Thursday, 22 January 2004

كركوك داخل أنبوب اختبار

كركوك داخل أنبوب اختبار

دلاور عبد العزيز علاء الدين

22 January 2004 ‌ الشرق الاوسط


يمر العراق، حالياً بمنعطف سياسي تاريخي لم يشهده منذ قرن، وربما ستحدد أحداث عام 2004 معالم الهيكل السياسي العراقي للقرن القادم وربما لما بعده.

في أوائل القرن الماضي، تمكن الملك فيصل الأول واعوانه من اقناع المستعمرين البريطانيين بضم منطقة كردستان الجنوبية ـ ذات الأغلبية السنية ـ الى وادي الرافدين ـ ذي الأغلبية الشيعية ـ حتى يتمكن من ترجيح كفة السنة العرب في الدولة العراقية حديثة التكوين. أما قادة الكرد وشيعة العراق، فقد وقفوا مكتوفي الايدي، انذاك واخفقوا في ممارسة دورهم، واللعب حسب قوانين الساعة، وراهنوا على أوراق خاسرة. هذا ما سمح لسنة العراق بالانفراد بالسلطة على مر العقود وحتى سقوط نظام صدام.

وفي اوائل القرن الحالي تغيرت قوانين اللعبة: «قلبت حرب امريكا على الارهاب الموازين رأساً على عقب. وبعد انهيار نظام صدام، بات الكرد وشيعة العراق أكثر اللاعبين بروزاً ، وبدوا وكأنهم يكسبون الجولة ـ في حين لعب سنة العراق اوراقاً خاسرة منذ رحيل صدام عن الساحة حيث باتوا بلا راع، ولم يظهر بينهم بديل مقبول. ويحاول بعض رجال الدين الذين تربوا في ظل النظام السابق الأخذ بزمام القيادة تحت شعارات غير واضحة تظهرهم غير قادرين على الالمام بقوانين اللعبة الجديدة.

أما رجال الدين الشيعة، خصوصا الذين تشردوا منهم خلال فترة حكم صدام وتراكمت لديهم الخبرة، فتصرفوا بحكمة، وظهروا كرجال دولة وقادة تعلموا من اخطاء الماضي ومن التجربة الايرانية الفاشلة، وتجلى ذلك في تكاتفهم مع العلمانيين، مسجلين سبقاً ميدانياً في رسم التحالفات واضحوا في وضع من يحدد الاجندة السياسية في البلاد.

أما قادة الكرد، الذين بدوا في الماضي كمن لا يستفيد من تجاربه المأساوية فظهروا فجأة متفقين كقوة واحدة، وكانوا سباقين للتنبؤ بالمتغيرات، وتمكنوا من اقناع الحلفاء بأنهم عراقيون وحدويون، وان وجود كيانهم الاداري لا يشكل خطراً على وحدة البلد، أو أمن المنطقة أو مصالح الغرب اجمالاً. هذا خلاف ما كان يخطط له صدام، الذي استخدم هذا الخطر الوهمي كحجة لكسب الدعم الغربي والشرقي لنظامه. وكثيراً ما كنت اتساءل فيما اذا كانت الادارتان الامريكية والبريطانية غافلتين عن هذه الحقيقة، ومما زاد قناعتي في هذا الشك هو استمرار الادارتين في دعم صدام حتى في ايام حلبجة واثناء عملية «الانفال» التي راح ضحيتها مئات الآلاف من المدنيين الاكراد. وزاد من قناعتي أكثر حين سنحت لي الفرصة بسؤال ماركريت تاتشر، رئيسة الوزراء البريطانية السابقة، في نيسان 1991، حين التقيتها على رأس وفد كردي طالباً منها التدخل لدى جورج بوش (الأب) وجون ميجر (رئيس الوزراء البريطاني حينها) لانقاذ مليوني كردي محاصر على الحدود الايرانية والتركية، بعد فشل الانتفاضة الشعبية في العراق. حاولت تطمينها بأن ما اطلبه هو انساني بحت ولا ابعاد سياسية له. سألتني تاتشر عن حقيقة نوايا ومطالب الساسة الأكراد. وقلت لها بأن الأكراد واقعيون في مطالبهم، ولولا قساوة الأنظمة المركزية، لكان واضحاً للعيان بأن «ولاء الكردي للعراق لا يختلف عن ولاء الاسكتلندي لبريطانيا». ضحكت ثاتشر لهذه المقارنة، وقالت «لم أفكر بمثل هذه المقارنة وهذا شيء جيد». أما انا فكنت مندهشا لفكرتها الناقصة عن الكرد والشيعة في العراق. ولحسن حظنا فقد اقتنعت ثاتشر، وبادرت على الفور بالاتصال بجورج بوش الذي كان يقضي عطلة عيد الفصح في ممارسة هوايته في صيد السمك، في حين كان جون ميجر منشغلاً بمشاهدة مباريات فريقه المفضل «تشلسي». وأدى تدخل ثاتشر إلى انشاء المنطقة الآمنة في شمال العراق، واعادة الكرد الى ديارهم واقامة البرلمان المنتخب والحكومة الكردية الأولى في العراق في 1992. والسؤال هنا: هل من الممكن لقادة الكرد ان يبرهنوا ما كنا ادعيناه امام ثاتشر والذي كان يخفيه صدام؟

وهل يمكن للكرد ان يقيموا اقليماً كردياً ديمقراطياً يقتدى به، من حيث تعايش الاقليات بسلام في سائر العراق والمنطقة؟ وهل يمكن للكرد ان يقودوا ما يمكن ان يؤدي الى ان يصبح العراق ديمقراطياً فيدرالياً مؤسساتياً للمستقبل؟

في آيار/ مايو 2003 كنت بصحبة هوشيار زيباري (وزير الخارجية العراقي الحالي) في فندق قصر السندباد في بغداد حيث كنا نسترجع ذكريات ايام حلبجة والأيام التي قضيناها سوية في التظاهر أمام السفارة العراقية واللوبي في ممرات المؤسسات الديمقراطية البريطانية لفضح نظام صدام. حينها قال لي زيباري: «من كان يصدق ان تتغير الاحداث بهذه السرعة، وان نتلاقى في بغداد على انقاض الدكتاتور الذي كان لا يقهر». فطرحت عليه تساؤلاتي متمنياً ان يكون الزعماء الكرد اهلاً لثقة كل العراقيين.

وعبرت عن قلقي من امكانية الحزبين الكرديين (الحزب الديمقراطي الكردستاني بزعامة البرازاني والاتحاد الوطني الكردستاني بزعامة الطالباني) على تحقيق التعاون في كردستان وفي بغداد. كان زيباري متفائلاً، لكنه تفهم قلقي النابع من التاريخ الحديث. فالتعايش الديمقراطي في التجربة الكردية لم يدم إلا سنتين ونيفاً (1992 ـ 1994) حتى اشتد التناحر العدائي بينهما وصار فريسة سهلة لصدام ودول الجوار. وما لبث ان اندلع الاقتتال الاخوي ليضع التجربة الديمقراطية على حافة الفشل. كانت نتيجة القتال ان راح آلاف الأكراد ضحايا وتشرد مئات الألوف، وعانت الاقليات الكردستانية بدورها من جراء ذلك. وفي النهاية انقسم الاقليم الكردستاني الى شطرين، وانفرد كل حزب بإدارة احد الشطرين الى ان اعتذر الزعيمان الكرديان علناً أمام البرلمان الكردي في اربيل في العام المنصرم.
تأسيساً على ما سبق، تقف التجربة الكردية الآن أمام منعطفات حاسمة، يقع في مقدمها توحيد الادارتين وقيام مجتمع ديمقراطي فدرالي، بالرغم من قناعتي، حتى وقت قريب بعدم تفضيل هذا التوحيد خوفاً على اعادة كرة المناصفة والتناحر الداخلي في ساحة اللعب مجدداً. لكن آن الاوان لتأسيس نظام تعددي في الاقليم الفدرالي حتى يرى العالم بأن الديمقراطية ليست مخلوقاً غريباً مفروضاً على العراقيين أو المجتمع الاسلامي. وان وحدة الادارتين الكرديتين تصب في مصلحة العراق العليا، وعلى مجلس الحكم ان يطالب بها. فوحدة الخطاب الكردي كانت كافية لابعاد شبح تدخل الجيش التركي في العراق ككل ووحدة الاكراد ستبعد شبح الحرب الاهلية في كركوك والمدن الاخرى ذات التعقيدات الديموغرافية. وبوسعي القول ان كركوك الآن تشكل انبوب الاختبار الديمقراطي. ان تهيئة المناخ الديمقراطي في هذه المدينة كفيل بكسب غالبية المجتمعات فيها، وهذا يستدعي ايجاد آليات ومؤسسات تضمن الحقوق الثقافية والقومية للتركمان والعرب والمسيحيين فيها. وهي افضل ضمان لاسكات المتطرفين بينهم، ولمنع التدخل الاجنبي، عندئذ يرى التركماني بأن العيش تحت مظلة الادارة الفدرالية الكردية حالة طبيعية ومفضلة وليس العكس.

لذلك على الكرد ترتيب البيت الكردستاني بالغ التعقيد. وان يقدموا الأمثلة كما يتمنونها للآخرين حتى يستحقوا قيادة قطار الديمقراطية في العراق كله.

Saturday, 1 November 2003

Surviving Saddam


BMJ 2003;327:s173 (29 November), doi:10.1136/bmj.327.7426.s173

Published in BMJ Careers at bmjcareers.com
Also in
studentBMJ 2003;11:393-436 November ISSN 0966-6494

career focus

PROFILE

Surviving Saddam

Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, professor of clinical microbiology at Nottingham University, thinks that doctors are better placed than politicians to help make the world a better place. Rusheng Chew speaks to a man whose commitment to human rights is the main priority in his personal and professional life

To all extents, Dlawer (Del) Ala'Aldeen looks like your typical academic: unassuming, keen on his research, and with a string of letters after his name. However, there is more than meets the eye to this 42 year old professor of clinical microbiology at Nottingham University, as I was soon to find out.

Del is an Iraqi Kurd. To many of us, this may not mean much. However, to him, it is the reason for many of the major choices he has had to make. To put this in its proper context, until not so long ago the (now deposed) president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was engaged in "systematic genocide of the Kurdish people, as well as wanton denials of human rights in Iraq," as Del puts it.

Compulsory military service was a fact of life for Iraqi youth. Back in 1983, this meant only two choices for the newly graduated doctor from the University of Al-Mustansiryia: "Either I joined the army, in which case I would have had to fight against my own people, or I left." Del chose the latter—but it wasn't all that easy to leave, naturally. He tells me that he had to leave Iraq through the mountains on the Kurdish-Iranian border using smugglers' routes—without his family. Once out of Iraq, he made his way to the United Kingdom, where the rest of his family who made it out gradually joined him.

I ask him why he chose medicine. "Medicine? It was something that I always knew I wanted to do—it is top of the professions as far as humanitarian reasons are concerned." And what about microbiology then? With a smile, Del replies: "I was drawn to microbiology by fate." He goes on to explain: "I wanted to go back to Iraq, especially Kurdistan, and help rebuild it once Saddam was overthrown—who would have known he would be in power for so long? So initially I wanted to specialise in infectious diseases, as over 70% of patients in Iraq suffer from some form of infection. But the academic side of things was being grossly neglected, and I figured that there was a greater impact to be made if I did academic clinical microbiology instead." Additionally, Del is much more interested in teaching and research than clinical work, and he felt that microbiology offered something with a bias towards the former while not neglecting the latter.

But as committed as Del is to microbiology, in which he trained in the United Kingdom, he is even more passionate about his work for the Kurdish cause, especially where human rights and chemical and biological weapons are concerned. This is hardly surprising, given that Del has had experience of discrimination against Kurds in Iraq and that his parents and siblings were survivors of attacks with mustard gas and other chemical agents. To this end, he was the founding secretary in 1988 (and chairman from 1992 to 2002) of the British based Kurdish Scientific and Medical Association (KSMA), an organisation that, among others, aims to "enhance medical and scientific cooperation between Kurdistan and the UK." Its activities include seminars and lectures, and it is instrumental in getting academics in the United Kingdom to act as external examiners for the three medical schools in Iraqi Kurdistan. The KSMA also solicits donations of books and equipment. "The Kurds always had the potential—it was just not developed under Saddam," he tells me. Del has no regrets at being involved in fighting for the Kurds, even though it was dangerous going against the Saddam regime. He says pointedly: "I have no regrets about fighting Saddam Hussein or tyrants like him."
I have no regrets about fighting Saddam Hussein or tyrants like him

The KSMA has been effective in promoting the causes Del is concerned with. For example, realising the power of the media, he has given media interviews and has publicly lobbied parliament and 10 Downing Street on the Kurdish issue, as well as that of chemical and biological weapons. In 1991, during the Gulf war, Del met the former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher to ask for her help in pushing for British support for the Kurds. This resulted in £20m ($33m, €28m) of aid for them and the creation of a safe haven, which lasted till the 2003 war. Del is modest about his achievements, however. To my suggestion that he is a hero to the Kurds, he replies: "I did my part, and everyone else did theirs; it was this that brought about success."

Del is also involved in work outside the KSMA. He was appointed to the British working party on chemical and biological weapons, which works towards disarmament. In June 2003 ("two weeks after the toppling of Saddam's statue") he went back to Baghdad to work with the charity Save the Children, focusing in particular on the understaffed paediatric hospital. Naturally the city, and indeed all of Iraq, was short of drugs and supplies, and so instead of being directly concerned with patient care, Del took on a coordinating role, concentrating on "enhancing [the] capability [of the health services], and suggesting projects to help in [its] reconstruction and modernisation." Still, he thinks he could have done more, the only constraint being the time he would have had to spend in Iraq. How did he feel, going to a place that was literally a war zone? "I was prepared for the risks," he says, adding, "What brought me back was greater than what could have kicked me out again." He tells me in no uncertain terms how liberating it felt to be back in the city of his youth, "now that the atmosphere of fear and terror is gone."

In his (obviously limited) free time, Del makes sure to spend time with his family: "I look after a young family [he has a wife and three children] and sizeable garden, as well as my ageing parents. I keep in touch with them and my siblings, who are very supportive of what I do." Besides that, he socialises a lot with friends. Writing—in Kurdish, English, or Arabic (he also knows a little Persian and Turkish)—for various journals and participating in KSMA activities (Del is still actively involved even though he has given up the chair) occupy the rest of his leisure time. I ask Del how he manages to have a life outside his work—perhaps he might have some useful tips—and he replies: "With difficulty. I have a very supportive wife, who is also Kurdish, and try to organise my time well, but it's not always easy."

Ever the activist, Del has these words of advice for medics: "Stand up to human rights abuses anywhere in the world; as medics we can do more than politicians to make the world a better place. As doctors, we have the right to push politicians for improved health services for people in other countries, and this gives us the best angle, and moral high ground, for lobbying."


Rusheng Chew, third year medical student

University of Nottingham, Nottingham


Friday, 26 October 2001

Bioterrorism and the New World Order

Out of the ashes of anthrax rises the future world order

Dr Dlawer Ala'Aldeen PhD MRCPath:
Consultant Microbiologist
Chairman, Kurdish Scientific and Medical Association

Published in www.Kurdishmedia.com on 26 October, 2001.

The long dreaded bio-terror is a reality now, infecting the heart of business and democracy, and is now moving between continents. For the second time in a decade, the United States and United Kingdom find themselves cutting strange deals to rally friends and foes to protect yet another fragile coalition. In the process, the leaders of freedom-loving countries are forced to compromise on the very basic principles of human rights and “foreign policy with human face”. There is nothing new in this, but could it be the start of a new era, the spark of a new world order?

Agents of bioterror: Almost any infective agent, that can damage humans can be considered a potential bioweapon. It is interesting that the list of agents stockpiled by the Russians and Americans includes agents as ineffective as typhus, Q-fever and brucella which are not fatal in the modern era of antibiotics and include crop damaging agents such as wheat stem rust and rice blast that will not affect humans. Iraqi bioweapon programme also included animal agents such as Camel pox.

Of the endless list of possible agents, which are invariably either bacteria or viruses, only anthrax, plague, small pox and botulinum toxin are thought to be likely agents to be used by terrorists. Of these, anthrax is probably the most serious bioterror agent because it needs the simplest of manufacturing infrastructure and is most durable and suitable for many forms of delivery, including, as we have seen, by mail. However, like most chemical and biological weapons (CBWs), anthrax is largely a horror agent. In the modern era most biological agents are now poor weapons in battle zones because soldiers are trained to fight in chemical and biological protection suits, and are usually vaccinated against the bacterium. The question therefore is why then are member states of the United Nations obsessed with producing and stockpiling them? What is the anthrax agent? Anthrax is caused by a bacterium called Bacillus anthracis. Under the microscope it is rod shaped and, when stained with a special dye (Gram stain), it has the distinctive look of a match box. The bacterium grows fast in the presence of plenty of nutrition, such as in-vivo in humans or in-vitro in laboratory culture media. This is the vegetative form. When the organism runs out of food, or faces a harsh physiological environment, it reduces its biological activity to absolute minimum. It forms a rigid capsule around its DNA and essential enzymes and brings life to almost total standstill. This capsulated form of the bug is called the “spore”. Sporulation is not only a key to survival, but also to transportation and dissemination. Spores are tinny, easily air-born and can remain viable in the for decades in the soil until transmitted to a nutritious environment again, such as mammalian body. Anthrax is primarily the disease of herbivore animal who would ingest soil-contaminated vegetables and develop intestinal anthrax, followed by blood poisoning and death. Humans acquire from herbivores via contaminated animal products.

What is anthrax? Anthrax denotes the clinical conditions that arise from infection with B. anthracis. The word anthrax is derived from the Greek “anthrakis” (black), which is the colour of the classical postulating skin lesion, known as the “malignant pustule”. This form of anthrax is by far the most common, and the mildest, form of the disease and is an occupational health problem. Now extremely rare in UK and USA, is an occupational health problem. affecting the exposed parts of the body in those who handle infected animals or their products (e.g. meat, wool, goat-hair).

The skin form of anthrax is the most likely one to be acquired from mail-delivered spores and is treatable with antibiotics. In the absence of treatment, cutaneous anthrax can become complicated and develop into fatal blood poisoning.. Another form of anthrax is the intestinal one, acquired via ingestion of contaminated animal products and may be fatal. This is even rarer in the UK than the skin form and is most unlikely to be acquired from the envelope delivered spores.

In contrast, the more severe form of the disease is the inhalational (pulmonary) anthrax, which is almost 90% fatal, unless aborted at the incubation period or treated at the early prodromal phase (when the first flu-like signs and symptoms start appearing). Here, air-borne spores are inhaled, reach the lungs and are transported via to middle part of the chest (mediastinal lymph nodes), where they germinate. The period between inhalation and germination could be as short as a couple of days or as long as 60 days or more (hence the recommended period of antibiotic prophylaxis). After germination, the organism grows exponentially and within a few days manifest itself as full-blown pulmonary anthrax.

Replicating bacteria release powerful toxins (poisons) that cause swelling, haemorrhage and cell death in the infected tissues (hence the black colour and the name anthrakis). The number of inhaled spores sufficient to kill a person is any thing between a few thousands to a few tens of thousands, depending on the victims health status.

Can terrorists prepare anthrax spores:

The Japanese group of Aum Shinrikyo sect, which consisted of skilled medics and scientists, produced and disseminated (unsuccessfully) anthrax spores in Japan. An anthrax-vaccinated terrorist with basic microbiology skills can easily manufacture quantities of anthrax spores from local animal isolates. There is no shortage of bacterial isolates in endemic areas, such as Africa and Middle East. The essential tools and elements can be found in a domestic kitchen. Concentrates anthrax cultures can just as easily reduced to crude spore-enriched powders. However, production of refined, weapon-grade, spores that can be more efficiently aerosolised will require more sophisticated biotechnology infrastructure, which is unlikely to have been established by Al-Qaida’s in Afghanistan.

Can terrorists access established sources from UN member states? For a more than a decade, there has been major concerns about the fate of old Soviet stocks that were left unprotected. Many countries, and possibly terrorist groups, are thought to have attempted to take advantage of the power vacuum that immediately followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The latest USA anthrax isolates are unlikely to have originated from Soviet CBW plants, they are said to be sensitive to penicillin and doxycycline (the two first line antibiotics in naturally occurring anthrax). Russian scientists are known to have engineered strains resistant to these antibiotics. The latest American outbreak is thought to have originated from a single source and the strain is thought to be a derivative of the virulent “Ames strain” which is used by researchers around the world. This strain was first isolated in the 1950s from a dead animal in Ames, Iowa and has been passed around between researchers.

Iraq is another likely source of anthrax for the Al-Qaida terrorists who would have plenty in common with the regime in Baghdad. In an interview with the Al-Jazeera satellite channel in 1998, Bin Laden stressed, shockingly, that it is his religious duty to acquire CBWs. Mr Dick Cheney, US Vice-President, also admitted that Bin Laden has over the years tried to acquire CBWs, and the US Government have copies of the manuals that Al-Qaida have actually used to train people with respect to “how to deploy and use these kinds of substances”.

Mr Richard Butler, the latest UN’s Chief CBW inspector who inspected Iraq for several years in the 1990s, reported that Mohammad Atta (the senior hijacker who died in the first plane crash in New York) had met Iraqi officials in Prague in June 2001, when deadly presents could have changed hands. Mr Butler also emphasised that Iraq had rebuilt its CBW programme since the UN inspections were stopped a few years ago. Saddam is known to have had hidden undeclared CBW stocks in residential areas and in closely guarded ordinary graves in Baghdad cemeteries; indeed experts believe that no less than half of Iraq’s old stockpiles probably remain unaccounted for. Furthermore, Iraq is thought to have recently acquired gigantic bacteriological fermenters that are required for mass production of bacterial cultures.

Despite these, the US and UN Governments are reluctant to point fingers at Iraq or the Al-Qaida terrorists. This is probably because they are trying to protect the fragile coalition which includes the pro-Iraqi Russians, Chinese and Arab states. They are also attempting to avoid infuriating many Arabs and Muslims who have long been exploited by Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.

Can the terrorists deliver spores efficiently? The Aum Shinrikyo cult of Japan, who managed to poison Tokyo underground commuters with the nerve agent, sarin, failed to deliver anthrax successfully in and around the city, despite repeated attempts. The latest envelop-delivery method is the poorest of all methods one could think of. The worst that it can cause is the skin form of anthrax and rarely, but tragically, inhalational form. It is, however, a major publicity-attracting form that created panic, disrupted peoples social lives and will no doubt inflict further damage to the US economy. The nightmare scenario is if the terrorists were able to make the spores air-born and cause more inhalational anthrax in least suspecting populations. The terrorists were able to aerosolise anthrax in the ventilation system of US House of Representatives, but congressmen are not the least suspecting population.

Atta is known to have enquired about crop-dusting planes in Florida, not far from where the first case was discovered. His plan might have been to spray American cities with spores and cause inhalational anthrax . In 1972, WHO experts suggested that 50 Kg of anthrax spores, released from an aircraft over an urban population of five million would cause 250,000 cases of the disease. Another report estimated that releasing a cloud of 100 Kg of spores upwind of Washington DC could cause between 130,000 and 3m deaths. This explains why crop-dusting planes have all been grounded in the US. However, the biggest worry is the thought of the quantities of anthrax spores that Atta was planning to aerosolise. Surely, he must have been thinking about more than just a few envelope-loads. Worse, did he bring back any thing other than anthrax from Prague, e.g. nerve agents that Iraqi has used previously.

Should we be concerned? Our best defence in the West is clearly our knowledge combined with the current high state of alert. The police and health care workers have a higher index of suspicion, and in the UK we have always been well-placed to deal with deliberate CBW incidents and outbreaks, which are not that different from those occurring naturally or by accident. There are policies for outbreak-controls and contingency plans have been issued (now revised in the light of recent events) by the Department of Health. Our defence will be further strengthened by informing and reassuring our public, including the healthcare workers. Anthrax does not spread easily between people and remains susceptible to many antibiotics, and, in the UK at least, there will be no shortage of antibiotic supply. Vaccine supply will not be an issue as vaccination will only be considered for a selected few, including those whose job it is to search, identify and/or control outbreaks. By now, the British public have learnt enough about the terrorists’ ill-chosen method of anthrax delivery, therefore, the risk of big outbreaks is minimal. However, the terrorists, by definition, are there to terrify and in that they have partly succeeded in the USA.

The role of the UN. Long and agonising discussions among nations since 1925, lead to several CBW-related conventions and treaties over the decades. The treaty of 1972 was considered inadequate and after 21 years of further discussions, a relatively comprehensive chemical weapons convention was signed in Paris in 1993 under the title "The Convention on the Prohibition of the Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction", which is self-explanatory. However, little progress has been made in terms of its implementation. So much so that no serious international measures were taken to prevent further spread into the hand of small groups and terrorists. The list of countries now known, or strongly believed, to possess CBW number more than 19, all of whom are signatories of the above treaty. They include Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, USA, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia. Iraq is the only country documented by the United Nations to have breached the treaties and to have used CW against the neighbouring Iran and the Kurdish population inside its own boundaries. Therefore, it is the urgent task of the United Nations to put an end, once and for all, to the production, proliferation and use of biological weapons.

The future world order: President Bush insists that “the best defence against terrorism is a strong offensive against terrorists”. At last, perhaps, the world’s only superpower is now focused on making the world a better place to live in. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviets and the Western democracies were heavily engaged in supporting powerful dictators in order to secure business and influence in strategic parts of the world, riding roughshod over fundamental principles of civil rights and turning a blind eye to clear violations of human rights by their “trade-partners”. The US and UK fully supported Iraq’s campaign to stop the Iranian business-unfriendly Islamic fundamentalism. Saddam’s massive programme of CBW (built by Western companies) was allowed to continue and the poisoning with Nerve gas of 15000 Kurdish civilians in Halabje (Kurdistan, Iraq) went unnoticed. Only when Saddam endangered Western interests by invading Kuwait, military action taken to stop him. He was punished but left injured and abandoned for the past decade.

In sharp contrast, the West fully supported the most primitive Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan to stop the spread of communism. The job was done, the Soviet Union collapsed and Afghanistan too was abandoned, as repeatedly acknowledged by Tony Blair in recent weeks. Blair promised not to abandon Afghanistan after this war and went on mediating between Arabs and Israelis.

Phase two of this campaign is supposed to uproot the causes of terrorism. This time they better not fail, for even worse is likely to come. Iraq is thought to have had made serious progress late 1980s in making and testing nuclear bombs. The fundamentalist Shi’as of Iran are thought to have made serious progress on this track too and Pakistan, ruled by a military dictator, successfully tested a nuclear bomb recently. The threat of weapons of mass destruction has never been greater and will not diminish, given the conflict-ridden globe of today. Tony Blair and George Bush are now morally committed to a project that has no end. Inevitably they would have win the backing of countries at the expense of suppressed minorities. The Russians, the Chinese and the Turks will now have the free hand of managing “internal affairs” in Chechnya, Tibet and Kurdistan in the manner they deem appropriate. The ruling Generals of Pakistan will take charge of implementing “democracy” in the neighbouring Afghanistan.

The cold war era was disastrous for the disadvantaged people of the Third World, and the so called “New World Order” was not any different. We have to acknowledge that a better world requires a stable world, achievable through settled disputes and protected human rights. Good business requires stable markets, which requires stable democracies, as we have learnt in Europe. Widespread democracy will pave the way for establishing a better harmonious global village, where there should be no room for gross human right abuses. [End].

Table of bioweapon agents on next page

List of microbial agents of USA, Russia and Iraq
USA Russia IRAQ
Anthrax
Botulinum toxin
Anthrax
Botulinum toxin
Anthrax
Botulinum toxin
Eastern and Western equine
Korean hemorrhagic fever
Bolivian hemorrhagic fever
Melioidosis dengue fever
Rift Valley fever
Chikungunya disease virus
Ricin
Rice brown spot disease
Late blight of potato
Stem rust of cereal
Newcastle disease virus
Fowl plague virus
Marburg virus
Ebola
Machupo virus
Japanese encephalitis
Russian spring-summer encephalitis
Ornithosis
African swine fever virus
Wheat stem rust
Gas gangrene
Aflatoxin
Trichothecene Mycotoxins
Wheat cover smut
Ricin
Hemorrhagic conjuctivitis virus
Rotavirus
Camel pox

Brucellosis
Encephalitis
Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis
Argentinian hemorrhagic fever
Tularemia
Q-fever
Lassa fever
Glanders
plague
Yellow fever
Psittacosis
Typhus
Rice blast
Rinderpest virus

Brucellosis
Encephalitis
Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis
Argentinian hemorrhagic fever
Tularemia
Q-feverLassa fever
Glandersplague
yellow fever
Psittacosis
Typhus
Rice blast
Rinderpest virus


Published in www.Kurdishmedia.com on 26 October, 2001.

Sunday, 1 May 1994

Playing by the rules: Kurds Shia and Sunni Iraqis

Playing by the Rules

Dlawer Ala ‘Aldeen


In: Iraq since the Gulf War, Prospects for Democracy. Editor: Fran Hazelton, for CARDRI. Zed Books Ltd. London & New Jersey. 1994. Chapter 18, pages 232-243

The artificial boundaries of the modem state of Iraq, which were laid down by the British in the 1920s and have been protected ever since by the major powers, created a heterogeneous combination of ethnic and religious groups. The British, militarily dominant after the First World War, drew the map of Iraq by annexing the southern part of Kurdish lands - the Ottoman province of Mosul - to the Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia inhabited mainly by Arabs, namely Baghdad and Basra. In the process, they denied the Kurdish people any right to an independent Kurdish state. The Kurds of southern Kurdistan have been through seventy years of forced co-existence with the Sunni and Shi’i Arabs under the rule of Sunni Arabs in Baghdad. The division of Kurdistan and amalgamation of these divergent groups created one of the most unstable countries in the Middle East. The plight of the Kurds (and their armed struggle for basic human rights) and the plight of the Shi’i Arabs in the south have been major contributors to instability in the entire region.

In the 1930s and 1940s, the southern Kurds somehow adapted to the new reality and started thinking in the context of modern Iraq. This was at the expense of their national identity and their human and political rights. With the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958, Britain finally lost influence as an imperial power within Iraq and the fate of the Kurds was left entirely in the hands of a series of undemocratic Arab nationalist governments. Without exception, these regimes — all of which were supported by either, or both, Cold War superpowers -- refused to recognize the Kurds’ democratic rights or demand for self-determination. Since the Ba’thists came to power - first in 1963 and then in 1968 - the very existence of the Kurds has been at risk. To the superpowers, the violation of human rights and suppression of the people of Iraq were no more than ‘internal affairs’ so long as the regime was deemed indispensable for trade and most recently for preventing the spread of the Shi’i Islamic revolution.

The ‘sacred’ boundaries of Iraq and exclusively Sunni rule in Baghdad became the only recognized image of Iraq during the era of the two superpowers. All policies were worked out around those boundaries which ensured that they remained unquestioned. However, with the emergence of the United States as the leading, or the only, master of the world, international relations have changed and old policies are no longer applicable. The clock must now turn the American way. Sadly, however, there is no evidence that the USA has developed any well thought-out policy towards Iraq. Its only obvious policy has been a reaction to events, and too little too late. Many observers have the impression that the US administration changes its policies frequently. This, and the way the USA conducted the Gulf War, demonstrates their ignorance of Iraq’s social and political structure.

The USA has long valued Saddam Husain as an economic and political partner. However, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, it strongly indicated that he was no longer a partner and should go, hence General Schwarzkopf’s desire to march all the way to Baghdad. But when, in the intifada of March 1991, the Iraqi people had the opportunity of removing Saddam Husain and replacing him with a Shi’i-dominated opposition, the Americans pulled away the rug and actively sought to prevent his downfall. Not having prepared a ‘friendly’ alternative (a military dictator with a different name), the USA accepted Saddam Husain as the ‘devil they knew’, preferable to the one they did not. They allowed the ‘internal affairs’ to carry on. The Shi’is were slaughtered in the south and the Kurds were left in the wilderness.

The British, however, are acknowledged to have a better understanding of the area, and have long conducted the policy they see as in their best interest. British policy has nevertheless time and again proved to be catastrophic for the people of Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. The British have had more knowledge, but always followed the USA, who have no thought-out policy. Fortunately for the Iraqi people, by the time of the mass exodus of refugees from Iraqi Kurdistan in April 1991, Margaret Thatcher had her own personal policy towards Saddam Husain. She had developed a deep dislike for him and, although no longer in power, was strong enough to make people listen in Britain and the USA. She initiated a sequence of events that resulted in John Major’s passionate move to intervene militarily in Kurdistan (with or without the Americans). Instead of letting the British take the moral high ground, the Americans jumped in ahead and led the way into the ‘quagmire’ to save lives. This was a classic example of US policy. Lives were saved in Kurdistan and George Bush became Hajji Bush. But the ‘safe havens’ were set up only in a part of Iraqi Kurdistan, less than half the area from which the refugees had fled. As for the Shi’is in the south, their untelevized suffering remained an ‘internal affair’.

Kurdish safe haven

The Allies made a deliberate effort to limit the Kurdish safe haven to the province of Dohuk where no more than 800,000 people had been dis placed. The majority of the refugees (1.2-1.5 million) were fleeing eastward towards Iran from the major cities of Kirkuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyya. Operation ‘Provide Comfort’ was an attempt to appease Turkey. Great efforts were made to stop the refugees entering Turkey by providing immediate aid on the mountains, Refugees were actively encouraged to return to their homes under the impression that the Allies would stay there to protect them. Turkey closed the border from day one and succeeded in creating enough pressure to have the refugee burden shouldered internationally. The Iranians, while opposed to the whole idea of the safe haven and regarding it much like a second Israel, tried to play the Turkish game and announced the closure of their border in the face of the tide of refugees. Their calls for others to shoulder the burden were largely ignored by Western governments (except for some limited aid mostly from non-governmental organizations), and fortunately they never closed the border, The Kurdish refugees along the Iranian border cried for help and for [ extension of the safe haven, but they too were ignored. Masses of refugees fleeing the provinces of Kirkuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyya remained in the open at Saddam’s mercy without aid or protection. They were trapped between the Iraqi army and the border with Iran, far from the safe haven in Dohuk province to the north-west, adjoining the Turkish border. Iran did not allow international aid to cross its border. The 36th parallel, which provided air cover for less than half of Iraqi Kurdistan, was not sufficient to inhibit Iraqi army advances south of the line. Thus, Allied protection not only remained inadequate throughout the period but, more sadly, the whole of operation ‘Provide Comfort’ was abandoned in July 1991. The Allies left the area before their task was completed.

In October 1991, the Iraqi government suddenly withdrew from the three main Kurdish governorates of Arbil, Dohuk and Sulaimaniyya and imposed a strict embargo on the entire area, leaving the strangled Kurds as the sole authorities in charge. The purpose of the Iraqi government’s gamble was not entirely obvious. It was believed to be a blackmail attempt which assumed that Iran, Turkey, Arab countries and the Allies would rush in to prevent the Kurds from running their own affairs for fear of a Kurdish independent state being established. Iran, Turkey and Syria began holding regular meetings to discuss the Kurdish situation, and publicly declared that they would not tolerate any talk of Kurdish independence or the break-up of Iraq. Nevertheless, the Kurdish parties were left alone to run a de facto state, with no income and no direct foreign support. None of the Western governments have offered direct financial support to the elected Kurdish administration which is seeking to lead, feed and police between 3.5 and 4 million people. One US government aid official attempted at a London conference in July 1993 to justify his government’s lack of action, by referring to the Kurds’ inability to eliminate the corruption inherited from Saddam’s regime. He ignored the need for financial support to
combat corruption and the fact that Western support enabled Saddam to establish such corruption in the first place.

Saddam Husain’s government is able to extract, refine and sell oil. It is still able to provide people with basic services, while the Kurdish region has been deprived of the means of providing such services. No attempt has been made to relieve the sanctions on the Kurds or allow them to generate some hard-currency income. Even the small amount of money made available to the United Nations for relief in Kurdistan was wasted through Baghdad. Furthermore, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are no longer backed to provide alternative support for the Kurds, and some have clearly been instructed not to deal directly with the legitimate, elected authorities in Kurdistan.

Southern Iraq

The uprising in the south of Iraq had a different tragic fate. Thanks to Iranian interference with the Shi’i uprising and the Allies’ lack of interference in Saddam’s counter-attack, Iraqi Shi’is were badly defeated. Tens of thousands of people were massacred during and after the uprising, and the true figures of those killed may never be known. Since the intifada, the level of repression of the people and destruction of their historical religious institutions has intensified to such an extent that the entire Shi’i cultural legacy is in danger. The ‘modernization’ of mosques, construction of highways over holy cemeteries and the ‘reorganization’ of the structure of the Shi’i clerical school have all accelerated since 1991.

The Marsh Arabs are one of the most ancient communities in the Middle East. They are now facing total destruction of their community and way of life. Like all other Iraqi communities, they suffered a great deal from oppression and from the Iran-Iraq war. Iii addition, the hard-to-govern marshlands form a refuge for army deserters and opposition members. This meant they have suffered government military offensives, including air attacks, the use of chemical weapons, underwater mines, burning of reed beds and water poisoning. Having failed so far to achieve total control of the Marsh Arabs, the government’s last resort has been to speed up and expand the southern desalination project (the so-called ‘Third River’ project). The clear purpose of this project is to drain the marshes and facilitate the government’s control over the area, thereby eliminating it as a base for political opposition. However, a spin-off is the desalination of the areas between the Tigris and Euphrates and possibly the exploitation of oil-fields under the marshes. Drainage has probably reached an irreversible stage, with vast areas already drained and dried.

All this is actively taking place south of the 32nd parallel, under the nose of Allied surveillance aircraft. Protective air cover has not stopped the Iraqi regime on the ground continuing to violate both human rights and UN Resolution 688. Saddam’s bombardment of the area has, if anything, intensified since the creation of the no-fly zone. Air cover without monitoring on the ground has proved almost as inadequate as not providing any cover. A no-fly zone with no safe haven for the Shi’is in the south means continued persecution, humiliation, starvation and destruction of long established social and religious structures.

The opposition and the future political system

Since the creation of modern Iraq, the Sunni Arab minority has monopolized power. This was convenient for the former superpower but catastrophic for the Kurdish and Shi’i populations and the rest of the Middle East. With an ethnically and religiously diverse population forcibly combined within artificial boundaries, Iraqi governments failed to minimize the country’s potential for disintegration by establishing a civilized constitution that would secure people’s rights and strengthen the affinity between them.

For a long time, the Iraqi opposition has remained disunited. This is hardly surprising. The various groups come from different backgrounds and have distinct interests. Their diverse backers include Iran, Syria, Sa’udi Arabia, Turkey and the CLA. However, sharing a single enemy, their common sense dictates the formation of a low affinity coalition. This has never been easy.

Clearly, the sections of the Iraqi opposition that enjoy wide popular support and have a strong organizational base inside Iraq are the Kurds and the Shi’ is. Alliances between Kurdish and Shi’i political organizations are therefore vital for any progress by the opposition, even though they are not monolithic groups. The rest of the opposition groups, important though they may be, are mainly loose organizations with little fame or following inside Iraq. Despite the diversity of the Iraqi opposition, there is fortunately at present a higher level of understanding among the various groups than ever before. All have accepted multi-party democracy as the only alternative to Saddam Husain, though they do not seem to have achieved unanimity on the issue of a future federal system for Iraq.

The Iraqi opposition has had to pass many tests before being able to present itself to the world as a credible alternative to Saddam 1-lusain. It has been expected to demonstrate that it represents the views of all the people of Iraq and enjoys the moral authority to act on their behalf. But its biggest test is to demonstrate that it has understood the rules of the game and can project itself as a coalition of professional, moderate statesmen who can relate to the West. It has not passed all the tests yet. It has not been able to prove that it would contribute to peace and stability and would not disturb the balance of power in the region; that it would not pose a threat to the West’s lifeline interest (the oil in the Gulf) or to Israel; that it would establish a capitalistic, pro-American free-market economy. It may even be expected to guarantee the Americans a lion’s share of the future reconstruction contracts (as in Kuwait) to repair Iraq’s crippled infrastructure, which is estimated at around $200 billion.

In the same way as dictatorship by the minority Sunni Arabs has proved catastrophic, the dictatorship of any other ethnic or religious groups will undoubtedly have a similar consequence. For instance, in the absence of complete democracy, a future Shi’i government based on clerical dictator ship will be suicidal. The non-Shi’i Iraqis, including Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Christians, have good reasons to fear such a dictatorship. All these groups, however, accept that a parliamentary system with a Shi’i majority is legitimate, tolerable and acceptable. Iraqi Shi’i leaders, willingly or not, seem to have accepted such a scenario, although the fundamentalists among them (and many so called ‘moderate’ Shi’i leaders) cannot accept Kurdish demands for limited autonomy, let alone self-determination. Many nationalist Sunni Arabs share the same feelings about the Kurds. Therefore, only a fully democratic constitution can guarantee human rights for all Iraqis and the creation of a stable country.

Since the March 1991 intifada, the Iraqi opposition in exile has come together and developed more mutual understanding than ever before. All parties are clearly convinced that their only chance of survival and of creating a formidable alternative to Saddam Husain’s rule is to reach such consensus, This perspective is shared, albeit with varying emphasis, by all three main communities that comprise Iraqi society: Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shi’is.

Kurds

The Kurds have long realized the grave risk in the sort term of insisting on an independent Kurdish state, and have accepted the current boundaries of Iraq. The only hope for them of securing some of their desired rights in the foreseeable future seems to lie in them committing themselves to an integral but democratic Iraq. The ‘State of Kurdistan’ remains the dream of every Kurd in the same way as every Palestinian dreams of the ‘State of Palestine’. Nevertheless, the Kurdish political organizations are genuinely insisting on coexisting with the Arabs in Iraq. The Kurdish leaders have recently come under growing pressure from sections of the Kurdish population for greater commitment to the Kurdish right of self-determination (including independence). However, the leaders have so far skilfully and successfully managed to resist pressure, persuading people to weigh risks against interests.

Looking back at the history of Baghdad’s Kurdish relations, it becomes apparent that the more aggressive the regime has been in treating the Kurds, the more demanding the Kurds have become. From the 1920s to the 1950s the Iraqi monarchy ignored the cultural and political rights of the Kurds, but treated individuals as full citizens. During those years, the Kurdish movement, for its part, restricted its political demands to little more than cultural rights. Since the 1960s, under republican rule, succes sive regimes have further denied Kurdish tights and stepped up their suppression. At the same time, Kurdish desire for self-rule increased and ‘autonomy’ became the slogan of the armed struggle.

Under Ba’thist rule and after a decade of genocidal war, coexistence with Baghdad has become increasingly difficult. The Kurds have developed a stronger desire for divorce from Baghdad. Indeed, the deteriorating relationship between Baghdad and the Kurds may soon reach a point of no return where mutual trust and coexistence become impossible. This is why only multi-party democracy with a parliamentary constitution can enhance Baghdad-Kurdish affinity, which a federal system will hopefully sustain into the foreseeable future.

Sunni Arabs

The loose term ‘Sunni Arabs’ refers to a heterogeneous combination of tribal, semi-tribal and non-tribal peoples occupying the triangle of Iraq between Mosul, Ramadi and Baghdad. This collection of non-religious, mainly nationalist Arabs is the social base of the Ba’thist oppressive machinery, with its monopolization of absolute power. Opposition to the Ba’thist regime is at its weakest in this region, and almost all Sunni Arab anti-Saddam activists are abroad. They enjoy less popular support than the Shi’is or Kurds and inside Iraq they are virtually unheard-of.

Among the Sunni Arab political organizations, there are many extreme pan-Arab nationalists who stress Iraq’s Arab identity and its role as a potential leader of the ‘Arab national liberation movement’. Groups such as former Ba’thists and the current pro-Syrian Ba’th Party not only insist on a firmly integrated Iraq and think that democracy will dismember it, but also see the expansion of Iraq and the formation with Syria of a giant United Arab Republic as a dream ticket. These ‘leftist Ba’thists’ count on Saddam’s Ba’th Party as their organizational base in Iraq, hoping that Saddam’s downfall will allow the exiled Ba’thists to fill his vacant post and continue Ba’thist domination.

The rest of the Sunni Arab opposition (i.e. the majority) consists of moderate democratic groups which are genuinely interested in establishing a constitution based on a Western-style democracy. They have long accepted that without this, the disintegration of Iraq is inevitable. Some have gone so far as to suggest a federal system (with a federal Kurdish state) for Iraq. It is important, however, that most of the organizations which have been arbitrarily labelled ‘Sunni Arab organizations’ are not founded on the basis of such an ethnic/religious identity. They all have a wide spectrum of membership, including Shi’is, Kurds and Christians.

Shi’i

The terms ‘Shi’i organizations’ and ‘Shi’i opposition’ have been incorrectly used to describe Shi’ i political/religious organizations or the people of southern Iraq. Apart from the purely clerical organizations, which recruit on the basis of Shi’i-Islamic religious commitment, the rest arc largely party-political organizations driven by the plight of the people of the South. Shi’is in Iraq suffered from persecution under the Ba’thists simply because of their religious identity, just as the Kurds were persecuted because of their ethnic identity. However, it is important to stress that not all Shi’is in Iraq support the Shi’i clergy or the Shi’i political’ religious organizations, and not all Shi’is wish to see an ‘Islamic state’ in Iraq. All the various political viewpoints and affiliations can be found in the Shi’i community, developed according to personal ideologies and interests. Nevertheless, the way that the Iraqi regime has insulted the spiritual symbols of Shi’is and denied them their human rights has in creased support for the clerical leadership abroad.

Such support is split between party-political organizations, like the Da’wa Party and the more religious pro-Iran clerical groups led by Al-Hakim. Al-Hakim is the son of one who epitomizes the Shi’i religion for many Shi’is and is regarded by many as a symbol of their struggle against Saddam. More importantly, al-Hakim is now the head of the Tehran-based Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the umbrella organization of all Iraqi Shi’i groups. It is interesting to note that there is no unanimity within SCIRI on Iraq’s future. Some have no problem with a modern Western-style democracy and accept the open market economy in principle. Others would accept nothing short of a pure Islamic state with a Shi’i-clergy dictatorship. During the Gulf War, members of SCIRI prayed for an Iranian victory which would carry them to power in Baghdad.

The end of the Iran-Iraq War and the changed circumstances it brought about helped lend a new dimension to Iraqi Shi’i thinking. More importantly, years of bitter experience in opposition have eventually enabled Shi’i organizations to understand the rules of the game of modern international politics. Whether they play by these rules is another matter; they ignored them for years and only recently have they given some indications of abiding by them. Nowadays, moderate Shi’i personalities are given a higher profile in international lobbying than the mainstream radicals of SCIRI. They have openly endorsed a Western-style democracy and are actively keen to be seen as truly modern statesmen. It is important to note that most Shi’i organizations no longer style themselves as the ‘only’ alternatives to Saddam Husain. Behind the scenes, however, a great majority of SCIRI members have not thoroughly digested the above rules, or the notion of a Western-style democracy in Iraq, let alone the rights of ethnic and religious minorities or the notion of a federal system.

The obvious dependence of the Iraqi Shi’i organizations, particularly the SCIRI leadership, on Iran, has had tragic consequences for the Iraqi opposition and the spring 1991 intifada, as it has masked the fundamental differences and genuine disagreements between the Iranian clergy and the Iraqi Shi’i party political leaders. There are innumerable religious and political differences between the two sides. For a start, the Iraqi Shi’i organizations do not believe in the same Wilayat Al-Faqih, in which ultimate power is concentrated in the person of al-faqih. Such differences are deep rooted and go back centuries. More importantly, the Iraqi Shi’is strongly resent Iranian interference in their internal affairs and in Iraqi opposition affairs. On a private level, Iraqi Shi’ i leaders do complain about this interference. Publicly, however, they would not put down their ‘religious brothers’ as the Western media do, because this would not serve their purposes. Also, they see no reason for giving up a ‘brother’, especially as they still await a gesture of good will from the West or its allies in the Arab world. It is unfortunate that the notion of Iran’s Islamic state or Shi’i fundamentalism has been generalized to include all Iraq’s Shi’i population in the South. Iranian attempts to export the Shi’i revolution to Iraq, Sa’udi Arabia, Afghanistan, the Lebanon and the former USSR made East and West unite in opposition.

It is tragic that the Iraqi Shi’i organizations have underestimated the power and danger of an unrivalled superpower. But the bigger tragedy lies in the illiteracy of this superpower which is yet to demonstrate skill and logic in manipulating the world. The only logic applied to US policies is ‘protection of the US national interest’, with no serious attempt to under stand local politics and cultural values. Thus, the US administration has yet to demonstrate an understanding of the differences between Iraqi and Iranian Shi’i, and the very complex nature of their relations. In the same way as Shi’ I organizations have realized that their only hope of participa tion in power is to accept Western-style democracy, the Americans should realize that without the participation of Shi’i political organizations in power there will be no stable, united and peaceful Iraq. Furthermore, as the Kurdish population of Iraqi Kurdistan will not settle for anything less than a federal state of Kurdistan within a federal Iraq, the Shi’is will not settle for anything less than full participation in any future governing institution. Unless the rights of these two long-suppressed groups are secured, and unless the West starts winning the good will of these people, there will be no guarantees for a stable market in Iraq or secure business with future governments.

The time for dictatorial rules in Iraq is over, and the time for democracy is now long overdue. The only system capable of saving Iraq’s integrity is a genuinely democratic multi-party parliamentary system. Until recently, many believed that in an Islamic developing country of the Middle East it would be difficult to establish such a Western-style democratic system. These views, however, were put to the test in May 1992 in Iraqi Kurdistan, with the first historical opportunity to establish a parliamentary system in part of Iraq.

The Kurdish federal state as a model for Iraq

Kurdish internal politics has many similarities with that of Iraq as a whole. It has comparable ingredients of conflict and bellicosity. Politically, there are the two main bitter rivals, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in addition to the communists, right-wing nationalist parties, Islamic parties, Christian parties, and others. Ethnically, there are Kurds (Soranis, Bahdinis, Hawramis, Failis), Turco mans, Assyrians, Armenians and Arabs. Religiously, there are Muslims (Sunnis and Shi’is), Christians and Yazidis. In fact, Kurdistan is more heterogeneous than any other part of Iraq. Nevertheless, it was possible to combine all these diverse groups under one legislative and executive system in which all parties (political, ethnic or religious) are represented. A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable to see leaders of the KDP and PUK even dine together; now they dine, travel and rule together. Both parties have realized the importance of the success of the experiment on which their own future and the future of their people depends. Their high level of collaboration and mutual compromise has provided security and reassurance for the people of Kurdistan.

This experience shows that irrespective of the ethnic and religious multiplicity, cultural diversity and geographical location of the nation, it is possible to establish a truly democratic system with a considerable degree of harmony. The actual constitution need not be an exact replica of that of any of the Western systems. In the same way as different Western countries have developed their own systems, Iraq can develop its own. The initial set-up of the current democratic system in Kurdistan was agreed before the election of 1992 by the different rival parties under the coalition of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF). The end result was the establishment of a unique parliamentary system which is well adapted to local politics and cultural values. Also, the rights of minorities like Christians have been secured through special mechanisms. As time goes by, the parliament will gradually develop the constitution and put down the roots of the system.

Despite the absence of any real income or external support, and despite the double imposition of sanctions, the democratic system in Kurdistan has managed to survive and grow in strength. The vast majority of its current problems are due to lack of funds and/or political security. How-ever, there are a few problems which are purely local and require immediate attention. For instance, the problem of the supreme leader of the Kurdish Federal State, locally named ‘the head of the Kurdish Liberation Movement’ has proved difficult to resolve. In the circumstances, one could argue that the people of Kurdistan were lucky that this issue was not resolved in 1992, because not all parties were convinced of the necessity of such a leader and they had not agreed on the extent of his or her executive power. The whole concept of the election of such a leader was raised only days before the 1992 election, and arguments about the powers of the post continued until election day. Even now, the rival parties have not resolved the issue.

Failure to elect an outright leader in the first round of voting meant that the two most powerful individuals in Kurdish politics - Jalal Talabani and Mas’ud Barzani -remained outside the system of government in Kurdistan. Without them, the Kurdish parliament and the Kurdish government remained relatively weak and financially poor. Throughout the past decade and a half these two leaders have had the ultimate decision-making power and they now jointly head the military coalition of the IKF. Even though they have remained outside parliament and have not been given any state positions, they constitute the ultimate authority behind the governing body in Kurdistan. They have retained the power to appoint (or fire) a prime minister, choose his cabinet and appoint (or fire) the speaker of the parliament. Furthermore, on the international platform, they act on behalf of the Kurdish parliament and its government. Their absence from government has been seen as a weakness, both in the internal authority and in the international standing of that institution. Their inclusion in the legislative and/or executive bodies, in whatever capacity, is an absolute necessity. The two leaders of the KDP and PUK have demonstrated their genuine interest in supporting the elected bodies and demanded that the Peshmerga forces and the general population see them as their legitimate rulers. Indeed, without the blessing of the two leaders, the whole experiment could have failed.

However, careful consideration clearly must be paid to the kind of executive and legislative powers to be given to the sovereign leader. His/her relation with the legislative and executive institutions must be well defined before the election battle is conducted and such definition has to be formulated in a way that leaves ultimate authority with the parliament. There is no reason why a single leader cannot be elected by the people of Iraq.

The experience in Kurdistan showed that the vast majority of Kurds had not decided who they would vote for until near the election date, when they were still examining manifestos to see who would protect their interests best. The same thing should apply to the people of Iraq, including those in the south. The people are sufficiently sophisticated politically to think in terms of peace, justice, economic well-being and freedom rather than religious fundamentalism or Arab supremacy.

Currently, the Iraqi opposition has chosen a council of joint leaders consisting of a Kurd, a Shi’i and a Sunni, but the ultimate test for people’s choice should be determined by a direct free election with nothing to stop any candidate becoming president, regardless of whether he/she is an Arab Sunni, a Kurd, a Shi’i, a Christian, a Turcoman, a Yazidi or a Communist. In Kurdistan the candidates for the leadership contest included representatives of four different parties, two of which were relatively small. One was an Islamic party represented by a Sunni clergyman, the other was socialist. One of the major candidates was a Bahdini Kurd while the others were all Soranis. Many Sunni clergymen and religious Kurds voted for agnostic political parties rather than the Islamic one, and many Sorani Kurds voted for the Bahdini candidate and vice versa.

Conclusion

There remains a wide gulf between the Allies and the Iraqi opposition, and between different groups within the Iraqi opposition. The first has resulted from a lack of understanding between the two sides, caused by the ignorance and obsessive approach of Western governments (particularly the USA) towards the Iraqi opposition, and its fear of the unknown when it comes to alternatives to Saddam Husain’s regime. On the other hand, some Iraqi groups (particularly the Shi’i organizations) have not yet learnt to play by the rules of modern politics under the supremacy of the USA. Each side, it seems, will have to begin to learn from the other. The Shi’i groups need to demonstrate true independence from Iran and the Allies need to demonstrate more skill and sophistication to help them achieve just that. Without winning the good will of the Iraqi people and the inclusion of Shi’is in the game, Iraq will neither be a stable country in the region, nor will it be a peaceful market for the West.

The gulfs between the Kurds, the Shi’ is and the rest of the Iraqi opposition have largely been created by the stubborn demand of the pro Iranian Shi’i groups for an Islamic State of Iraq, with a clerical dictatorship and the absolute denial of the aspirations of other ethnic and religious groups. Sunni Arab nationalists are just as undemocratic and stubborn. Both groups fear the disintegration of Iraq and resent the Kurdish movement and the declaration of a Federal State of Kurdistan. The Kurds have not yet fought for an independent state and have done their utmost to reassure all Iraqis, but further denial of their rights will undoubtedly fuel enthusiasm for such a fight. Iraqi opposition parties need closer ties and better understanding than ever before. Replacing one dictatorship with another is certainly no longer acceptable to lraqis. Democracy is the only alternative to Saddam Husain that will secure stability and peace.

Thursday, 4 April 1991

Meeting Thatcher: help fleeing Kurds

Thatcher urges 'mercy mission' of tents and food to fleeing Kurds

By Michael Simms:
The Guardain: Thursday 4th April, 1991

MARGARET Thatcher led forceful calls in Britain yesterday for immediate international action to help the Kurds. After receiving a deputation of Kurdish exiles at her home in Belgravia, she said it was not the time for "legal niceties". The Kurds had appealed to her as "a mother and a grandmother" to use her influence with the Prime Minister and President Bush, but she carefully avoided any hint of conflict with the policies being outlined by her successor.

She declined to mention any need for renewed military intervention by the allied forces, or by anyone else. "It should not be beyond the wit of man to get planes there with tents, with food, and with warm blankets." she said. "I think we should take very firm steps. We should go now - it is a real mercy mission."

Dr Dlawer Ala'Aldeen. of the Kurdish Scientific and Medical Association said Mrs Thatcher promised to do all she could to help. "She was very sympathetic, she was very understanding and she has been very well informed about the situation." Mrs Thatcher said later that she had agreed to meet the Kurdish deputation after hearing radio reports describing the "pitiful state" of refugees in the mountains bordering Turkey.

Saturday, 5 January 1991

Death Clouds: Saddams use of CW

DEATH CLOUDS

Saddam Hussein’s Chemical War Against the Kurds

By Dlawer Abdul Aziz Ala'Aldeen

TABLE OF CONTENTS

  1. Introduction
  2. Poison and Saddam Hussein
  3. Kurdish fears
  4. Events prior to the first use of chemical wepons in Kurdistan
  5. Mustard gas and the first clouds of death in Kurdistan
  6. Nerve gas and the Anfal operations
  7. The casualties and damages
  8. The environment
  9. Saddam's aggression rewarded
  10. References
  1. Documents I
  2. Documents II
  3. Documents III
  4. Documents IV
  5. Table of attacks and casualties
  6. Maps of Iraq and Kurdistan


INTRODUCTION

The Gulf war between Iraq and the United States-led coalition forces has highlighted, as never before, the potentially appalling destructive capability of a regime armed with chemical and biological weapons. Military commentators and the media have speculated endlessly on whether Saddam Hussein would use his massive arsenal of chemical weapons. Yet the reality is that Saddarn's Ba'thist regime has already unleashed these terrible weapons time and time again and with massive loss of life. The victims were the Kurdish people of Iraq - who have long fought for their plight to be recognised internationally and for the monstrous use of chemical weapons to be ended forever.

Modern Iraq emerged from the Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia following Britain's military dominance of the region after the First World War. The British drew up the borders of the modern Iraqi state by annexing Kurdish lands to the north and, in the process, denying the Kurdish people any right to an independent Kurdish state. Since the 1920s, the Kurds in Iraq have suffered political dominance by a succession of Arab regimes based in the capital Baghdad. After the overthrow of the Hashimite monarchy in 1958, Britain finally lost influence as an imperial power within Iraq and the fate of the Kurds was left entirely in the hands of a series of undemocratic, Arab nationalist governments. Without exception, these regimes refused to acknowledge the Kurds' right to full citizenship, far less the Kurdish demand for self-determination. In recent decades, the people of Iraqi Kurdistan have campaigned for political rights and have been forced to resort to armed struggle against the Baghdad government to secure civil rights. Their cause has contributed to the political instability of the Middle East and so, the Kurds would argue, must also be accommodated in any solution of the region's problems.

Governments from East and West, including the two major superpowers, have consistently refused to address the Kurdish issue, in part because stability in the region has not always been in their political or economic interests. During the Cold War era, both sides were heavily engaged in supporting powerful, yet often dictatorial regimes in the region, particularly in strategically important countries such as Iraq. The driving motive of business and trade led the major powers to ride roughshod over fundamental principles of civil rights and to turn a blind eye to clear violations of human rights by their Middle Eastern trade partners. Moreover, companies trading with Iraq chose to violate international agreements by supplying plant and raw materials that enabled a vast arsenal of weapons of mass destruction to be accumulated.

This neglect by industrial nations has allowed the proliferation of chemical weapons and the production of these weapons across the globe. It is the urgent task of the United Nations to put an end, once and for all, to the production, proliferation and use of chemical and biological weapons. It would be made clear that the international community will not suffer arsenal of chemical weapons to be used against states or, indeed, against the minority populations of a particular nation.

In the Gulf war between Iraq and the US-led coalition forces, such an arsenal of chemical weapons was targeted against the Western powers who were Saddam Hussein's former allies. The old Cold War order had broken down and both antagonists seemed to have misunderstood the emerging order. Saddam over-reached himself and perhaps misjudged his former allies by invading Kuwait and the Western powers seemed suddenly to have rediscovered their long-forgotten allegiance to the principles of nationhood and autonomy in their defense of Kuwait - a moral cloak, cynics would say, for defending their economic interests. But a new political and economic imperative is sure to emerge from the ashes of war - the necessity for a stable Middle East that will not be vulnerable to the whims of dictatorship or the economic dictates of powerful nations outside the region. If such harmony is to be achieved, then it will surely be on the basis of independent, democratic states who have firmly grasped the ideal of self-determination and who have finally secured that right, perhaps at the expense, of the West's industrial / military superpowers. Moreover, if the establishment of democracy in the nation states of the Middle East is to be the foundation of further peace and prosperity, then the fundamental issue of democratic and civil rights for the Kurdish people will also have to be confronted. There can be no negotiated, democratic settlement of the region 's problems unless the democratic aspirations of the Kurds are fulfilled. Any international conference on the region must include the legitimate representatives of the Kurdish people if it is, in any way, to herald a new democratic and peaceful order for all the peoples of the Middle East.

POISON AND SADDAM HUSSEIN

Iraq is not the only country to have used chemical weapons and the Kurds are not the first victims of Iraq's poison gases. However, it s the first time in history that these weapons of mass-destruction have been used by a state against its own civilians to suppress internal democratic opposition, or as weapons of genocide to eradicate an ethnic minority.

The recent history of the Kurds in Iraq consists of a long series of tragedies, of which only the major ones have gained world public awareness and generated varying degrees of international concern. Only the holocausts of Halabja (March, 1988) and Bahdinan (August, 1988) became well publicised, but these are just two episodes in a long saga of tragedy. There have been numerous other chemical attacks which were not publicised or investigated by the international community despite consistent allegations and appeals by the Kurds. This report will focus on these less publicised but equally significant occasions when the Iraqi Government used various chemical weapons in Kurdistan against the Kurds between April, 1987 and October, 1988.

The record of the current Iraqi Ba'thist Party, which seized power through a coup d'etat in 1968 [1], reveals a long history of ruthlessness towards its opponents and national minorities. This includes physical and psychological harassment of people; unlawful extermination of individuals and members of the Kurdish and non-Kurdish pro-democracy opposition; violent suppression of mass unrest and, in the case of armed insurgency, bloody and exhaustive warfare on a massive scale regardless of cost.

when crowded schools, education centres and other public buildings were targeted on April 24th 1974 [7]. During the four years of negotiation that preceded this war, the Ba'thist government made several failed attempts to assassinate the powerful Kurdish leader, Mala Mustafa Barzani. One of these attempts, in 1972, involved offering Barzani and his colleagues oranges that had been injected with deadly poisons.

KURDISH FEARS

Rumours began to emerge in the early eighties about Iraq's development of a poison weapon capability. I remember when organophosphorus pesticides started to disappear from Iraqi shops at this time, supporting fears that chemical weapons were being produced. Concern grew that such a capability might enable the Government to gain the upper hand in its war against the Kurds as well as in the Gulf war against Iran. We had no reason to believe that Saddam Hussein would hesitate to use any weapons at his disposal to suppress the "trouble-making" Kurds, and once a chemical weapons capability was ready then it would be only a matter of time before the Kurds were experimented on. However, many still believed that despite his previous record, Saddam Hussein would probably not go as far as using these internationally-banned and indiscriminate mass-destruction weapons against his own civilians. This probably played some part, in addition to financial and political difficulties, in people's lack of preparations for defence against chemical weapons.

Although chemical weapons were not used against them until April, 1987, the Kurds had witnessed these weapons being used on Kurdish soil in Iranian Kurdistan in January, 1982, and against Iranian troops in the fierce battles of Haji Omaran and Grdamand in Arbil province, late in 1983 [8]. Initially, suspicion that Saddam intended to use poison gases against the Kurdish democratic opposition was based on rumour, and speculation on the Iraqi military psychology. Suspicions were subsequently confirmed when taped communications, captured high-ranking military officers [9] and military documents revealed the Ba'thists' terrible plans.

Documents I and II, shown below, were captured by Peshmargas (freedom fighters) of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and clearly demonstrate the Iraqi military preparations for the use of chemical and biological weapons long before their eventual use. It is important to note that document I refers to the distribution and stocking of biological materials in addition to chemical ones. This was a further evidence that Iraq had developed biological weapons early in the eighties and that it most probably had the means to deploy them. This evidence of biological weapons did not gain international publicity until late in 1988 when news of the use in Kurdistan of biological agents like Typhoid and other infectious micro-organisms were reported [10, 11].

EVENTS PRIOR TO THE FIRST USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN
KURDISTAN

It is important to look at the events prior to the use of chemical weapons in Kurdistan to enable the formation of a comprehensive picture of their deployment Therefore, a number of relevant historical events will be mentioned before presenting the available data concerning actual attacks.

Kurds in Iraq had been fighting to win basic human and political rights from successive central governments in Iraq for many decades, and for more than twenty years against the current Ba'thist government [1, 12]. Since 1975, the Ba'thists had never publicly admitted the existence of the unsolved Kurdish question or the presence of a significant Kurdish opposition, internally or externally. Suddenly, at the end of 1983, Saddam Hussein officially recognised the cause for which the Kurds had been fighting. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the two major Kurdish political organisations in Iraqi-Kurdistan, was approached for negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish issue. This was probably a result of several factors, including Saddam's intention to use the PUK with its armed forces and followers to aid his efforts in the Gulf war. The PUK leaders, desperate for a respite after long years of hardship, struggle and isolation, welcomed the offer despite their awareness of the government's intentions and despite the lack of trust between the two sides. Thus, 13-month-long bilateral negotiations towards a mutual understanding began in December, 1983.

The PUK saw a number of possible long-term achievements to be gained in these negotiations. For the first time since 1975, the Ba'thists officially recognised the Kurdish movement; they implicitly recognised the right of the Kurds to fight for their rights and confirmed that no genuine autonomy had been granted to them. In private, Saddam Hussein went as far as making a number of concessions to Talabani, the leader of PUK, promising a number of changes in Kurdistan toward a long lasting peace [13]. This political game ended in January 1985, and lead eventually to renewed fighting between the two sides. Once the PUK resumed fighting, it managed to inflict severe blows on government forces and exert more effective and crippling military pressure on the Iraqi army in the north than ever before, not only in the countryside but also in the government controlled big towns and major cities. Liberated areas were expanding everyday and more than one quarter of Iraq's entire army was tied up again in the north to face the Kurds [12]. The moral, political and military strength of the Kurdish forces was boosted a great deal with the rapprochement of the PUK, KDP and the other main Kurdish political groups and parties with the subsequent formation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front. The latter was formed under the slogan of "the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a democratic Iraq and autonomous Kurdistan" [14].

Iran, the natural beneficiary of this renewed fighting, approached the PUK for new relations to combine forces against Saddam. Indeed, joint operations were undertaken with small numbers of Pasdars (Iranian Revolutionary guards) joined the Peshmargas in attacks on military targets inside Kurdish cities like Kirkuk. This was, naturally, unacceptable to Saddam Hussein. By spring 1987, the Kurds had become the only powerful and influential internal opposition, controlling massive liberated territories. The PUK alone had a firm grip over a land bigger than the Kuwaiti emirate, including the Arbil and Sulaymania provinces. The KDP had a similar grip over the Bahdinan area in the Duhok and Mousil provinces. There were, of course, grey areas where control over villages and towns alternated, with the government in control in the day and the Peshmargas at night The Peshmargas threat to the major Kurdish cities of Arbil,

Sulaymania, Duhok and Kirkuk and the half-Kurdish city of Mousil was growing. This was in addition to the ever-increasing pressure on Saddam from the South with the lack of any hope of a foreseeable truce with, or victory over, Iran. Saddam Hussein was growing impatient every day and was convinced that he could not eradicate, or even suppress, the ever-growing Kurdish movement by the use of "conventional" measures. Therefore, he did not hesitate to grant his powerful cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid, Governor of Northern Iraq [15], full access to Iraq's military capabilities, including chemical weapons, in order to eradicate the Kurdish movement. This former soldier of the Iraqi army was the very Al-Majid who recently earned international opprobrium when he was appointed as Governor of Kuwait in August 1990 [16], following Iraq's invasion. Al-Majid's prime responsibility in Kurdistan was to ensure a total and permanent suppression of the Kurds and complete Arabisation of the important Kurdish towns and cities regardless of costs or methods used. One example of the methods he applied in Kurdistan is the horrific revenge killings in retaliation for Kurdish military operations. People were forced to watch the public execution of young Kurds (aged between 14-35) on the high streets of Arbil, Sulaymania and Kirkuk as retaliation for the killing of Ba'thist security agents by the Peshmargas [20]. Al-Majid's other tactics to regain control over the liberated territories were:

  1. to remove and deport all the people from the "grey" areas where the government retained only partial control, raze their villages to the ground and prohibit re-building or any other activity (see document LII below).
  2. to impose a total economic blockade on defined "prohibition zones" where shoot-to-kill policies were applied and no moving creature was allowed to survive (see documents III and IV below).
  3. to bum down crops, farms, bushes, trees and other plants and to spoil the water supply.
  4. and finally, to launch systematic, and highly organised attacks on liberated areas at several stages (the Anfal operations, see below) on different fronts, in order to regain control over these areas.

Steps 1, 2 and 3 were all preparations for 4 in order to minimise the support to Kurdish fighters before the final attacks and to impose a total blockade on the whole region including the vast number of civilians and peasants who inhabited the area. It became evident that the target was not merely the Peshmargas but the whole population of Kurdistan. Thus, over 4,000 villages were demolished [15] and half a million people deported and scattered all over Iraq [12], even to desert part of the Arab south where they were forced to live in "Protected Camps", comparable to the Nazi concentration camps. Villagers, who were not even warned or made aware of the Government's plans for them, faced the same treatment as the Peshmargas.

MUSTARD GAS AND THE FIRST CLOUDS OF DEATH IN KURDISTAN

On April 15th, 1987, four planes flew very low over Helladen, Bergallu, Kanitu, Sirwan, Awazic, Noljika and Chinara, all in Sulaymania province [15], and dropped very unusual bombs in each of these small towns and villages. The people were unfamiliar with the strange sound of the bombs, the unusual colour of the smoke, the absence of the normal rocket attacks and the peculiar tin-like bomb shells that actually fell. It was long feared that the Iraqi Government might seek to use chemical weapons in battles with the Peshmarga. However, it did not occur to the villagers that these odd-looking shells were poison weapons, being dropped without any prior fighting or provocation in the area [20]. In Bargalu, five men went to the scene of the bombing after the planes had left and began close examination of the shells and craters. Puzzled by their findings, some (like Mr. Rawaz) went as far as touching the peculiar shells, carrying them to the town centre. It was past midnight before examiners of the bombs, one of whom (Hakem Omar Aziz) now lives in London, started developing puffy and watery eyes, dry throats and harsh coughs. They suffered skin bums and developed blistered armpits and groins during the following days. Describing his injuries, Hakem Omar said that it took two weeks before he could see again and at least a month before his skin lesions healed. In another village, a young shepherd had attempted to dismantle an unexploded bomb in order to use the contents for making fishing bombs, not knowing that this time it contained not TNT but a deadly poison.

As a result of this first attack there were tens of serious casualties. In Bargalu, almost all the inhabitants suffered from severe headaches, weakness and other mild symptoms which took several days to disappear. Those who were exposed to heavy doses of the gas, because they were close to the attack area or were downwind, suffered extensive eye, skin and lung injuries. Infection of the wounds often led to complications and many died as a result. Those who survived tended to be disfigured by scars, developed various eye problems or had chronic breathing disorders [17]. Doctors stressed that lack of proper advice on protective measures and ignorance played a significant role in worsening the effects of these bombs. There were no laboratory means of identifying the chemical used. However, from the symptoms and injuries the doctors concluded that a powerful vesicant poison, like Mustard gas, was the agent used in these raids.

On the very next day, April 16th, Arbil province was attacked by Iraqi planes and several villages were bombed with similar poisonous gases. These villages were Sheikh Wassanan, Totma, Zeni, Ballokawa, Alana, Darash and the whole of the valley of Balisan. In Sheilch Wassanan, a village in Rawanduz district - Arbil province consisting of 150 houses and a population of approximately 500 people, 12 aircraft attacked at 7.00 am for nearly 15 minutes using conventional and chemical weapons [18]. Everybody was poisoned to some extent in this village and 121 civilians were killed instantly, including 76 children aged between one day and eight years, with the rest injured [15]. 286 of the injured civilians hurried towards the city of Arbil to seek medical attention. The victims managed to enter the city's main hospital (Arbil Teaching Hospital) where they were initially admitted. The authorities soon approached them, demanding their signature on a declaration in which Iran was named as the "perpetrator" of the attack. The victims refused to sign the declaration and so the authorities rounded them up and took them prisoner. The fate of these victims was not known for a long time. Only late that year it became known that they were being kept in a military prison in Arbil (near the exit which leads to Mousil) for a few days where they were deprived of all kinds of facilities [19]. The authorities asked them again to sign the declaration and appear on Iraqi television to incriminate Iran for this chemical attack on their village but these victims refused to do so. In this prison, 202 of the victims died over a short period as a result of their untreated skin bums, lung damage, infections and other injuries caused by exposure to the mustard gas. The remaining 84 relatively healthy adults and children were taken to a secret spot near Rashkin village, not far from Arbil military base where they were killed and buried in mass graves [19]. A military medical doctor, who witnessed the tragic scene and later defected to Iran and then to the West, revealed that the bodies were burnt before they were buried. It became known that even the bodies of those who died in Arbil prison were taken away by the security forces (Istikhbarat) led by Mamand Qishqayee and destroyed [19]. The horror of this mass-murder shocked the people of Kurdistan. Relatives of the victims were prevented from speaking about or mourning their missing family in public.

From our contacts with doctors and paramedics in the Kurdish cities, we learnt that all the staff were ordered not to treat or in any way assist victims and were ordered to inform the authorities about the presence of any patient bearing wounds from chemical weapons. Failure to do so, or any moves to publicise the occurrence of such injuries, would be subjected to the severest punishment possible. My mother was severely injured in one of these attacks and was subsequently taken to Arbil for proper medical treatment. There she consulted one of my old medical colleagues in Arbil Teaching Hospital who was shocked and terrified by their meeting. He refused to examine my mother and his only advice to her was to go back to where she came from as soon as possible, or else she would be caught by the authorities like those in Sheikh Wassanan and would not be seen again.

The attacks of April 15th and 16th were followed by daily attacks on villages and Peshmarga strongholds in Arbil and Sulaymania provinces for at least six days (as shown in the table below), causing death and injury to hundreds of people. On May Day, 1987, the people in the liberated areas of Duhok, another province in Iraqi Kurdistan, witnessed their first raids by chemical weapons in which two people died and tens were injured. The major Kurdish province of Kirkuk, the richest oil province in Iraq, suffered poison attacks for the first time on May 23rd, 1987, when Tomar, Gargan and Qamargan villages were bombarded and tens of victims, including seven children died.

By mid 1987 chemical attacks on the Kurds had become a daily reality and it was clear that the Government would no longer hesitate to use these weapons in spite of the indiscriminate nature of poison gas attack. Unlike the war with Iran, where chemical weapon attacks were almost always preceded by fierce fighting and concern over military defeat, most attacks in Kurdistan were completely unprovoked and were not preceded by military activities by the Peshmarga in those areas. On the contrary, the government used chemical weapons as a preliminary step to terrify people and generate panic before waging organised military offensives. Furthemore, in many instances aircraft were witnessed dropping bombs on uninhabited land and farms far from villages for no apparent military reason other than the poisoning of the environment [20].

NERVE GAS AND THE ANFAL OPERATIONS

Mustard gas at first remained the predominant chemical weapon used and it was not until the Government launched the "Anfal Operations" that the more toxic nerve gases were used on a wide scale in Kurdistan. "Anfal" is an ancient Islamic term, which originally denoted the plunder and slaves seized in the cause of a Jihad or holy war. Termed Anfal by the Ba'thists, these operations in 1988 consisted of carefully-planned and highly-organised massive multi-stage offensives on Peshmarga strongholds directly supervised by Saddam Hussein who was based in Sulaymania [13,15]. The attacks started with Sulaymania's Jaffaty valley in early February, 1988 (Anfal-I). Anfal-I lasted till late March. Anfal-II focused on the Garmian area and was waged during April, 1988. Anfal-Ill concentrated on the liberated areas of Arbil province in May, and Anfal-IV on Duhok and Mousil provinces in late August and early September, 1988. All these Anfal operations were preceded and synchronised with systematic waves of poison gas attacks that killed people instantly without leaving any apparent injuries.

Escaping death became more difficult. The conventional methods of protection were no longer useful as the gases (odourless and lighter than mustard gas) seeped through the wet breathing-turbans, damaging the respiratory system of the victim. People were seen gasping and struggling for breath and helplessly lying on the ground jerking with convulsions. Mr. K. Bakhtiar, 27, a victim and eye witness recalled his experience when his village was attacked by the fast killing nerve gas. He said: "We all knew it was a gas attack and tried to follow the usual steps of protection. But this time it was different. First, I saw people behaving strangely and so were the animals, acting as if they were struggling. Some were lying on the ground. I saw birds falling off the trees. Every thing was mad. I knew that the situation was very dangerous and I was frightened and did not know what to do but to run away towards the hill. I felt like I was weak, unable to run or fully control my movements. My mouth was full, I could not see properly, but worst of all, I could not breath normally. I did not know what I was doing and realised that I must be dying. I can not remember any more and I must have lost concience. Doctors tell me that it is a true miracle that I am alive and I believe so too. This is my second life and I am trying to enjoy the most of it."

The numbers of deaths increased considerably. In Halabja, 5,000 died and over 9,000 were injured [15]. It is important to clarify events before the holocaust of Halabja and to stress a very important historical fact, as I have noticed that the world media, press and public have been mislead so far. Halabja was not occupied by Iranian troops before the Iraqi planes bombarded the town with chemical weapons. Halabja was liberated from government control by the Kurdish Peshmargas, mainly from the PUK who were partially assisted by the other Kurdish organisations [21]. Mr Shawkat Haji Mushir, a member of the leadership committee of the PUK, led 500 Peshmarga and fought his way towards Halabja while government forces were busy carrying out the Anfal-I operation in Jafaty valley. The people of Halabja, desperate for freedom, welcomed the native Peshmargas, including their leader who was himself from the town of Halabja. Except for a cameraman and two unarmed individuals, no Iranians participated in this operation. Saddam Hussein, astonished by the people's loyalty to the Peshmarga, tried publicly to link the battle for Halabja to the Iraq-Iran war, despite the fact that no battle front with Iran had been opened in that area and no Iranian official had entered the town. Iraqi planes then bombarded the town with poison gas. Only after that, the Iranians came to the rescue of the victims and entered Halabja. Their humanitarian efforts were much appreciated by all in the town, however, the authorities in Iran attempted to take advantage of the tragic scenes there for political propaganda. They obtained the film, which was taken earlier while the town being freed by the Peshmarga, and combined it with footage taken after the bombardment [21, 22]. The way events were presented in their film indicated that the whole operation was an Iranian victory over Iraqis and that the people of Halabja had welcomed the Iranian occupiers. The Kurds later paled a heavy price for this mispresentation of events - for which, the Iranians expressed their regrets.

In Dashti Koya, and the Valley of Smaguli and Balisan over 200 died and over 1,200 were injured in one day on March 27th, 1988. On the same day, Qaradagh district, including the heavily inhabited town and the near-by villages, were heavily bombarded. In this attack, of the hundreds of casualties, 412 injured civilians headed towards Sulaymania seeking medical treatment, but failed in the attempt. The same story of Sheikhwassanan was repeated the military forces in Tanjaro rounded up the victims and stopped them from reaching Sulaymannia. They were never seen again.

THE CASUALTIES AND DAMAGES

Chemical attacks became increasingly intense and widespread all over Kurdistan. However, during the first year, before February 1988, the effects of the attacks grew relatively less and less disastrous. People were building up experience and gathering information on how to protect themselves from the poisons so as to avoid unnecessarily extensive injuries. Some obtained old gas masks and others learned how to breath through wet cloths containing charcoal. People were told that mustard gas is heavier than air and during attacks they learnt to rush to the top of the mountains and to sit around a big fire and not to scurry to the traditional refuge in the caves as they have done through out history unless they built a fire at the cave mouth, drank plenty of water and took thorough showers as soon as possible [20]. The efficacy of these measures became evident in the following months when recorded casualties decreased relatively in terms of numbers and severity despite the greater intensity and widening scale of the attacks.

The available data, see the table below, consists of reported victims with chemical injuries only [15, 17, 20, 21, 23, 28]. It was not easy to maintain a proper record of the casualties in these areas due to the far from ideal circumstances of collecting information. Not registered were those who suffered mild injuries, those who did not come forward for treatment and those who were outside the attack areas and received injuries as a result of breathing-in poison blown by the wind. The latter casualties were much higher than all initial estimates, due to the massive scale of the attacks. An eye witness, Mrs N. Khidir, 49, spoke about her experience in Bargalu when she, and many others, woke up in the morning with headaches, tight chests and a general feeling of weakness. At first she thought her symptoms were due to a bout of flu, but it soon became known that they had been breathing in poison gas which had traveled on the wind from Sargalu, a village few miles away, which was bombarded late the previous night with artillery shells loaded with chemical weapons.

Panic would fill the minds of the people in risk areas with each air raid or artillery bombardment. The whole population would run in panic, screaming "Kimiawy, Kimiawy". Children ran in fear looking for parents, parents wandered in panic trying to account for members of their family. Some would rush to their homes to grab breathing cloths (or old gas masks for the few lucky ones) and then dash to higher altitudes. Mr. F. Karim, 29, an eye witness, said that on one occasion "as soon as the cloud from smoke of the bombs started to spread we went climbing the mountain. Only after reaching the top I realised that I was running with one bare foot and had dropped a fruit sack which I was carrying at the time. I was shaking and we were all looking down at the village in the valley watching the other villagers, including women, children and even animals, running in all directions and we could hear them crying. I suddenly realised that my handicapped cousin was left behind. I wanted to go back and rescue him, but friends stopped me and said 'if you go down you will never come back and we will lose you both. The only thing you could do is to sit down and pray for him'. Mr Karim added "He is martyred, and I still feel guilty because I forgot him at the time of panic, I should have behaved like a brave man and should have saved him despite the risks".

Soon after the planes had gone, people would head towards the areas attacked to assist the injured and bury the dead. The injured were usually taken to local health centres, where young Peshmarga doctors or paramedics were based. For the doctors, the difficulties were endless. In most areas they could not offer any treatment. In most centres, no oxygen or life-support machines were at their disposal to support victims with severe lung or bone marrow damages. They were only able to offer first aid, advice and some symptom- relieving agents like pain killers or eye drops. They used to clean the wounds with antiseptics and protect them from infection. "The severely affected either died before us or were sent across the border to Iran" said one doctor [17]. Doctors and paramedics and their health centres were also occasionally victims of the bombardments. Mr Abdul Aziz, 59, told me about an attack on Bargalu on September 3rd, 1987, when he and his wife were severely injured along with several others. The whole area was covered in clouds smelling of rotten onions and people were hurrying to climb the nearby Sekanian hill, seeking a higher altitude. Some people with physical injuries rushed to the local health centre, but the centre itself was cloaked in smoke from the chemical bombs and could offer no help not only during the attack, but for some time after.

THE ENVIRONMENT

Also not included in the available data is the amount of damage inflicted by the chemical weapons on the environment and wild life. Mr Omer, 28, injured in March, 1988, and currently being treated in Germany for disfiguring scars and other long-term effects of mustard gas, told us that he and 200 others were in Shanakhsy when Iraqi planes dropped their bombs one afternoon. People evacuated the village in panic, but by late that night the majority of the people had returned to their homes. They re- inhabited the poisoned environment and started drinking water, eating food (particularly fruit) and used contaminated furniture and beds only to wake up after midnight suffering from symptoms identical to those suffered by the people they had assisted earlier in the day. Furthermore, after the attack many people from neighbouring villages came to the assistance of the victims without taking protective measures, handling the victims and contaminated materials. They too subsequently became victims of mustard poisoning.

Kurdistan is the most fertile part of Iraq, which is normally self-sufficient in wheat, barley, oats, vegetables, timber, dairy products, meat and poultry [6]. The inhabitants of the attacked areas are mainly peasants who rely on agriculture and domestic animals for their living. The environment was rendered completely uninhabitable for long periods after each attack. Depending on the distance from the bombarded spots, plants and trees suffered varying degrees of damage [20]. In general, the whole area, including the land and green plants turned yellow. Nothing new grew in the heavily contaminated areas near the attack spots for more than one or two years despite heavy rains during winter. The grass and low-growing plants died within a short time with no hope of recovery. Higher growing plants and trees turned yellow and lost leaves but recovered later. The damage was progressively milder further from the centre of the attack. Water sources were contaminated and rendered undrinkable.

Animals like birds, chickens, sheep, goats, cows, donkeys, cats, guard dogs and even insects like bees were not spared [20]. Animals suffered in various ways. Some were directly affected just like the humans and killed instantly or suffered from watery eyes, burnt skin, damaged lungs and ill health. Others were indirectly affected either through eating contaminated grass and wild plants or drinking contaminated water. Many starved due to lack of healthy pet food and were therefore put down by their owners. Some of the sick animals and even the more healthy ones were sold at very cheap prices (one tenth or even one twentieth of normal). Owners of these animals had tremendous problems in selling diary products like milk, yoghurt and cheese and even meat because people in the cities refused to buy potentially contaminated animal products. This also forced owners to destroy their animals. It goes without saying that the local wild life all suffered a great deal. There were scenes of snakes lying dead on the ground; falcons lying dead as a result of feeding on the carcasses of poisoned animals; frogs and tortoises lying dead at the lakesides and fish floating dead in the water, dead flies, cockroaches and earthworms were everywhere.

SADDAM'S AGGRESSION REWARDED

By the end of May, 1988 the area looked like a different planet. The land had become uninhabitable and the people, including the Peshmargas, had to retreat from the Sulaymania area and parts of Arbil province in the face of massive poison attacks. Elsewhere, the Kurds were still able to maintain liberated areas and Peshmargas were able to repulse Government forces in fierce battles, inflicting heavy losses on the government. The situation remained unstable throughout this period until Iraq signed the truce with Iran and the subsequent arrival of United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observatory Groups (UNIIMOG) at the border between the two countries. The UNIIMOG troops were refused access to the Kurdish areas by Iraq despite requests. The Government transferred more troops from the south to Kurdistan and built up a large army ready for offensives. Towards the middle of August, a few days after the truce with Iran became effective, the count down started for Saddam to make good his promise made to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia when the latter suggested an achievable solution for the Kurdish problem in Iraq [24]. Saddam's reply to the King was that he would deal with the Kurds "once and for all". Thus, the period from August 25th to September 1st (the Bahdinan holocaust) became another tragic watershed in the Kurdish struggle for human rights and self-determination and in Kurdish relations with the central government and the Arab people of Iraq. Within a few days, thousands were gassed to death; tens of thousands were made refugees and thousands more were captured to face life in a heavily guarded camp as prisoners of war. The captives were dumped in a camp on open land to suffer the most appalling conditions and the harsh winter of Hoshtirmil near the city of Arbil. They were deprived of food and shelter. Over 70 children died within the first few weeks as did several elderly and pregnant women.

The lucky ones who managed to cross the border into Turkey were accepted as "guests" and kept in three camps, Diyarbakir, Mardin and Mus. There, in exile, the Iraqi Kurds suffered fear, abuse and neglect [25]. One year after their arrival in Mardin, 2070 of the refugees were poisoned [26]. The symptoms suggested use of some form of neuro toxic agent. Blood samples from victims were tested in United Kingdom laboratories, including the National Poison Unit of Guy's Hospital [27]. The toxicologists concluded that an unusually potent organophosphorus nerve poison must have been the cause. They also suggested that the poison was most probably of the kind used by the Iraqi Government as a chemical weapon. All the circumstantial and scientific evidence pointed to deliberate poisoning.

The Bahdinan tragedy gained international publicity and aroused public concern world wide. But the governments of the major world powers and of the Middle Eastern countries failed to condemn Saddam for this inhuman attack on his own citizens. The Soviet Union failed to comment on the tragedy in its own internal media and went as far as condemning the Western media for publicising the gas attacks calling it "American propaganda" against sovereign Iraq based on "no evidence" [29]. Some Western countries even rewarded Saddam by increasing his credit for buying military hardware [30]. Most of the Arab states failed to express any humanitarian concern and some of them, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt went as far as strongly defending Saddam before the United Nation's Security Council members. Mr Ghazy Al-Rayes, Sheikh Nasser Almanquor respectively the ambassadors for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia joined with Sadiq Al-Mashat, the Iraqi ambassador to the United Kingdom (now to the United States) on a visit to Mr. William Waldegrave, then United Kingdom Foreign Minister, in condemning the British media coverage and "Britain's campaign against Iraq", encouraging the British Government to disbelieve Kurdish claims about the use of chemical weapons [31].

The impotence of the international community and the lack of condemnation from individual governments in the face of Saddam's clear violation of human rights allowed this regime to continue with its genocidal war. Indeed, some expert media commentators suggested that western impotence acted as an incentive to Saddam to continue these monstrous attacks [32]. Chemical bombardment of Sheikh Bizeni and Hamea in Kirkuk province and Chami Razan in Sulaymania province in mid October, 1988, only a few weeks after the Bahdinan holocaust, showed that Saddam was swift to realise the opportunity that this lack of opposition offered him.

REFERENCES

  1. Saddam's Iraq, Revolution or Reaction. CARDRI. 1989. Zed Books. London. UK.
  2. Amnesty International "A l-Nashra Al-I khbaria". (Arabic). March, 1988.
  3. Amnesty International news release. Al Index: MDE 14.1 .1988. Distr. SCIPO. International Embargo. 13.1 .1 988.
  4. Hazhir Teimourian. The Times. 13. 1. 1988.
  5. Index on Censorship. March 1988. Vol. 17. P39.
  6. Anthony McDermott. In: The Kurds. The Minority Rights Group. Report No. 23. May 1981.
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  14. Iraqi Kurdistan Front declaration. July, 1987. Published in: Al-Sharara No. 7. (Arabic) July, 1987 and Gal No. 26. (Arabic) August, 1987.
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  22. The Catastrophe of the Century. Halabja, another Nightmare. Film (on video) produced and distributed by Iran.
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