‌تايبه‌تی له‌ جۆری تراژيديا و كاره‌ساتدا، كڕياری زۆره‌.

چيڕۆك، يان به‌ دوای ده‌نگ و باسدا په‌يدا ده‌بێ، وه‌يان ده‌توانرێت به‌بێ گۆڕانی دراماتيكی دروست بكرێ. له‌ كاتی لۆبيكردندا، قورسه‌كه‌يان (و گرنگتره‌كه‌يان) دووهه‌ميانه‌، واته‌ دروست كردنی چيڕۆكی به‌ بێی هه‌واڵی تراژيك. ئه‌و جۆره‌ چيڕۆكه‌، به‌ تايبه‌تی له‌ دوای كز بوون و نه‌مانی هه‌واڵ، به‌رده‌وامێتی به‌ كه‌مپه‌ين ئاستی ئاگاداری خه‌ڵك ده‌دات . فرۆشتنی چيڕۆك به‌ ميديا زه‌حمه‌تتره‌ له‌ فڕۆشتنی هه‌واڵ. به‌ڵام له‌گه‌ڵ ئه‌وه‌شدا چيڕۆك كڕياری خۆی و نرخی خۆی هه‌يه‌. {لێره‌دا مه‌به‌ست كڕين و فرۆشتن نيه‌، به‌ڵكو ته‌نيا مه‌به‌ست له‌ عه‌رز و ته‌له‌به‌)

دوای كاره‌سات به‌ ماوه‌يه‌ك، ئاست و گرنگيی هه‌موو خه‌به‌رێك به‌ره‌و كزی ده‌ڕوات، هه‌تا نامێنێ. خه‌ڵكيش تێر ده‌بن يان بێزار ده‌بن له‌ دووباره‌ بوونه‌وه‌یان. به‌لام بۆ بابه‌تێكی مه‌زنی وه‌ك مه‌سه‌له‌ی كورد، نابێ ئاستی ئاگاداری خه‌ڵك به‌ره‌و كزی بڕوات، وه‌ ڕۆلی هه‌ره‌ گرنگی بنكه‌ و كادری به‌رپرس له‌ ميديا له‌ دواخستنی ئه‌و كزيه‌يه‌، كه‌ ئه‌ويش بێ گومان له‌ ڕێی دروست كردنی چيڕۆكه‌وه‌يه‌ بۆ ميديا.

ميديا و شێوازی كلاسيكی كورد

تا ئێستا تێ ڕوانين و بۆ چوونی كورد بۆ ميديای ڕۆژ ئاوا له‌سه‌ر شێوه‌ی (به‌ره‌و پيره‌وه‌ چوون) بوه‌ بۆ ڕۆژنامه‌نووسان. واته‌ له‌ ڕێگه‌ی په‌يوه‌ندی شه‌خسیه‌وه‌، به‌ شێوازی داواكردن و بگره‌ پاڕانه‌وه له‌ ڕۆژنامه‌گه‌ر و دۆسته‌كان بوه‌، به‌و ئومێدی كه‌ ڕازيان بكه‌ن بۆ ئه‌وه‌ی بايه‌خ به‌ مه‌سه‌له‌كه‌مان بده‌ن. بۆ ئه‌وه‌، حيزبه‌كان ڕۆژنامه‌گه‌ری دۆستيان به‌ پاره‌ و موجامه‌لات ڕاكيشاوه‌ و سه‌رچاوه‌ی هه‌واڵ و ته‌سهيلات و پاره‌ی مه‌سره‌فيشيان پێشكه‌ش كردون. هاوكاتيش، گۆشه‌ و ئاوازی چيڕۆكه‌كانيش هه‌ر له‌سه‌ر هه‌مان خورشيد و خاوه‌ر به‌ هه‌مان وه‌ته‌ری عاتيفی دووباره‌ ده‌كرێته‌وه‌. ئيتر له‌ كاره‌ساته‌كان و دابه‌ش كردنی كوردستان و دڕنده‌يی دوژمنه‌كانمان و پياوچاكی ميلله‌تمانه‌وه‌ بۆی دێنه‌ خوار و به‌ره‌و هه‌مان كۆتايی. ئه‌وه‌ ڕ‌‌ه‌نگدانه‌وه‌ی ئاستی تێنه‌گه‌يشتنمانه‌ له‌ بازاڕی ڕۆژنامه‌گه‌ری.

ميديا كارگه‌ی به‌رهه‌مهێنانه‌ له‌ بازاڕی كرواه‌

ئه‌و شێوازه‌ كۆنه‌ پێويسته‌ بگۆڕدرێ. ده‌بێ له‌مه‌ودوا سه‌يری ميديا بكه‌ين وه‌ك بازاڕێك، يان بيزنيسێك، كه‌ بيزنيسمان و خاوه‌ن پيشه‌ی (پرۆفيشنال و موحته‌ريف)ی شاره‌زا به‌ڕێوه‌ی ده‌به‌ن. كه‌رسته‌ی خاو و كه‌لوپه‌لی بيزنيسه‌كه‌ بريتينه‌ له‌ ده‌نگوباس و ووتاره‌كان‌. كارگه‌كانيشيان بريتينه‌ له‌ چاپخانه‌ و ئێزگه‌كانيان،‌ و به‌رهه‌مه‌كه‌شيان بريتينه‌ له‌ بڵاوكراوه‌كانيان‌. كارگه‌ به‌ بێ كه‌ره‌سته‌ی خاوهه‌ڵناسوڕێت. ميدياش ه‌ بێی هه‌واڵ و چيڕۆك هه‌ڵناسوڕێت. هه‌تا چۆنايه‌تی كه‌ره‌سته‌ی خاوه‌كه‌ باشتر بێ، ئه‌وا كاريگه‌ری به‌رهه‌مه‌كه‌یان زياتر ده‌بێ و بازاڕيشيان گه‌رمتر ده‌بێ. به‌رهه‌می هه‌ر كارگه‌ و كۆمپانيايه‌كيش له‌ ڕێگه‌ی تۆڕی ده‌يان ده‌لاڵ و دوكان و بازرگان و بازاڕگێڕه‌وه‌ ده‌خرێنه‌ بازاڕه‌وه‌. فرۆشياری كه‌رسته‌ی خاويش له‌ ڕێگه‌ی ئه‌وانه‌وه‌ خۆی ده‌گه‌يه‌نێته‌ كارگه‌ و به‌رهه‌مه‌كه‌یان پێ ده‌فرۆشن. كه‌واته‌ ميديا پێويستی به‌ ئێمه‌يه‌ به‌قه‌ده‌ر پێويستی ئێمه‌ به‌و. بۆيه‌ شێوه‌ی مامه‌ڵه‌مان پێويسته‌ له‌سه‌ر ئه‌و بناغه‌يه‌ بێ و له‌ جياتی (چاو تێبڕين) ده‌بێ (هاوكاری)يان بكه‌ين. له‌جياتی (داوا) ده‌بێ (يارمه‌تی)يان بده‌ين. له‌جياتی بڵێين (تكايه‌ يارمه‌تيمان بده‌ن)، ده‌بێ بڵێين (ئايا چۆنتان يارمه‌تی بده‌ين هه‌تا يارمه‌تيمان بده‌ن). خۆ ئه‌گه‌ر هه‌واڵ و چيڕۆكه‌كه‌مان به‌تێن بوو، ئه‌وا ڕووی په‌يوه‌نديه‌كه‌ وه‌رده‌گيڕين و ده‌ڵێين (كه‌رسته‌يه‌كی گرنگمان هه‌يه‌ وه‌رن بيكڕن پێش خه‌ڵكی تر).

پوخته‌كه‌ی

ده‌بێ بۆچوونمان و چوونه‌ پێشمان بۆ ناو ميديا له‌و ڕوانگه‌يه‌بێ. ڕاسته‌ ڕۆژنامه‌نوس هه‌يه‌ دۆستی كورده‌، به‌ڵام كه‌ كار ده‌گاته‌ سه‌ر ساغه‌، "سۆز" ده‌ورێكی ئه‌وتۆ نابينێ، چونكه‌ ناكڕدرێ و نافرۆشرێ، و كاريگه‌ريه‌كه‌ی سنوری بۆ هه‌يه‌. واته‌ ده‌بێ سياسه‌تمه‌داری كورد وه‌ك (پڕۆفيشنال بۆ پڕۆفيشنال) په‌يوه‌ندی له‌گه‌ڵ ميدياكان بكه‌ن.

له‌ بنكه‌ی كورديدا، پێويسته‌ كادرێك ته‌نيا بۆ كاری ميدايا ته‌رخان بكرێ (كادری ميديا). كادری ميديا ده‌بێ زۆر به‌ وردی له‌ بازاڕه‌كه‌ا بكۆڵێته‌وه‌ و له‌ نزيكه‌و‌ه‌ ديراسه‌ی بكات، و به‌ زوويی شاره‌زايی له‌ سيسته‌مه‌كه‌ په‌يدا بكات. ڕۆژنامه‌ی چه‌پ و ناوه‌ڕاست و ڕاستڕه‌و لێك جيا بكاته‌وه‌ و له‌گه‌ڵ هه‌ريه‌كه‌يان به‌ زمانێك بدوێ، واته‌ (مرونه‌)ی هه‌بێ. كارگه‌ جياجياكانی ناو بازاڕی ميديا ڕێڕه‌و و سياسه‌تی جياجيايان هه‌يه‌ و جۆری به‌رهه‌م و جۆری كرێكار و خوێنه‌ر و گوێگریان جيايه‌‌. كه‌واته‌ هه‌ريه‌كه‌ی قالبی تايبه‌تيان بۆ كه‌رسته‌ خاوه‌كان هه‌يه‌ و سه‌رچاوه‌ی جياشيان بۆ ئه‌و كه‌رستانه هه‌يه‌. بۆيه‌، كادری ميديا ناتوانی ته‌نيا وتارێك دابڕێژێ و به‌بێ ده‌ستكاری به‌ ته‌واوی ڕۆژنامه‌كانی بفرۆشێ.

بڵاوكردنه‌وه‌ی هه‌واڵ و چيڕۆك له‌ ڕۆژنامه‌ و ڕاديۆ ئاسانتره‌ وه‌ك له‌ ته‌له‌فزيۆن. به‌ڵام كاريگه‌ری‌ ته‌له‌فزيۆن له‌وانی تر زياتره‌. مه‌جالی بڵاوكردنه‌وه‌ی هه‌واڵ له‌ هه‌مو مينبه‌ره‌كاندا ته‌سك و دياری كراوه‌ و كاتيشی زوو به‌سه‌ر ده‌چێ. به‌ڵام بڵاو كردنه‌وه‌ی چيڕۆك مه‌وداكه‌ی زۆر فراوانتره‌ و كاته‌كه‌شی به‌سه‌ر ناچێ. شوێن و ماوه‌ی بڵاو كردنه‌وه‌ی چيڕۆك زۆرن. بۆ نموونه‌: له‌ ته‌له‌فزيۆنی به‌ريتانيدا، (پانۆڕامای بی بی سی) و (ديسپاچی كه‌ناڵی چوار) و هی تر. له‌ ڕۆژنامه‌‌ش چه‌ندين لاپه‌ره‌ی تايبه‌تمه‌ند هه‌يه‌، بۆ نموونه‌: هه‌واڵی ناوه‌وه‌، ژيان، كۆمه‌ڵ، ڕاپۆڕتی ياسا، به‌شی نامه‌ی هاوڵاتی، ووتاری ڕۆژنامه‌ و هی تر. ئيتر ئه‌وانه‌ و چه‌ندين گۆڤار و هه‌فته‌نامه‌ و مانگانه‌ و به‌رنامه‌ی تايبه‌تی ڕاديۆ و هی تر، هه‌رهه‌موويان مه‌جالی ئيستيغلال كردنيان هه‌يه‌.

هه‌ڵبه‌ت، دوای ماوه‌يه‌ك له‌ كار كردن، كادری ميديا شاره‌زايی له‌ بنج و بنه‌وانی بازاڕی ميديا په‌يدا ده‌كات. په‌يدا كردنی ئه‌زمون كاره‌كه‌ی به‌ره‌و ئاسانی ده‌بات و به‌رده‌وام توانستی (كه‌فائه‌تی) به‌رز ده‌كاته‌وه‌. لێره‌دا گرنگی بنكه‌ له‌وه‌ به‌ديار ده‌كه‌وێ. گه‌ر بنكه‌ به نوێنه‌ری كورد بناسرێ و له‌ نێو بازاڕی ميديا به‌ سه‌رچاوه‌يه‌كی بڕوا پێكراوی هه‌واڵ و چيڕۆك دانی پێدا نبنرێ، وه‌ ناونيشانی دياری كراوی بزانرێ، ئه‌وا ديسان كاری كادری ميديا ئاسانتر ده‌بێ. خۆ له‌ كاتی ڕووداوێك، په‌يدا بوونی هه‌واڵ وه‌يان گه‌ڕان به‌ دوای چيڕۆك، كرێكاره‌كان بێ ماندوو بوون و سه‌ر لێشێوان ده‌توانن نوێنه‌ری كورد بدۆزنه‌وه‌ و له‌گه‌ڵ كادری ميديا بكه‌ونه‌ ئاڵوگۆر. ئاشكراشه‌ كه‌ هه‌تا كورد خاوه‌نی تاقه‌ بنكه‌ (نه‌ك چه‌ند بنكه‌يه‌ك) بن، ئه‌وا بڕوا پێكراویه‌تی و قورسايی گوتار (تصريح) و هه‌واڵ و چيڕۆكه‌كانيان مه‌زنتر ده‌بێ.

په‌رله‌مان

په‌رله‌مانيش، وه‌ك ميديا، بازاڕێكی سه‌ربه‌خۆيه‌. سيسته‌مێكی تێكه‌ڵ و ئاڵۆزه‌ و كه‌رسته‌ی خاوی ئێمه‌ی پێويسته‌، به‌ڵام نه‌ك هه‌ر به‌ خاوی (وه‌ك بۆ ميديا). به‌ڵكو ده‌بێ پێشتر پوخته‌ بكرێ و دابڕێژرێ. باشرين كڕياری كه‌رسته‌ی خاوی ئێمه‌ له‌ ناو په‌رله‌مانه‌كان، زۆربه‌ی جار، لايه‌نی ئۆپۆزيسيۆنه‌. له‌ ناو ئۆپۆزيسيۆنيش كڕياری بێ پرسيار، چه‌پڕه‌وه‌كانن، كڕياری دوودڵيش سياسيه‌كانی باڵی ناوه‌ڕاست و ڕاستڕه‌وه‌كانن.

مه‌به‌ستی سه‌ره‌كی ئۆپۆزيسيۆنی په‌رله‌مان له‌ په‌يوه‌ندیه‌كانيان له‌گه‌ڵمان، وه‌يان له‌ پشتگيریه‌كانيان، خزمه‌ت كردنی كورد نيه‌ به‌ پله‌ی يه‌كه‌م. به‌ڵكو مه‌به‌ستی سه‌ره‌كيان به‌كارهێنانی قه‌زيه‌كه‌يه‌مانه‌ له‌ دژی حكومه‌تی خۆيان و بۆ ئيحراج كردنی حيزبی ده‌سه‌ڵاتدار. ئه‌گه‌ر كه‌رسته‌كه‌ی ئێمه‌ به‌ كه‌ڵكی ئه‌و مه‌سه‌له‌يه‌ نه‌هات، ئه‌وا زه‌حمه‌ته‌ وه‌ری بگرن به‌ شێوه‌يه‌كی كاريگه‌ربه‌كاری نهێنن.

فاكته‌ری گرنگ له‌ كاری ناو په‌رله‌ماندا بريتيه‌ له‌ چۆنێتی داڕشتنی قه‌زيه‌كه‌ و پوخته‌ كردنی چيڕۆكه‌كه‌يه‌، هه‌روه‌ها‌ له‌ شێوه‌ی په‌يوه‌ندی كردن و چوونه‌ پێشه‌ له‌ ئه‌ندامانی په‌رله‌مان. فاكته‌ری هه‌ره‌ گرنگ، له‌ په‌رله‌مان و له‌ناو ميديا، بريتيه‌ له‌ په‌يوه‌ندی شه‌خسی تايبه‌ت به‌تێن له‌گه‌ڵ بڕيارده‌ره‌كان‌. كه‌واته كادری ئاكتيڤی ناو په‌رله‌مانی خاوه‌ن قه‌زيه‌، ده‌بێ زمانزان و لێهاتو و ديپلۆماسی بێ، و زوو شاره‌زايی له‌ سيسته‌می په‌رله‌مان و چۆنێتی بڕيار و حوكمڕانی و كار وه‌رسوڕاندن و هه‌لس و كه‌وتی ئه‌ندامان په‌يدا بكات.

له‌ سه‌ره‌وه‌دا باسمان كرد كه‌ ئۆپۆزيسيۆنی په‌رله‌مان باشترين كڕياره‌ بۆ كه‌رسته‌ی خاومان. بێگومان ئه‌وه‌ش وا ناگه‌يه‌نێ كه‌ ئه‌ندامی په‌رله‌مانی لايه‌نی حكومه‌ت كڕيار نين. به‌ڵكو ڕه‌نگه‌ كڕياری كاريگه‌رتريش بن، هه‌تا ئه‌گه‌ر له‌ ئاستێكی نزميش بن. هه‌موو ئه‌ندامێكی په‌رله‌مان، له‌ گه‌وره‌وه‌ تا بچوكيان، گرنگن. پێويسته‌ كادری ناو په‌رله‌مان بێ وچان په‌يوه‌ندی به‌ گشت ئه‌ندامه‌كانه‌وه‌ بكات و مه‌سه‌له‌كه‌يان بۆ ڕوون بكاته‌وه‌ و په‌يوه‌ندی شه‌خسييان له‌گه‌ڵدا ببه‌ستێ، چونكه‌ هه‌تا ئه‌گه‌ر ئه‌ندامێكی په‌رله‌مان حه‌زی به‌ به‌شداری جموجۆڵی كورديش نه‌كرد، ئه‌وا هيچ نه‌بێ له‌ زمانی ئێمه‌وه‌ ئاگاداری ڕووداوه‌كان‌ ده‌بێ و له‌ كاتی تووش بوونی بابه‌تێك يان كاتی ده‌نگ دان يان كۆكردنه‌وه‌ی ئيمزا، ئه‌وا زه‌مينه‌يه‌كی هه‌يه‌ له‌م باره‌يه‌وه‌.

له‌ په‌رله‌مانی به‌ريتانی، بۆ نمونه‌، نزيكه‌ی ٦٥٠ ئه‌ندامی په‌رله‌مان و ١٢٠٠ لۆرد هه‌ن. گه‌ر كاديری ناو په‌رله‌مان ه‌‌ر ڕۆژه‌ی ئه‌ندامێك ببينێ و په‌يوه‌ندی پێوه‌ بكات، واته‌ هه‌فته‌ی پێنج ئه‌ندام، ئه‌وا نزيكه‌ی حه‌وت ساڵی ده‌وێت تا هه‌موويان ده‌بينێ. كه‌واته‌ كاری ناو په‌رله‌مان مه‌زن و قورسه‌ و كه‌مپه‌ينێكی پڕ ئه‌رك و به‌رده‌وامی ده‌وێ. بۆيه‌ش شاره‌زايی و ئه‌زمون بۆ كادری ناو په‌رله‌مان زۆر گرنگن، نه‌ك ته‌نها بۆ تێگه‌يشتنی سيسته‌می په‌رله‌مان، به‌لكو بۆ تێگه‌يشتنی جۆری بيركردنه‌وه‌ی هه‌ر ئه‌ندامێكی په‌رله‌مانيش. بۆ خاتری نه‌فه‌وتانی ئه‌زمون و شاره‌زايی كادر و گواستنه‌وه‌ له‌ نێو نه‌وه‌كاندا، زۆر گرنگه‌ كه‌ پوخته‌ی كاری ڕۆژانه‌ی كادر و ئه‌نجامی چاو پێكه‌وتنه‌كان هه‌مووی بنوسرێته‌وه‌ و بپارێزرێت.

ئه‌ندام په‌رله‌مان و زانياريه‌كان

ئه‌ندامی په‌رله‌مانی هه‌ر وڵاتێك‌ له‌ زۆر ڕێگه‌وه‌ ده‌توانی زانياريه‌كانمان به‌كار بهێنێ. بۆ نمونه‌، شێوه‌ گرنگه‌ كلاسيكيه‌كانی په‌رله‌مانی به‌ريتانی ئه‌مانه‌ن: پرسياری په‌رله‌مانی ،(Parliamentary Questions)كۆكردنه‌وه‌ی ئيمزای ئه‌ندامان بۆ بڕياردان (Early Day Motion)، سيمينار و كۆبوونه‌وه (Parliamentary meeting)‌، پێشنيار و قه‌راردان (Resolution) ..هتد. جا ده‌بێ كادری لۆبيكه‌ری ناو په‌رله‌مان ئه‌و كارانه‌ بۆ ئه‌ندامی په‌رله‌مان ئاسان بكات و يارمه‌تی بدات.

په‌يوه‌ندی كردن به‌ ئه‌ندامی په‌رله‌مان له‌ زۆر ڕێگه‌وه‌ ده‌كرێ. به‌ڵام له‌ هه‌مويان گرنگتر، كه‌ تاكو ئێستا خراوه‌ته‌ پشت گوێ و كورد به‌ چاكی به‌كاری نه‌هێناوه‌، بريتيه‌ له‌ په‌يوه‌ندی كردن به‌ ئه‌ندام په‌رله‌مانه‌كان له‌ هه‌ڵبژارگه‌كان (ناوچه‌ی هه‌ڵبژاردنه‌كان، Constituency- المنطقه‌ الانتخابيه‌). ئه‌وه‌يان شێوه‌يه‌كی كاريگه‌ره‌، به‌ هۆی كوردێك يان دۆستێكی كوردی نيشته‌جێی ناوچه‌ی ئه‌و ئه‌ندامه‌، ده‌توانرێ "داوا" له‌ ئه‌ندام په‌رله‌مانه‌كه‌ بكرێ كه‌ به‌ كارێكی دياريكراو هه‌ڵبستێ. ئه‌وه‌ داوايه‌ پاڕانه‌وه‌ نيه، به‌ڵكو جۆره‌ فه‌رمان (ئه‌مر)ێكه‌ و به‌ گوێره‌ی ده‌ستوری ديموكراسی ده‌بێته‌ ئه‌ركی سه‌رشانی ئه‌و ئه‌دنامی په‌رله‌مانه‌ كه‌ پێی هه‌لبستێ.

كادری ناو په‌رله‌مان ده‌توانێ ڕۆڵی كارگێڕ و هه‌ڵسوڕێنه‌ر و ڕێكخه‌ری ئه‌و جۆره په‌يوه‌نديانه‌ ببينێ. ده‌توانێ نامه‌يه‌كی ستانده‌رد (standard) و كورت و پڕمانا دابڕێژێ، و ده‌يان كۆپی لێ ده‌ر بكات و بۆ كورد و دۆسته‌كانی كوردی ناوچه‌ هه‌ڵبژارگه‌ په‌رله‌مانيه‌ جياجياكانی ‌ سه‌رانسه‌ری وڵاته‌كه‌ بنێری. نيشته‌جێی ناوچه‌ی هه‌لبژاردنه‌كه‌ (كورده‌كه‌ يان دۆسته‌كه‌) ته‌نيا به‌ دوو كاری ئاسان هه‌ڵده‌ستێ: يه‌كه‌ميان: ته‌له‌فۆنێك بۆ به‌له‌ديه‌ی (Town Hall) ناوچه‌كه ده‌كات، ناوی ئه‌ندامانی په‌رله‌مانه‌كه‌ی به‌ ناونيشانه‌وه‌ وه‌رده‌گرێت. دووه‌ميان: ناو و ناونيشانی ئه‌ندامی په‌رله‌مانه‌كه‌ ده‌خاته‌ سه‌ر نامه‌ ستانده‌رده‌كه‌ی كادره‌كه‌ و ده‌يخاته‌ پۆسته‌وه‌. خۆ ئه‌گه‌ر نيشته‌جێيه‌كه‌ بۆی كرا، ده‌توانێ له‌ نوسينگه‌ی ناوچه‌كه‌ی (surgery) چاوی به‌ ئه‌ندامی په‌رله‌مانه‌كه‌ بكه‌وێ، و به‌وه‌ ئيشه‌كه‌ی كاريگه‌رتريش ده‌بێ. به‌م جۆره‌ ئه‌ندامی په‌رله‌مانه‌كه‌ ناچار ده‌بێ ئه‌ركه‌كه‌ی جێبه‌جێ بكانت و وه‌ڵامی داواكه‌ی بداته‌وه‌. خۆ ئه‌گه‌ر ئه‌ندامی په‌رله‌مانه‌كه‌ له‌ حكومه‌ت دا بوو، وه‌ پايه‌يه‌كی به‌رزيشی هه‌بوو (بۆ نموونه‌ وه‌زير وه‌يان جێگری وه‌زير)، ئه‌وا وه‌ڵامه‌كه‌ی (به‌ نامه‌ يان به‌ ده‌م) وه‌ك ده‌ربڕينی ڕای حكومه‌ته‌ و ده‌توانرێت سوودی لێ وه‌ر بگيرێت و بگه‌يه‌نرێت به‌ ئۆپۆزيسيۆن، يان ميديا و هه‌نده‌ی تر كاری به‌ دوادا بێت و چيڕۆكی لێ دروست بكرێت.

كادری په‌رله‌مان ده‌توانێ نامه‌يه‌كی شه‌خسی بنێرێ بۆ يه‌كێك له‌ وه‌زيره‌كان و داوای ڕوون كردنه‌وه‌ی هه‌لۆێستی حكومه‌تی لێ بكات وه‌ يان داوای جوڵه‌ی لێ بكات. هه‌ر وه‌ڵامێكی كه‌ ده‌ستی ده‌كه‌وێ، ئه‌وا ديسان به‌واتا هه‌لوێستی ڕه‌سمی حكومه‌ته‌. به‌ هه‌مان جۆريش هه‌لوێستی حزبه‌كانی تر و وه‌زيره‌كانی سێبه‌ر (Shadow Minister) وه‌رده‌گيرێت.

كه‌واته‌، كادری ناو په‌رله‌مان، نه‌ك ته‌نيا نابێت به‌ته‌نيا بێ له‌ كار كردن، به‌ڵكو به‌ هۆی بنكه‌وه‌ ده‌بێ په‌يوه‌ندی به‌ خه‌ڵك و دۆست و ڕێكخراوه‌ ناپه‌رله‌مانی و په‌رله‌مانی و ئه‌ندامانی په‌رله‌مان و خه‌ڵكی ناو حكومه‌تان و هه‌روه‌ها بنكه‌كانی تری كورد له‌ وڵاتانی تره‌وه‌ هه‌بێ. واته‌ بنكه‌ وه‌ك كۆمپانيايه‌كه، به‌ تۆڕێكی تێك هه‌لچووی تێك هه‌لكێشراوی ڕێك و پێك، كادريش وه‌ك داينه‌مۆ و ناوه‌رۆكێكی بنه‌ڕه‌تيی ، هه‌موو لايه‌نه‌كان به‌يه‌كه‌وه‌ ده‌به‌ستێته‌وه‌ و ڕۆلی زيندووی تيادا ببينێ. كاتی ڕووداو يان كاره‌سات، هه‌موو تۆڕه‌كه‌ ده‌خاته‌ جوله‌ و هه‌ژان. ئه‌وه‌يش گرنگی و ڕۆلی كادرو بوونی بنكه‌ ده‌رده‌خات.

نموونه‌يه‌كی تری كاری تێكڕای ڕێك و پێك (العمل المنسق) له‌ نێو بنكه‌ جياجياكانی وڵاتدا، كار كردنه‌ له‌ په‌رله‌مانی ئه‌وروپی و كاونسلی ئه‌وروپا (Council of Europe and European Parliament). ده‌بێ هه‌ر بنكه‌يه‌كی لۆبی كوردی ئه‌ندام په‌رله‌مانی ئه‌وروپی (MEP) وڵاته‌كه‌ی به‌گه‌ڕ بێنێ و هه‌مان جۆره‌ زانياری بداتێ، و موتابه‌عه‌ی جموجۆڵه‌كانی هه‌موو لايه‌نێك به‌ كاريگه‌ريانه‌ بكات. گرنگی كاركردن له‌ ناو په‌رله‌مانی ئه‌وروپێ دا له‌ دوای ١۹۹٢دا زياتريش ده‌بێ.

پاره‌ كۆكردنه‌وه‌

ئه‌وه‌ گرنگترين بابه‌ته‌. هيچ كارێك و هيچ كارگه‌يه‌ك و هيچ ڕێكخراوێك به‌ بێ سه‌رمايه‌كی باش ده‌ست به‌ كاری كاريگه‌ر ناكات. به‌لام كه‌ خوله‌ی كار كه‌وته‌ خولانه‌وه‌، ئيتر په‌يدا كردنی سه‌رمايه‌ ئاسانتر ده‌بێ، وه‌ ڕه‌نگه‌ بتوانرێ بايی خۆ به‌ڕێوه‌ بردن په‌يدا بكرێ. بۆ نموونه‌، له‌ سه‌ره‌تای دروست بوونيه‌وه‌، ڕێكخراوی (كۆمه‌ڵه‌ی زانستی و پزيشكی كورد – Kurdish Scientific and Medical Association) به‌ حاڵ به‌ هۆی ئابونه‌ی ئه‌ندامان به‌ڕێوه‌ ده‌چوو، كه‌چی ئێستا گيرو گرفتی پاره‌ی نه‌ماوه‌.

په‌يوه‌ندی جۆرواجۆره‌كانی بنكه‌ی لۆبیكردن، سه‌رچاوه‌يه‌كن‌ بۆ پاره‌ په‌يدا كردن. له‌ڕێی ئه‌زمونی پاره‌ په‌يدا كردن بۆ قوتابيانی زانكۆ و بۆ ڕێكخراوی كۆمه‌ڵه‌ی زانستی و پزيشكی كورد، هه‌ندێ ده‌رگا شاره‌زا بووين. به‌ڵام بێگومان ڕێ و شوێن و ده‌رگای پاره‌ په‌يدا كردن بۆ ڕێكخراوێكی سياسی جياوازه‌ له‌وانه‌، و ڕه‌نگه‌ زه‌حمه‌تتريشه‌. بۆ به‌رێوه‌ چوونی بنكه، سه‌رچاوه‌ی پاره زۆر جۆره‌، بۆ نمونه‌:

أ‌- ئه‌ندامان: ئه‌گه‌ر خه‌ڵكی كورد و دۆستی كورد بڕوا بده‌نه‌ بنكه‌ وه‌ك نوێنه‌رێكی شه‌رعی كورد، و كاری زه‌ق و باشی پێوه‌ ببينن، ئه‌و بێگومان دوو دڵی له‌ يارمه‌تيدانی ناكه‌ن.
ب‌- ڕێكخراوه‌ دۆسته‌كان ده‌توانن يارمه‌تی وای بنكه‌ بده‌ن كه‌ خه‌رجی قورسی له‌كۆڵ بكه‌نه‌وه‌. بۆ نموونه‌ له‌ ڕێی كارئاسانی بۆ بڵاوكردنه‌وه‌ و پڕۆپاگه‌نده و پۆست و دۆزينه‌وه‌ی خه‌ڵك و پيتاك و زۆر شتی تر.
ج‌- ڕێكخراوه‌ خێرخوازه‌كان: بێگومان له‌ نێو ئه‌و هه‌زاران ڕێكخراوه‌ خێرخوازه‌ جياجيايانه‌ی وڵاتانی ڕۆژ ئاوا، چه‌ند دانه‌يه‌ك لايه‌نگری وا په‌يدا ده‌كرێن كه‌ ده‌‌ستووره‌كانيان ڕێگه‌ی يارمه‌تيدانی قه‌زيه‌ی وه‌ك هی ئێمه‌ بده‌ن. كادری پاره‌ په‌يدا كردن ده‌توانێ ڕاپۆڕت و نامه‌ی داواكاری ئه‌وتۆ دابڕێژێ كه‌ له‌گه‌ڵ ده‌ستووری ئه‌و ڕێكخراواه‌ خێرخوازانه‌ بگونجێ. ئه‌وه‌ش ده‌كه‌وێته‌ سه‌ر شاره‌زايی و لێزانيی و لێكۆڵينه‌وه‌ جيدديه‌كانی كادره‌كه‌. زۆربه‌ی ڕێكخراوه‌ خه‌يريه‌كان يارمه‌تی كاروباری سياسی ناده‌ن به‌ڵام ڕاپۆڕتی كادر و شێوه‌ی داڕشتنی نامه‌كانی، ڕه‌نگه‌ بتوانێ ئه‌و گيروگرفتانه‌ چاره‌سه‌ر بكات.
ح‌- په‌رله‌مان و كۆميته‌كانی په‌رله‌مان: زۆر جار ئه‌ندامی په‌رله‌مان يان كۆميته‌يه‌كی په‌رله‌مان به‌ كاری گرنگ هه‌لده‌ستن به‌بێ ئه‌وه‌ی پاره‌یان تێ بچێ، يان خۆیان پاره‌یان بۆ ده‌دۆزێته‌وه‌ به‌ هۆی په‌يوه‌ندی تايبه‌تی خۆیان و به‌ هۆی ناوبانگ و سومعه‌يان.
خ‌- حكومه‌ته‌كان: به‌ تايبه‌تی حكومه‌ته‌ سۆشياليست و سۆشيال ديموكراته‌كان به‌ زۆر كار هه‌ڵده‌ستن، و كارئاسانی ماددی بۆ لايه‌نی لۆجيستی (ڕێگاوبان و خه‌رجی كۆنگره‌ و شتی تر)ن ده‌كه‌ن و خه‌رجی له‌سه‌ر كورد كه‌م ده‌كه‌نه‌وه‌.
د‌- سه‌رچاوه‌ی هه‌مه‌جۆری تر: بۆ نمونه‌، كه‌نيسه‌ و ده‌زگاكانی به‌له‌ديه‌ی ناوچه‌كان، پارت و ڕێكخراوه‌ كوردی و ناكورديه‌ دۆسته‌كان، كار و پڕۆژه‌ی بازرگانی به‌ سه‌رپه‌رشتی هه‌ڵسوڕاندنی بنكه‌، يان سليفه‌ی بانك و...هتد. كۆمپانيای جياجيا وه‌ك ڕاديۆ و ته‌له‌فزيۆنيش سه‌رچاوه‌يه‌كن، كه‌ گرانت (منحه‌)ی تايبه‌ت ده‌ده‌ن بۆ ناردنی ڕۆژنامه‌گه‌ری سه‌ربه‌ست (Free-lance journalists) بۆ ئه‌نجام دانی كاری جياجيا، بۆ لێكۆڵينه‌وه‌ له‌ رووداوی گرنگ. خه‌رجی ڕێگاوبان و خواردنيان ده‌ده‌ن يان له‌ كۆتاييدا به‌رهه‌مه‌كانيان لێ ده‌كڕن.

ئيتر ئه‌وانه‌ و چه‌ندين ڕێگا و ده‌رگا و شێوازی تر هه‌ن كه‌ ڕه‌نگه‌ بيرم بۆيان نه‌چووبێت و كادری بنكه‌ له‌ ڕێگای خه‌باتی ڕۆژانه‌ييه‌وه‌ شاره‌زايان ده‌بێت. ئه‌و سه‌رچاوانه‌ی كه‌ پاره‌ نه‌بن، ئه‌وا يارمه‌تيده‌رن، يارمه‌تيه‌كانيشيان خۆی له‌ خۆیدا ده‌ستكه‌وتێكی كه‌مپه‌ينه‌ له‌ ڕووی ڕاگه‌ياندنه‌وه‌، يان له‌ روی مه‌عنه‌ويه‌وه‌.

لێره‌دا كۆتايی به‌و شێ كردنه‌وه‌ كورته‌ دێنم، به‌ ئومێدی به‌رپا كردنی لێكۆڵينه‌وه‌ و گفتوگۆ و به‌ئاواتی هه‌نگاونان بۆ خستنه‌كاری خاڵه‌كانيانه‌وه‌. هه‌روه‌ها به‌ هيوای بيستنه‌وه‌ی ڕا و بۆچوون و ڕه‌خنه‌ی ڕۆشنبير و خه‌ڵكی خاوه‌ ڕا (خاوه‌ن ئيهتيمام) به‌و مه‌سه‌له‌يه‌، چی له‌ ڕێگه‌ی بڵاو كراوه‌ی جياجيا و چی له‌ ڕێگه‌ی دروست كردنی بازنه‌ی بچوك بچوكی ئاڵۆگۆڕی فيكريه‌وه‌ و خڕ كردنه‌وه‌ و ته‌ركيز كردنی بابه‌ته‌كانی كۆڕی باس له‌سه‌ر خاڵه‌ گرنگه‌كانی په‌يوه‌ند به‌ دوا ڕۆژ و ڕێگه‌ی خه‌بات

ئازاری ١۹۹٠.